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Chapter 1
General Introduction
There have been lots of discussions and debates on the usefulness of regulations.
And these discussions either focus on the concept of regulation as a whole or some
particular regulations (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). It is always challenging to evalu-
ate the effects of certain regulation. And it often depends on the scope and focus of
such investigations. If we refer regulation as a general set of rules or standards, then
its usefulness is a rather fundamental issue. Or if we focus on one particular set of
regulation, its impacts often depend on what setting or what market participants
we intend to address. For instance, accounting regulations usually affect account-
ing professionals who practice these regulation and companies which adopt these
regulations.
There are different views for how to define what is regulation. According to
the definition summarized by the famous sociologist Philip Selznick, regulation is
sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities valued by
a community (Selznick, 1948). So following the definition, we could consider market
participants or relevant parties related to some markets as a community. When
1
2a public agency for instance government impose regulations on certain market, it
is obvious that market participants in such market are the ones suffer the effects
and consequences of the regulations. Then it is quite important to consider the
scope of market participants or interest parties while investigating the effect of
regulations. So if we consider a particular set of financial or accounting regulations,
it is reasonable to evaluate market participants in a capital market.
In order to better understand the effect of regulations, it is helpful to under-
stand the common reasons to have regulation in the first place. There are views
that believe the power of free market and market forces will operate to best serve
the goal of society. So regulation is not really necessary. However, the development
of economics regulations is actually a result of market inefficacy (Laffont and Tirole,
1993). We can see that economic regulations are often proposed after some signif-
icant market crisis or designed to prevent further crisis (Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a
good example). Stiglitz (1998) suggests that market failures in developing countries
may be more pronounced, and therefore the case for public regulation is stronger. In
addition, information imperfections in market transactions also provide incentives
for regulations (Laffont and Tirole, 2000). Accounting regulation, to some extent,
can be argued to fulfill such incentives since required accounting disclosure can pro-
vide information to mitigate information asymmetry. So regulation should not be
considered only in negative terms. It is our goal as researchers to provide more
thorough picture of economic reasoning on the effect of regulations.
Regulation and competition
Besides the above mentioned market efficiency-related reason of regulation, preserv-
ing competition is considered another important reason. Baldwin and Cave (1999)
3point out that the anti-trust regulation exercised by the US at the beginning of
twentieth century is a perfect example for regulator’s intention to restrain potential
or existing monopolies. Monopolies sometime may be associated with price discrim-
ination which could jeopardize the welfare of consumers. When monopolies are in
control of a market, regulators often concern the price or quality of products in such
market. For instance, the recent developments in audit market reflect that regu-
lations may change when the concerns over lack of competition get serious. One
important feature of audit market is that the Big 4 auditors provide services to the
bulk of public listed firms in most major economies (Francis et al., 2012). Regulators
within EU and the US have discussed various policies that would effectively enhance
competition and reduce the high market concentration. So in the eyes of regulators
it is necessary to maintain an environment conducive to competition. European
commission believes that having a fair competition creates benefits for consumers
and enterprises themselves in the form of lower prices and better products. Hence
the view of regulators often translates directly into how they would react to certain
crisis or change regulations to address certain issues.
Competition in general is an important part of governments’ industrial policy.
Besides the existing competition I refer in the earlier discussion, entry or foreign
competition is another important incentive for regulations. As a part of their indus-
try or competition policies states often evaluate whether to allow for foreign firms to
enter certain markets and we can often see examples of regulated market access or
forbidden access for foreign firms. For instance, governments are often careful about
allowing market access of foreign firms to national security or technology sensitive
industry. There are two interesting cases which would well represent how regulators
regulate market access in these industries. First, the largest Chinese oil company
4attended to acquire Unocal, an American oil and gas operator. But the US congress
believed that such transaction would danger the national interest and the potential
acquisition was declined (Steger, 2012). Another example is Huawei, the Chinese
telecom giant, tried to purchase 3LEAF, an American server technology firm. Be-
cause of the concern over national security issues, the US House of Representatives
call for a complete ban on acquisitions of American assets by the Chinese telecom
companies (Namaki, 2014). These cases show that regulators or governments may
act accordingly if there are concerns on entry competition or foreign firms exercis-
ing influence in certain industries. And comparing to regulate existing competition,
entry competition might create different incentives.
Regulation in different regime
So far the discussion on development of regulations is not restricted to particular
countries or particular law origins. I understand the differences embedded in legal
systems can significantly affect how regulations develop in different countries. In
fact, some research already show that regulations in different countries can take
many different forms and the form of regulations can also change over time (Minogue,
2005). In my papers, the research intend to focus on the settings which are less
affected by such differences, for instance audit market reform for the EU, or decision
process which are common for all firms, for instance product quantity decision in a
product market competition setting.
Nevertheless, here I briefly discuss how country difference might be reflected in
the development of regulations. According to Majone (1996), historically there have
been two main approaches to regulation, the European approach and the American
approach. In general, the differences of these two approaches are related to the
5earlier mentioned concept “market efficacy”. In Europe public ownership was the
main platform of economic regulation. The idea is to let the government to impose
regulations on the economy and protect the public interest. And it is also related
to the notion that market itself is not able to solve all the problems. However, in
the US, independent boards or agencies are responsible for monitoring and enforcing
regulations. The idea is that market itself should function well on its own, unless
there was a major crisis that government has to step in. This is not to say that
government is not playing a role in the process and in many cases government or
legislative branch has power over the regulatory agencies, for instance the SEC
needs to answer to the US congress. These two approaches are based on different
ideologies and different belief on how market works. In Majone’s opinion, for the last
five decades, the European have shifted more towards the US approach. Of course,
these two approaches cannot include all the differences for all the states. But these
two approaches can be somewhat related to the development of regulations, even
for developing countries. For instance, China as a developing country with different
political regime is more or less using the European approach. In China, the state
ownership in all kinds of industries intends or claims to represent the public interests.
The development of regulations is often strongly directed by the government and
the interest represented by the state ownership. Of course, it is very much debatable
whether such practice in China is efficient or not. At least, we can say that these
two approaches have their own fair share of failures over the years.
Quality of regulation
It is a complicated issue to evaluate the quality of regulation. As mentioned earlier
the effect of regulation can be identified by how market participants are affected.
6The quality of regulation in general can be assessed by the effectiveness and efficiency
of its outcome (Jillian et al., 2007). Effective regulation should achieve the goals
set out by the state or regulatory body. For instance, in the discussion of audit
market reform, regulators want to use mandatory rotation or joint audit policy to
reduce high concentration. In Chapter 3, we investigate the effect of possible joint
audit policy and focus on its counterfactual effects on market structure. Efficient
regulation means that the goal should be achieved at minimum costs. The costs
can be the cost of administering the regulatory system or the compliance costs of
regulation (Guasch and Hahn, 1999). Of course, a full benefit vs. cost analysis is
more appropriate to evaluate efficiency. In Chapter 3, change of consumer surplus
is considered as a reasonable benchmark for evaluating a particular policy.
Accounting and regulation
The above discussions refer regulation in a more general term. Accounting regu-
lations as main interests of accounting researchers are sharing the similar issues I
mentioned before. Accounting practice and accountants (auditors or corporate ac-
countants) as a community are subject to a great deal of regulation. The scope
and effects of accounting regulations are of course not limited to the ones practicing
accounting. A major objective of accounting is to provide information to interested
parties. And accounting data can be viewed as carriers of information, which should
affect firms’ strategic decision making (Christensen and Demski, 2003). Hence ac-
counting regulations affect a wide range of market participants and firms may report
accounting information differently based on certain incentives. The ideal scenario
for accounting or accounting regulation is to ensure reliable and relevant reporting
and only concern with reporting economics facts (Solomons, 1978). But we all know
7that political considerations often affect the process of developing accounting reg-
ulations. As Watts and Zimmerman (1978) state that accounting regulation is the
result of the interplay of political forces. Accounting professionals have been devel-
oping accounting regulation in the spirit of self-regulation since the major regulatory
bodies are independent professional bodies. However, governments and firms often
use political means to influence the standard setter and the process of developing
standard (Dewing and Russell, 2008; Ramanna, 2008; Zeff, 2010). For instance,
it is evident that during the financial crisis politicians and financial firms played a
role in changing the fair value accounting. The IASB also claim that the change
was intended to create level playing field for the European financial institutions to
compete with their international competitors.
Accounting regulation and competition
Concerning consequences of accounting regulation, capital market outcomes such as
cost of capital or liquidity have been very popular (Daske et al., 2008). With respect
to the reporting incentives, capital market also has been the setting that researcher
address extensively. However there are certain settings which might be equally
important but not studied as extensive as capital market, for instance, competition
setting. Competition as an important reason for regulation, and its role in the
disclosure literature has been very prominent.1 In general, competition shapes the
information environment and provides important incentives. For instance, firms
might have incentives to show worse financial positions with respect to competition
policy. In the case of government protecting them from foreign competition, it
could be better off for firms to appear as vulnerable. There are empirical evidences
1 Vivies (2006) provides a summary.
8that firms manage earning down in order to seek protection from the state (Jones,
1991). In addition, since accounting numbers are used for anti-trust purpose, firms
also have incentive to appear less profitable and avoid receiving further scrutiny
(Cahan, 1992; Armentano, 2007). This also is related to the issue that Chapter 2
addresses. In the previous competition-disclosure literature, accounting properties of
the disclosure are less reflected, for instance, conservative reporting. And accounting
regulators pay more attention to the contracting aspects of disclosure in determining
the basic attributes like accounting conservatism, but the effects of information
sharing scenario among competitors are less considered (Sadka, 2004). In Chapter
2, I try to address the effect of conservative reporting bias in an oligopoly setting and
extend our understanding on the interplay of competition and accounting reporting.
Overview of the chapters
The chapters in this dissertation are more or less related to the issues that either
address the impact of regulation or reflect how market participants behave in a
regulated market. The scope of these papers is not restricted to accounting regula-
tions but accounting regulations or markets for accounting professionals are mainly
embedded in the settings which my dissertation investigate.
In general, this dissertation extends the understanding on the impact of regula-
tion or accounting related regulation on market participants and market as a whole,
for instance their market output, competitive strategic disclosure and market struc-
ture changes. It consists of four chapters that address diverse research questions but
centering on the impact of certain regulation and how would market competition
play a role in such dynamic.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the effect of conservative reporting on the output and
9profits of competing firms in a product market. Dye (2001) raised the question “are
there real effects due to conservative accounting reporting bias, and if so, what are
they?” To answer these questions, extensive studies have been done on the role of
accounting bias in different economic scenarios such as investment decision and debt
contracting. However, little research has been done on its role in a product market
setting when facing competing firms. Therefore, I investigate how such accounting
bias affects the market output and market structure in an oligopoly setting. The set
up allows the research to capture the two different types of competition as mentioned
earlier, and they create interesting trade-off for competing firms. Competing firms
may want to show their good position in order to make incumbent firms produce
less. But they might concern about a possible entrant when entry competition is
presence. They may use conservative reporting to deter the possible entrant. Based
on prior literature studying the disclosure strategies under imperfect competition,
I model a setting which includes both rivalry competition between existing firms
and threat of a competitive entrant into the market. The results show that if only
existing competition is considered, incumbent firms would prefer more conservative
bias in order to obtain higher output. If conditioning on information quality, the
optimal level of conservative bias to maximize profits lies in the middle of the defined
bias range. So such optimal level of conservatism could be seen as what the existing
firms would lobby for. And regulators would also consider conservative accounting
for anti-trust purpose. In addition, the results also show that if potential entry is
included, the potential entrant prefers less conservative reporting, but the incumbent
firms are not necessarily increasing their profits by being more conservative. In sum,
these findings suggest a non-monotonic relationship between the conservative bias
and competition, and accounting conservatism can be a credible commitment device
10
in product market competition.
Chapter 3 empirically investigates how a proposed joint audit policy would affect
market structure in the UK audit market.2 With respect to the current discussion
for audit market reform, our study provides policy implications for market evolution
and social warfare. Bases on the demand estimation approach, we propose a new
framework to model the relationship between auditors and client firms in both single
auditor regime and joint auditor regime. And we also extend the application of
demand estimation model in a unconventional market such as audit service market.
In general, we first estimate the demand for single auditors and pairs of auditors
using a joint audit market. Then we validate demand estimations for single auditors
using a single audit market. Last we use demand estimations for simulating the
effects of introducing joint audits in a single audit market. Besides the main three
steps, we also have deal with several distinct issues with respect to audit market.
In contrast to the standard demand estimation, there are some special features
about the product characteristics of audit service that would affect modelling the
audit firm choices, for instance, audit fees charged by the same audit firm vary
across clients, public listed companies are mandated to hire auditors. Moreover, we
only observe audit fees for actual matches between audit firm and clients. Hence
we need to predict what audit fees a client would have expected to pay, if it had
chosen another audit firm than the one we observed in the data. When predicting
audit fees, we also try to deal with the typical endogenous price problem in demand
estimation.3 As suggested by Gerakos and Syverson (2013), the exogenous supply
shock from merger and acquisitions between clients are used as an instrument for
2 The chapter is based on a coauthored paper with Aiyong Zhu and Christopher Koch.
3 In this case, the audit fees are usually correlated with audit quality or other unmeasured
characteristics of audit firms left in the error term.
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predicting audit fees. We first test the validity of this instrument in our model and
then apply the control function approach to address endogenous predicted audit
fees for the nonlinear discrete choice model. In the second stage, we conduct the
standard demand estimation by using the predicted audit fees and conditioning on
the control function. After identifying clients’ preference towards audit firms, we
are able to study how the proposed joint audit policy4 would affect the audit market
structure in the UK.
Audit market in the UK is the largest and most concentrated in Europe; whereas
French audit market has the lowest concentration ratio and France is the only coun-
try that implements joint audit policy in Europe (Ballas and Fafaliou 2008). We are
particularly interested in whether the joint audit policy would affect market con-
centration in the UK. Intuitively, since the high dominance of big four audit firms5
in the UK it reveals that listed companies prefer the Big 4 auditors because of their
high reputation or outstanding service, we should not expect that these companies
would choose another small audit firms if they were obligated to hire two audit
firms. Then how do we explain the lowest market share of big four audit firms in
France? With a deeper dig into the French data, we find that the most prevalent
combinations of the two audit firms consists of one from big four audit firm and the
other one from a small audit firm. Accordingly, we propose there may exist different
synergy (pair effect) in different combinations of audit firms and clients also have
heterogeneous preference towards these combinations. Thus, we first use French au-
dit market to identify the synergy (pair) effect between different pair types in joint
4 Detailed definitions are present in Chapter 3. In brief, joint audit requires that the client has
to hire two audit firm issuing one independent audit report annually.
5 The big four audit firms are referring to PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG and Ernst
& Young.
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audit and in the meantime estimate clients’ preference for the individual audit firms.
Then we conduct the counterfactual analysis of implementing joint audit policy in
the UK. The validation results show that preferences for auditors vary largely by
client size, but less so across countries. In another words, the client attributes are
mainly driving the choice of auditors, not so much from the institutional differences
across countries. The simulation results show that joint audit policy would reshape
the market structure substantially and the effects of introducing joint audits are het-
erogeneous across audit firms. Most importantly, we find that the largest audit firm
would even gain additional market share. There would not be so much increase for
both medium and small auditors. The counterfactuals also indicate that joint audit
would have limited welfare effects. While there are negative effects of forcing clients
to partly replace the current auditor with another auditor, the positive pair effect
basically reverses this negative effect. As a consequence, the net welfare change for
clients in UK would be negative and decrease by 7.2 million GBP for all the clients
together on average over the sample period.
Given some of the findings in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I seek to extend the under-
standing on how the merger and acquisitions among client firms affect the dynamic
of the relationship between auditors and their clients. Merger and acquisitions be-
tween client firms present an interesting scenario for the audit firms. In general, after
the merger and acquisition transaction finish, one of the two firms has to drop his
auditor. And typically the auditors of target firms are the ones losing their business
(Anderson et al., 1993 and Firth, 1999). In this paper, I empirically investigate how
client mergers and acquisitions affect the audit fee pricing and the auditors’ behav-
ior to issue audit opinion in the UK market. From a price competition perspective,
the paper also shows how the other audit firms which are not involved in any M&A
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transactions respond to client mergers. In general, audit firms charge less audit
fees after more clients merge and acquisition transactions happened. And such fee
reducing effect would appear even before the actual merger transaction took place.
Given the fact that some of these transactions were rumored or announced relatively
long time before the transaction date, it is possible that the auditors anticipate and
react to such competition pressure. After experiencing more M&A activities in cer-
tain industry, auditors are more likely to issue qualified opinion for the clients in the
same industry. Such effects are more pronounced in the post 2008 period, possibly
because the introduction of the Eighth Company Law Directive.
In Chapter 5, I look into how particular accounting regulation change affected
the practice of bank entities in the time of financial crisis. During that time, the
amendments to IAS 39 & IFRS 7 were introduced by IASB as a direct reaction to
the financial crisis. Since IFRS followers was given the option to reclassify certain
financial assets, it partially changes the mark-to-market requirements, and leads to
the fair accounting regime being less tied up with relevant accounting treatments.
Using a sample set of manually-collected data, this paper empirically examines how
the sampled European banks from different regions use this reclassification to strate-
gically deal with problematic financial assets and how these reclassification activities
are associated with different bank characteristics.
The findings show that the new amendment helps the banks in less profitable
condition and avoid further impairment losses. In the study, the banks that adopted
the reclassification option took advantage of the positive effects on profits. The
positive effects on shareholder equity were not as significant. The banks that did
not apply the option were characterized by a higher ROE compared to the banks
that had applied the reclassification. Among the other financial ratios, leverage
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ratio is relevant but not significantly related. Banks from more developed regions
were more inclined to apply such change whereas the banks with more investment
banking business were not more likely to apply the reclassification option. Lastly, we
find that sampled banks from different regions practiced the disclosure requirement
differently.
Chapter 2
Conservative Reporting and
Product Market Competition
2.1 Introduction
The economic determinants and consequences of accounting conservatism have been
studied extensively in a range of different economic scenarios such as investment de-
cision, debt contracting etc. However, its role in a product market setting when
facing competing firms is less explored. As suggested by some voluntary disclo-
sure literature with respect to competition (Darrough, 1993; Harris, 1998 etc.), a
competing firm may disclose certain information in order to gain competitive advan-
tage. But if the required disclosure is somehow biased by the conservative nature
of imposed accounting rules, then it comes into question how the competing firms
perceive the accounting bias in the disclosed information. Is the conservative re-
porting only perceived to be merely a distortion of information in the competition
case or does it has real impact on economic agents? With regards to the investment
15
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scenario, Feltham and Ohlson (1996) and Zhang (2002) state that conservative bias
has no effect on the inference investors make about the firm’s value. It is not trivial
that the same claim holds for the competition scenario. So this paper investigates
how imposed conservative reporting could influence the structure and outcome of
an oligopolistic market and whether the effects remain the same when different type
of competition is considered, for instance, competition with potential entrant.
There are some evidences showing that in a competitive market environment,
certain required conservative approaches may provide companies with some advan-
tage or at least companies do not raise different opinion about this policy. For
instance, in highly competitive industries such as high-tech industry, competition
among firms for market share and creation of entry barriers creates large portion of
R&D expenditures (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996), however, when the standard was set
for more conservative practice i.e., forbidding the capitalization of R&D expenses,
firms posed little opposition to such regulation, especially the case of SFAS2 for
American firms. So it is interesting to see whether the regulated accounting bias
has real effects on firms’ output decisions and profits in a product market setting.
With respect to the inclusion of potential entry in the setting, Zimmerman (2011)1
pointed out that financial reporting system characteristics such as transparency or
conservatism likely affect entry by potential competitors. Then it is possible that
the conservative bias introduced by the reporting system could affect the potential
entrant’s entry decision and consequently affect the market structure.
In several empirical studies such as Dhaliwal et al. (2008) and Folsom (2010),
product market competition is suspected as a possible cause of accounting con-
servatism. Dhaliwal et al. (2008) document a positive association of this relation.
1 Lecture slide at 2011 JCAE PhD Consortium
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However, Folsom (2010) suggests that this relation might not be monotonous. Hence
this paper investigates this relationship further through a competition-disclosure set-
ting. The study contributes to the discussion with some direct theoretical evidences
with a model where firms might report conservatively and compete in an product
market setting. And the empirical studies for instance Qiang (2003) suggest that the
firms with larger market shares might prefer conservative accounting policy because
the potential unfavorable regulations such as antitrust actions. As the setting here
is the oligopoly model which can be seen as an example of a market with few partici-
pants, some implications about how the conservative accounting policy would affect
product market structure are derived with respect to the antitrust consideration.
The study is mainly twofold. First the case where only two firms are competing
in a duopoly situation is analyzed for the effect of accounting bias on production
output and profit. Then the entry decision and triopoly game are considered. The
main objective is to observe how the conservatism characteristic affects the disclosed
information and the output choice decisions. Since the conservatism feature is im-
posed by regulation bodies, it is also possible to investigate what the optimal level
of conservative bias maximizes the firms’ expected profit in this type of situation.2
In the existing competition setting the firms prefer itself to report more con-
servatively and its competitor less conservative in order to obtain higher output
outcomes. And when such an accounting system is imposed, they would be bene-
fited by disclosing lower cost signal regardless what true cost realization is, since this
can yield higher production output. With regards to the maximization of expected
profit under the existing competition, there exists an optimal level of conservative
2 Although conservatism characteristic is abandoned by IASB, this decision is certainly debat-
able because the conservative policies are still embedded in the regulations.
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bias, however it depends on the informativeness of the accounting report. And the
accounting bias introduced by the accounting system in fact lowers the incumbent
firms’ expected profit compared to the benchmark case where an unbiased system
is in place. With the presence of potential entry, a less conservative accounting sys-
tem is preferred by the potential entrant because it increases the entrant’s expected
profit, however, no optimal level of conservative bias can be derived. The results
in general show that the regulated accounting bias has real impact on the product
market structure and such impact at a macro level is more notable in a concentrated
market.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews
the relevant literature. Section 2.3 provides the set ups of the model. Section 2.4
presents the results and analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
As mentioned before, the revealed information that affects competing firms is char-
acterized with the feature of conservative reporting. So this paper is related to prior
literature that studies the disclosure strategies under imperfect product market com-
petition. These studies either focus on rivalry competition between existing firms or
the threat of a competitive entrant into the market. For instance, Darrough (1993)
concludes that in a duopoly setting the incentives to voluntary disclosure is related
with the type of private information and firms can communicate relevant “bad news”
information to rivals to improve coordination. With respect to entry competition,
Gal-Or (1986) states that incumbent firms with unfavorable information tend to dis-
close such information by considering the incentives from the product market alone.
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Darrough and Stoughton (1990) show that the single incumbent firm voluntarily
discloses bad news to discourage potential entry. Under a conservative reporting
system, it might be more likely for firms to put more weight on unfavorable signals
when disclosing information. And under such a reporting system, favorable signals
are more reliable as they are produced under stricter scrutiny. When a setting with
both rivalry firms and potential entry considered, the accounting bias caused by
the conservative reporting might benefit the existing competitor and also may act
as deterrence mechanism for the incumbent firms. So this study contributes to the
literature on the interaction between disclosures and competition by specifying the
shared information with mandated accounting bias while considering both existing
competition and potential entry threat.
There have been some studies intended to differentiate the disclosed information
through financial reporting manipulation in an imperfect competition setting, for ex-
ample, accounting fraud (Sadka, 2006) or biased reports (Bagnoli and Watts, 2010).
Bagnoli and Watts (2010) demonstrate that firms can influence their competitive
position in the product market by introducing bias into the cost disclosure. What
differentiates this study is that the shared information is assumed to be subjective
to a precommitted accounting system where the aggressive or conservative account-
ing is characterized. So the reporting bias in this study is set out by the regulation
instead of management. And such manipulation could also have effects on the firms’
competitive position since conservative reporting policies are commonly embedded
with accounting regulations.
In addition, Sadka (2004) points out that from regulator’s perspective more
considerations were applied to the contracting aspects of disclosure in determining
the attributes like the conservatism properties, but the effects of information sharing
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among competitors are less considered. This paper sheds some lights on this issue
whether the information sharing situation matters in such scenario. The analytical
studies of Gigler et al. (2009) and Li (2009) characterize the statistical nature of
conservatism in the setting with the debt contracting and conservatism. And this
study also extends the conservatism representation used by these studies to a setting
where firm competing in product market. And with possible extensions of current
model, it is also possible to investigate the effect of accounting bias on production
outcomes when the debt contract are involved.
2.3 The set up of the model
2.3.1 Market structure
The setup of the model is rather standard.3 First it is assumed that the nature of
product market competition is Cournot with perfectly substitutable products. First
I examine the interaction between two existing firms and also the effect if a potential
entrant is considered. When firms competing with an existing competitor, reporting
signals showing better prospect might contribute to larger market share, however
when facing potential entrant, showing worse signal could have deterrence effects.
Especially when an accounting system could bias such signals, this scenario presents
an interesting dynamic interaction.
The market demand function for the homogeneous product sold by the firms is
3 The Cournot set up follows the general setting established in the previous literature like
Shapiro (1986), Gal-Or (1986) and Vives (2002). Vives (2006) indicates that the disclosure results
might be sensitive to the competition type. However Brander and Lewis (1986) suggests that firms
are supposed to compete in quantities. And some comparison studies (Kreps and Scheinkman,
1983) show that after precommit to quantity, firms under Bertrand game yield the same results as
Cournot outcomes at least when full information disclosure. So the Cournot competition is used
in the current setting.
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P = a−∑i qi,where i = 1, 2 or e (the entrant), P is the unit price for the product,
a is the intercept of market demand (a > 0) , q1, q2 and qe represent the quantities
produced and sold by each firm 1, 2 or e. Units of output are normalized so that unit
of each product generates the same utility for the consumer. And market demand is
common knowledge. It is assumed that marginal costs ci of the incumbent firms are
either low or high. The probability of firm 1 or 2 having low cost or high cost is 12 ,
then the nature decides whether the incumbent firm has low cost or high cost. As
here the management’s effort to improve the cost efficiency is not considered. And
only the firms themselves know their own true cost realization. So ci ∈ {cL, cH}
where i = 1, 2 and cL = c−ε, cH = c+ε, c and ε are known, and c > ε. Accordingly
c represents the average production cost in this market and ε is variation value that
changes the production cost. The marginal cost ce for the entrant is distributed
over[e−ω, e+ω] (ce ∼ [e−ω, e+ω]). Here I do not make particular assumption about
the difference between marginal costs of the entrant and incumbents. However, it
is possible that the entrant might have higher marginal cost than the incumbents,
since it is new to the market. The marginal cost ci is a firm’s private information
and the cost realizations are independent. The profit of each firm is Πi = qi ·(P −ci)
where i = 1, 2 or e.
In this setting, it is assumed that the incumbent firms can not communicate
their true cost except through the accounting report. The incumbent firms disclose
cost information through financial reports prior to the output choices. There have
been some studies regarding accounting disclosure apply this premise, for example
Bagnoli et al. (2010). The assumption is that a firm’s financial statements can
be used to infer the firm’s reported marginal costs. And information regarding
raw material, production technology and labor etc. has been considered to reveal
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companies’ cost of production. Pae (2000) points out that management discussion
and analysis disclosure reveal factor prices (costs). Here the reported information
can be masked by certain conservative policy. One also can consider an example
that whether firms adopt low or high efficiency production technology, and the costs
after the adoption are known. The disclosure regarding the adoption information
can be different when more conservative reporting applies. In general the signal
can be considered more like an aggregated measurement that indicates the profit
prospects of each firm, since cost information is the main indicator that affect the
respective profit in this production-decision process and the firm’s only strategic
decision is on production quantity.
The entry game is set out similar to Hwang et al. (2000) where their study
focuses on the welfare consequences of incumbent firms’ disclosure effect facing en-
try. What mainly differentiates this setup is the use of different accounting system
representation which will be introduced in the next section. Here the entry part
of the game is sequential which allows the entrant to observe the disclosed signal
before decide to entry the market.4 The assumptions about the potential entrant
are defined as: the potential entrant does not disclose its cost information and it
learns about its cost at the same time as the existing firms. Then the potential
competitor will enter the market only if its ex-post expected profit is over a fixed
cost K.
4 There are different types of market entry games, for instance, simultaneous entry (Dixit and
Shapiro, 1986), or sequential entry (Vives, 1988).
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2.3.2 Accounting system
This section gives the set-up for the accounting system that defines the biased sig-
nal. The structure is modeled by adjusting what Venugopalan (2004) and Li (2009)
apply. In their settings, high signals mean good condition and low signals mean bad
condition. In my setting, as firms disclose cost-related information, the meanings
of signals are reversed. So I adjust the conditional probabilities of signals in order
to demonstrate conservative reporting. When privately observing its own cost, each
incumbent firm discloses a signal of their cost to the public, and the signal can be
either a low cost signal siL or a high cost signal siH , where i = 1, 2. The report is
observable. The signal might be biased by containing a certain degree of accounting
distortion. In general, in the accounting system the parameter λ defines the infor-
mativeness of the reported signal and δ indicates the degree of conservatism imposed
by accounting system, with λ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1−λ]. Both λ and δ are determined
exogenously by the regulator and the incumbent firms disclose the signals generated
by this accounting system. The idea here is to capture the information quality of
the disclosure and the imposed accounting bias at the same time.
Since the generated signal is either siL or siH where i ∈ {1, 2}, costs are either
c − ε or c + ε , denote L as true cost is low and H as true cost is high, then the
following conditional probabilities of signals for different cost types can be defined
as:
P (siL|L) = λ+ δ P (siH |L) = 1− λ− δ
P (siL|H) = δ P (siH |H) = 1− δ
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Based on the signal generated, the firm updates its expectation about the cost
type of the other firm. Then accounting features can be observed by the respective
posterior probabilities of true states which are:5
P (L|siL) =
λ+ δ
λ+ 2δ (2.1)
P (H|siL) =
δ
λ+ 2δ (2.2)
P (H|siH) =
1− δ
2− λ− 2δ (2.3)
P (L|siH) =
1− λ− δ
2− λ− 2δ (2.4)
If λ is increasing, the accounting signals are more informative because the prob-
ability revealing true state (P (L|siL) or P (H|siH)) is increasing. Take P (H|siH) as
example, when λ increases, only the denominator of P (H|siH) decreases, so P (H|siH)
increases. This means that firms can better infer their competitors’ true type when
observe the signals. It becomes more informative to differentiate low-cost type from
high-cost type. As δ decreases, both P (L|siL) and P (L|siH) are becoming higher,
i.e., ∂P (L|s
i
L)
∂δ
and ∂P (L|s
i
L)
∂δ
are smaller than zero. This means that in a more conserva-
tive accounting system firms are less likely to obtain signals that show better profit
prospect, in this case low cost signal. Then the accounting system is more conserva-
tive. The system is at its most conservative state when δ = 0, high cost type always
disclose siH , and is the most liberal when δ = 1 − λ , low cost type always disclose
siL. Similar to what Gigler et al. (2009) explained in their setting, accounting con-
5 These posterior probabilities of true cost type are derived from the respective conditional
probabilities.
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servatism increases the information content of low cost signal which indicates better
expectations on future earnings, and decreases the information content of high cost
signal which indicates downward expectations on future earnings.6
λ defines the information quality of the accounting report and it can be inter-
preted as how informative the firm require to report or how accurate the accounting
numbers are. As it is imposed by the accounting system, the information quality of
the signal is the mandated informativeness. The degree of conservative or aggressive
bias δ is also defined by this accounting system. The general degree of conservatism
is usually enforced by standards and accounting standards define certain conserva-
tive approach for instance historical cost accounting for positive NPV project or
do not allow the capitalization of R&D costs. When a very conservative approach
such as expensing all R&D costs is imposed, δ can be considered with a lower value.
And when historical cost accounting is applied, the policy is more conservative and
accounting numbers are more reliable. The accounting signals is generated from the
two incumbent firms are under the assumption that these firms are committed to
the accounting system.7 So the firm’s management discretion through the reporting
process is not considered. In this setting, as the firms precommit to the reporting
policy, one example can be raised that when the firms try to determine their depre-
ciation policy of production related equipment, they precommit to a conservative or
aggressive approach set out by the standard prior to the actual production.
Then the basic time line can be illustrated as:
6 Then these definitions are consistent with the interpretation of conservatism by empirical
studies such as Basu (1997). In his study, the finding on more timely reporting of bad news
could be caused by a conservative accounting system with the property that favorable reports have
greater information content than unfavorable reports.
7 This truth telling assumption argues that a strong audit protection is enforced and it makes
sure that the firms disclose according to the accounting system.
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Figure 2.1: The time-line of the model
2.4 The results and analysis
2.4.1 The competition with unbiased accounting system
In this case, suppose two incumbent firms report their true costs and the signals are
perfectly correct. So it is the same as their true costs are common knowledge. Then
when there is no entry considered, the equilibrium solutions to the duopoly case are
the regular Cournot results with the expected costs (Radner, 1963). When both
firms have low or high costs, their optimal production choices qi are a−c+ε3 or
a−c−ε
3 .
When one firm has low cost and the other has high cost,8 the optimal production
choices qi are a−c+3ε3 and
a−c−3ε
3 . If the potential entrant decides to enter, then the
three firms compete in a triopoly situation. Denote ce as the entrant’s cost and
known to the players, then the incumbent firms 1 and 2 will choose their optimal
output as a+ce−3(c−ε)4 when both have low cost realization and
a+ce−3(c+ε)
4 when both
have high cost realization. And when one firm has low cost and the rival has high
cost, the output choice would be a+ce−3c+5ε4 or
a+ce−3c−5ε
4 . Accordingly the entrant’s
output choice qe is a+c1+c2−4ce4 . And the firm’s profit Πi (i = 1, 2 or e) is simply
the square of the output amount. Then denote Πdi (i = 1, 2) as the profit in the
duopoly situation and Πti as the profit in the triopoly situation, then the profit of
firm i under these scenarios are shown in the following table:
8 The results are symmetric when the cost realizations are reverse scenario.
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Table 2.1: The profit of firm i in the benchmark duopoly case and triopoly case
Cost realization Πdi Πt1orΠt2 Πte
Both firms have low cost (a−c+ε)
2
9
[
a+ce−3(c−ε)
4
]2 [
a+2(c−ε)−4ce
4
]2
This firm low cost, the competitor high cost (a−c+3ε)
2
9
[
a+ce−3c+5ε
4
]2 [a+2c−4ce
4
]2
This firm high cost,the competitor low cost (a−c−3ε)
2
9
[
a+ce−3c−5ε
4
]2 [a+2c−4ce
4
]2
Both firms have high cost (a−c−ε)
2
9
[
a+ce−3(c+ε)
4
]2 [
a+2(c+ε)−4ce
4
]2
And the firm’s expected profit E(Πi) is the weighted average of the four profit
values under the situation of duopoly or triopoly.9 For instance, when truthful
reporting is imposed, the expected profit of an existing firm under the duopoly
competition is a2−2ac+c2+59 .
2.4.2 Competition in duopoly situation
Production strategies in duopoly situation
First examine the case when only the two existing firms compete, so the entry doesn’t
occur or equivalent to the case when no entry game is considered. After the firms
observe each other’s signal regarding cost and there is no entry from the potential
entrant, the information sets for two incumbents can be defined as y1 = (c1, s1, s2)
and y2 = (c2, s1, s2) where s1, s2 ∈ {siL, siH}.
Then the maximization problem of each incumbent firm can be described as:
max
qi
E[P (yi) · qi(yi)− ciqi(yi)]
For firm i solves
max
qi
E
[(
a−∑2j=1 qi) · qi − ciqi | yi]
9 If assume that entrant firm randomize his entry decision, then his expected payoff in the this
case is the weighted average profit times probability of 12 .
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Then the first order condition is: a−E
(∑2
j=1 qj | yi
)
− qi − ci = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}
In order to find the linear equilibrium, some output strategies can be conjectured.
So similar to the linear strategy approach proposed by Radner (1963) and adopted
by Hwang et al. (2000), when the firms observe these signals, they can use this
set of information structure to update their expectation of the rivals’ cost. Firm i
anticipates that its rival will use signal si to infer its cost ci and the rival’s output
choice will condition on the updated expectation. Competing firms use the disclosed
information to infer the rivals’ true cost. And since they anticipate the rival firms will
do so, they will also include the updated cost information in their output strategy in
order to avoid disadvantage in the competition. Then the optimal output strategies
are:10
qd1 (y1) =
a
3 −
1
2c1 +
1
3E (c2 | s2)−
1
6E (c1 | s1) (2.5)
qd2 (y2) =
a
3 −
1
2c2 +
1
3E (c1 | s1)−
1
6E (c2 | s2) (2.6)
In the optimal linear equilibrium, the firm’s production strategy depends on its
own disclosure despite the fact that firm knows its own cost. As suggested by Bagnoli
et al. (2010)11, firm i knows the rival is using i’s disclosure to make inference about
i’s production cost, and then firm i’s production strategy depends on its inference
about the rival’s decision which depends on the information the rival can extract
from the disclosure. Since the respective posterior probabilities are known from
the earlier definitions on the disclosed signals, the firms will use these posterior
10 Denote superscript d as the duopoly and t as triopoly. See the caculation for the optimal
strategies in the Appendix
11 page 1196
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probabilities to update their believe regarding rivals’ cost. Define EcL and EcH as
the expected values of relevant costs based on the observed signals, as the true cost
realization is binary, then they are calculated as follows:
EcL = E
(
ci | siL
)
= (c− ε) · P (L|siL) + (c+ ε) · P (H|siL) = c−
(
λ
λ+ 2δ
)
ε (2.7)
EcH = E
(
ci | siH
)
= (c− ε) · P (L|siH) + (c+ ε) · P (H|siH) = c+
(
λ
2− λ− 2δ
)
ε
(2.8)
As ∂EcL
∂δ
= 2λ(λ+2δ)2 and
∂EcH
∂δ
= 2λ(2−λ−2δ)2 with λ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1 − λ] , then
∂EcL
∂δ
and ∂EcH
∂δ
are both> 0. If the informativeness parameter λ is held constant,
increasing δ leads to both expected costs increase. When the accounting system
is less conservative, an increasing δ leads to higher expected costs regardless what
signal is sent. So no matter what type of signal the firms send to the market, their
rival will expect them more likely to have higher costs because the chances of a high
cost firm disclose low cost signal are getting higher. Then since the output outcomes
under the existing competition are consist of the market parameter a , the firm’s
own cost and the expected costs based on the signals. The optimal output strategies
are increasing in the market parameter and the expected cost of the competitor, and
decreasing in its own cost and expected cost.
Lemma 1. If the production strategy in the duopoly setting is considered, when
λ is held constant, the firm would prefer itself to report more conservatively and its
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competitor less conservative.
According to the relationship of the accounting bias parameter δ and the ex-
pected costs based on the observed signals E (c1 | s1) and E (c2 | s2), both E (c1 | s1)
and E (c2 | s2) are decreasing in the degree of conservative bias. And the accounting
system is less conservative as δ increases. Here the signal types don’t matter any-
more, because both EcLand EcH are increasing with δ. So the production strategies
are increasing when E (c1 | s1) is getting smaller (the firm itself is more conserva-
tive) and E (c2 | s2) is getting larger (its rival is less conservative). Intuitively, when
one firm reporting more conservative, the competitor will update his believe that
the rival has lower cost which means competitive advantage in this case. One could
argue that the management discretion on accounting policy is not included in the
previous assumptions. However, as proved in Ziv (1993) where two competing firms
can send any cost message and is not confined to the truth, the yielded output is
the same as the equations (2.5) and (2.6) propose. Then here we discuss the firms’
behavior in a relative manner, it is safe to conclude such results and extend to later
analysis.
There are four different signal scenarios and two different cost realizations, so
in total there are eight possible output choices. If expand all the possible output
choices from the equations (2.5) and (2.6) and substitute the value of EcL and EcH
into different scenario of signal combinations, then the following table shows the
results of output strategies:
Lemma 2. When imposed accounting system is in place, competing firms would
benefit from disclosing low cost signal to obtain higher output.
If one of the two firms is considered, the output values under the situation of “LL”
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Table 2.2: Output outcomes under the duopoly competition
Signal Type True Cost Realization (c− ε ) True Cost Realization (c+ ε )
S1L, S
2
L(LL) a3 − c3 + ε2 − 16 · λλ+2δ · ε a3 − c3 − ε2 − 16 · λλ+2δ · ε
S1L, S
2
H(LH) a3 − c3 + ε2 + 13 · λ2−λ−2δ · ε+ 16 · λλ+2δ · ε a3 − c3 − ε2 + 13 · λ2−λ−2δ · ε+ 16 · λλ+2δ · ε
S1H , S
2
L(HL) a3 − c3 + ε2 − 16 · λ2−λ−2δ · ε− 13 · λλ+2δ · ε a3 − c3 − ε2 − 16 · λ2−λ−2δ · ε− 13 · λλ+2δ · ε
S1H , S
2
H(HH) a3 − c3 + ε2 + 16 · λ2−λ−2δ · ε a3 − c3 − ε2 + 16 · λ2−λ−2δ · ε
(when both firms report low cost signals) are strictly higher than the output values
under the situation of “HL” (when firm 1 reports high cost signal and firm 2 remains
reporting low cost signal). Similarly, the output values under the situation of “LH”
(when this firm reports low cost signal and the other firm reports high cost signal)
are also higher than the output values under the situation of “HH” (when both firms
report high cost signals). By comparing the output results when firms disclosing
either high or low cost signal, the above results show that the duopoly players are
better-off when they disclose low cost signal regardless its own real cost realization.
So consider existing competition alone, if firms could affect their accounting report,
reporting low cost signal would be a dominant strategy.
The expected output for firm i in the duopoly setting which denoted as Ed(qi)
is the weighted output amount from Table 2.2.12 And Ed(qi)=a−c3 , and the cost
parameter becomes the expected cost defined by nature. So the accounting bias
introduced by the imposed accounting system has no effect on the expected output
outcome for the existing competitors. However the expected profit is affected as the
results shown in the following section.
12 The probability table in the Appendix is used for the weighting.
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Expected profit under duopoly
Next derive the representation of firm i’s expected profit. So from equation (5), the
expected profit E(Πi) is E
[(
a−∑nj=1 qi) · qi − ciqi | yi] . As the derived optimal
output strategy qi (yi) are the solution to the maximization problem for quantity,
from the first order condition we have qi (yi) = E
(
a−∑nj=1 qi − ci). Then the ex-
pected profit for firm i in both duopoly and trioploy situation is [qi (yi)]2 . Then the
expected profit under duopoly E(Πdi ) is calculated by sum up the weighted profits
under eight different scenarios. And the following proposition can be derived by
examining the effect of δ and λ on the expected profit.
Proposition 1. When the firms precommit to an imposed accounting system,
there is an optimal level of conservative bias δ = 1−λ2 to maximize the expected profit,
depending on the informativeness of the signal λ ∼ [λ0, 1] where λ0 ≈ 0.58.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that when the accounting system imposes certain degree
of conservative bias and the firms precommit to such reporting policy, there could
be an optimal level of conservative bias that maximize the firms’ expected profit
when facing existing competition, however it is conditional on the informativeness
of the reports. This optimal level of conservative bias is at the medium level of
conservatism that this system can impose. Such optimal level of conservatism could
be considered as what the existing firms would lobby for since it maximizes their
expected profits. And this provides the implication that in the empirical setting it
is necessary to control for the disclosure quality of the accounting reports. Consid-
ering the regulation implications, when regulators are interested in improving the
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transparency of an oligopoly market by requiring more disclosure for the anti-trust
purposes, the certain level of conservative bias might help to achieve this kind of
policy promotion since in fact the existing firms are maximizing their profit. And if
the regulators are interested in limiting the profitability of certain oligopoly indus-
try when the quality of disclosure is low, the certain level of conservative reporting
policy also helps to minimize the existing competitors’ profitability.
Since the accounting system can bias the report from both directions “conserva-
tively” or “aggressively”, so the expected profit of the two firms under the extreme
cases (when δ = 0 and δ = 1− λ) can be compared with expected profit under the
case where an unbiased accounting system is presented.
Proposition 2. When the existing competitors report under such accounting
system, the expected profits are lower than the profits under an unbiased system.
Proof. See the appendix.
This proposition shows that the accounting bias introduced in such accounting
system always decreases the amount of firm profit when existing competitors are
considered. And the profits are decreased because of the efficiency loss brought by
the accounting bias. Note that from table 2, there are two scenarios that the firm
for sure has higher output compared to that under unbiased accounting system:
firm with low cost realization disclose low cost signal or high cost signal when the
other firm disclose high signal. But the rest of the scenarios are uncertain depend-
ing on the level of accounting bias. So under existing competition, the firms prefer
unbiased accounting system over the biased accounting system if the objective is
to be more profitable. However when profitability often serves as the measure of
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monopoly power (Pindyck, 1983; Armentano, 2007), then higher profit might not
be preferable. Then if the potential antitrust sanction imposes a cost larger than
the expected profit difference 13, this provides some arguments for large firm might
prefer conservative accounting policy if the antitrust action is severe. Although it
lowers the earnings from the product market, the firms appear less profitable and
may avoid the scrutiny of antitrust agency which could impose larger cost.
Proposition 3. When the firms report under extreme conservative or aggressive
accounting system, their expected profits are the same and they are strictly lower than
the profit under an unbiased system.
Proof. See the appendix.
So there are no differences for the existing competitors between a very conser-
vative system and very aggressive system. They would obtain the same expected
profits. And these types of biases lower the firms’ profits compared to the unbiased
accounting system.
Lemma 4. The firms’ expected profits under extreme conservative or aggressive
accounting system increases with the level of λ
To show the relation between the firm’s profits under these two cases and the
level of λ, the first order derivative of firm i’s profits w.r.t. λ both are:
∂
∂λ
E(Πdi ) =
11
18
2
(−2 + λ)2 > 0
So the higher level of λ, the higher the profits under the extreme conservative or
13 This is possible because the value of 1118
2(2δ2+2λδ−2δ+λ2−λ)
(−2+λ+2δ)(λ+2δ) appears relatively small because
the defined range of parameters.
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aggressive system. Then how informative the accounting reports matters when the
imposed accounting system is either very conservative or very aggressive.
2.4.3 Competition with entry
Production strategies in triopoly situation
When the potential entrant decides to enter the market, since the entrant learns
its own cost, its information set would be (ce, s1, s2) . The incumbent firms know
that entrant enter the market and assume that they will revise their expectation on
the entrant’s cost, the expected cost is denoted as E (ce | s1, s2). Then the optimal
output strategies are:14
qt1 (y1) =
a
4 −
1
2c1 +
1
4E (c2 | s2)−
1
4E (c1 | s1) +
1
4E (ce | s1, s2)
qt2 (y2) =
a
4 −
1
2c2 +
1
4E (c1 | s1)−
1
4E (c2 | s2) +
1
4E (ce | s1, s2)
qte (ye) =
a
4 −
1
2ce +
1
4E (c1 | s1) +
1
4E (c2 | s2)−
1
4E (ce | s1, s2)
And according to the representation of qte (ye), the potential entrant would prefer
both incumbents less conservative because the values of E (c1 | s1) and E (c2 | s2)
are increasing when the conservatism parameter δ is increasing (less conservative)
when the informativeness level λis held constant.
14 See the Appendix.
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The effect of conservative reporting on entry decision
In this section, the entry decision depends on that the potential entrant will enter
the market only if its ex-post net profit is bigger than zero. So the profit Πteis bigger
than the fixed entry cost K, or the same as [qte (ye)]
2 > K. Consider the situation
when the profit is zero as the boundary condition, and the boundary unit cost for
the entrant c¯e can be derived as:15
c¯e =
1
5
[
2a+ 2E (c1 | s1) + 2E (c2 | s2)− e+ ω − 8
√
K
]
(2.9)
From (9) it is noted that when the conservatism parameter δ is increasing, the
boundary cost c¯e is also increasing because of the expected costs of two incumbents
increase. So if the incumbents are less conservative, the potential entrant would
infer that the incumbent firms have higher production cost, then it will be more
likely to enter the market since the entrant faces a higher boundary cost and as long
as its own cost is lower than this boundary cost, it will enter for sure.
If the different scenarios of the disclosed signals are considered16, the relation of
these boundary cost is: cLLe ≤ cHLe (cLHe ) ≤ cHHe .17
The relation is intuitive, when both firms disclose low cost signal, it would be
more likely to deter the potential entry. Moreover, when λ = 0 the signals are not
informative at all so the boundary costs are the same regardless what cost signals
are sent to the market. Then it is no difference for the potential entrant to evaluate
its own unit cost based on the observed signals from the incumbents.
15 See the Appendix.
16 Denote superscript LH;HL;LL;HH as the different combination of disclosed signals.
17 Comparison in the Appendix.
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Similarly the probability of entry Pe also can be derived as:18
P (ce ≤ c¯e) = 15ω
[
a+ 2E (c1 | s1) + 2E (c2 | s2)− 3e+ 3ω − 4
√
K
]
(2.10)
So this indicates how the incumbents evaluate the entrant’s entry probability.
When the incumbent firms are reporting more conservatively, the expected values of
their costs are lower, then the entry probability of the entrant is decreasing as the
entrant infers that the incumbent firms have lower true cost realization.Then con-
sidering the probability alone, the incumbent would prefer to report conservatively.
Similar to the break-downs of the boundary costs, the relation of the probabilities
of entry under different cost signals is: PLLe ≤ PHLe (PLH) ≤ PHHe . When λ = 0 ,
the probabilities are the same as the signals are not informative.
Lemma 5. When λ is constant, the potential entrant prefer less conservative
reporting for both incumbent firms.
Because the entrant’s expected profit is [qte (ye)]
2 · Pe −K and both qte (ye) and
Pe are increasing with respect to accounting bias parameter δ. So when the disclo-
sure remains the same level of informativeness, a less conservative reporting system
would encourage the potential entrant. This result suggests that when potential
competition is considered, a less conservative policy could be better to encourage
more market entrants and policy makers might view this as advantage because their
aim is often to protect and promote competition in markets.
After obtain the expected cost of the entrant E(ce) (in the Appendix), all the
possible output outcomes for the incumbents in the triopoly game can be expanded
from the optimal triopoly production strategies .The following table shows the re-
18 See the Appendix.
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sults:
Table 2.3: Possible production strategies for the incumbent firms under the triopoly
game
Signal type True cost realization (c− ε ) True cost realization (c+ ε)
S1L, S
2
L(LL) 14
[
a− 2 (c− ε) + E (ce)LL
]
1
4
[
a− 2 (c+ ε) + E (ce)LL
]
S1L, S
2
H(LH) 14
[
a− 2 (c− ε) + E (ce)LH − 2λ(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε
]
1
4
[
a− 2 (c+ ε) + E (ce)LH − 2λ(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε
]
S1H , S
2
L(HL) 14
[
a− 2 (c− ε) + E (ce)HL + 2λ(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε
]
1
4
[
a− 2 (c+ ε) + E (ce)HL + 2λ(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε
]
S1H , S
2
H(HH) 14
[
a− 2 (c− ε) + E (ce)HH
]
1
4
[
a− 2 (c+ ε) + E (ce)HH
]
Lemma 6. When imposed accounting system is in place, firms would benefit
from disclosing high cost signal to obtain higher output when entry happens .
If one of the two firms is considered, the output value under the situation of
“HL”(when firm 1 reports high cost signal and firm 2 remains reporting low cost
signal) is higher than the output values under the situation of “LL”. Similarly, the
output values under the situation of “HH” (when both firms report high cost signals)
are also higher than the output values under the situation of “LL”. By comparing
the output results when firms disclosing either high cost or low cost signal, if firms
could affect their accounting report,reporting high cost signal is better off for the
incumbent firms since from the relation E (ce)LL ≤ E (ce)HL ≤ E (ce)HH , the pro-
duction choice under “HH” is higher than “LL”.
The total expected profit for incumbent firm
As mentioned earlier, the total expected profit for one of the incumbent firm is the
weighted average expected profit between both duopoly and triopoly situation. So
denote E(ΠTotali ) as this total expected profit: Pe · E(Πdi ) + (1 − Pe) · E(Πti) which
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is weighted on the eight different scenarios. After taking first order condition, it is
no feasible solution for an optimal level δ of to maximize the total expected profit
for the incumbent firm. However by applying simulation with numeric example,
the relation of total expected profit for incumbent firm and the parameters can be
illustrated in the following graph (Figure 2):
Figure 2.2: The relation of incumbent’s total expected profit and parameters δ,λ
Take numerical values: a = 50; c = 2; ε = 1;e = 3;ω = 1 and K = 100
As illustrated in the figure, when the informativeness parameter λ is held con-
stant (one of these ten cases), the total expected profit is not uniformly changing
with respect to the conservatism parameter δ and there exists a level of conservative
bias that might minimize the expected profit. Since the ten different cases19 of λ
19 These cases are randomly chosen and more cases of λ can be taken when graphing this
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is distributed increasingly along the Y-axis (the highest case when λ is 1 and it is
a point (0,169.48) on the Y-axis; the lowest case when λ is 0 and it is a straight
line parallel to X-axis), the expected profit of incumbent firms are increasing with
respect to the informativeness parameter. Since the entrant conditions its decision
on the disclosed information, the incumbent firms can get better inference regarding
the potential entrant’s cost information when they disclose their cost more accu-
rately. Then this could contribute to such profit increase as the figure suggests.
This observation indicates that the more informative accounting reports or more
accurate cost information could result higher profit when both competition scenario
are considered. So when regulators impose higher level of informative requirements,
the incumbent firms may not be against such proposal. Of course as shown in the
graph, such promotion also depends on how conservative the accounting system is.
By taking the exact value of each case, it can be proved that the expected profit
is largest when δ equals 1 − λ in each case. So the incumbent firms may prefer a
very aggressive reporting system when λ is held constant and this is not the same as
the results from existing competition suggested. And it is intuitive to see that when
λ equals 0, the accounting signal not informative at all, the expected profit is the
same regardless what the level of conservative bias is. So is the case when λ equals
1, the accounting signal is fully informative (the same as the unbiased reporting).
Then this suggests the similar result that the accounting bias lowers the incumbent
firm’s expected profit in the presence of entry competition.20
simulation but it doesn’t change the shape or the relation demonstrated by current figure.
20 The paper is cautious about the generality of this part of results, although the inclusion of
more cases in the simulation and change of different combination of numeric inputs don’t change
the observed results.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, a competition model with the disclosed information that contains reg-
ulated bias is used to illustrate how the competitive positions of competing firms are
affected by the accounting bias imposed by certain accounting system. The results
show that if only the existing competition is considered, the incumbent firm would
obtain higher output outcome if the rival firm is imposed with a less conservative
reporting system. And with respect to the expected profit under duopoly case for
each incumbent firm, there exists an optimal level of conservative bias that may
maximize the expected profit, but it is subject to the informativeness of the ac-
counting report. This provides testable empirical implication that in the empirical
setting, it is critical to control for the information quality of the disclosed report.
And the accounting distortion introduced in such accounting system decreases the
expected profits of existing competitors. When the potential entry is considered,
the potential entrant prefers a less conservative accounting system since the conser-
vative reporting from the incumbent increase the entrant’s entry probability and its
expected profit. However there is no feasible optimal level of conservative bias in
this case. The results from the numeric example suggest that such accounting dis-
tortion also lower the expected profit even in the presence of entry competition, but
increasing the informative quality of cost information could improve the expected
profit level. And when accounting system is not fully informative or not entirely
uninformative21, then the incumbent firms might enjoy a higher expected profit by
precommiting to an aggressive accounting policy.
There are some further extensions and improvements to be considered for this
21 The two boundary choices of λ
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paper. First of all, as suggested by Gal-Or (1986) and Vives (2006), the type of
information disclosed in the competition could have effects on the optimal level of
disclosure. As the focus of this paper is not to derive the optimal disclosure level, this
is less concern to the current setting. However it would be interesting to see whether
the present results will hold if one assumes the disclosed information as information
other than costs, for instance, demands. The similar tests on a Bentrand setting
could be also interesting. Secondly, social welfare analysis could also provide more
policy implications. Thirdly, only one period of reporting is considered. So firms’
competitive position might be different in a multiple period setting. The hidden
reserve effect of conservative reporting could change the way how firms update the
accounting signal and compete. Lastly, as the current setting only considers the
product market, the interaction of conservatism and other influencing factor i.e.
debt contracting is not included yet. A further extension could be a setting where
firms with debt financing compete in a product market.
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2.6 Appendix
The duopoly production strategy
As described, the maximization problem for firm i is
max
qi
E
[(
a−∑2j=1 qi) · qi − ciqi | yi]
Then the first order condition is
a− E
(∑2
j=1 qj | yi
)
− qi − ci = 0
So the following equations are conjectured linear output strategies (the approach
is similar to what Hwang and Kirby (2000) and Bagnioli and Watts (2010) adopted).
Mi and Ni are the coefficients in the linear strategies.
qd1 (y1) = M0 +M1c1 +M2E (c2 | y1) +M3E (c1 | y2) (2.11)
qd2 (y2) = N0 +N1c2 +N2E (c1 | y2) +N3E (c2 | y1) (2.12)
Then combine these two strategies and take the expectation based on the infor-
mation set we have:
E
 2∑
j=1
qj | y1
 = (M0 +N0) + [M1E (c1 | y1) +N1E (c2 | y1)]
+ (M2 +N3)E (c2 | y1) + (M3 +N2)E (c1 | y2)
= (M0 +N0) +M1c1 + (M2 +N3 +N1)E (c2 | y1)
+ (M3 +N2)E (c1 | y2) (2.13)
44
E
 2∑
j=1
qj | y2
 = (M0 +N0) + [M1E (c1 | y2) +N1E (c2 | y2)]
+ (M2 +N3)E (c2 | y1) + (M3 +N2)E (c1 | y2)
= (M0 +N0) +N1c2 + (M1 +M3 +N2)E (c1 | y2)
+ (M2 +N3)E (c2 | y1) (2.14)
Then substitute the conjectured strategies into the first order condition to obtain
the following functions:
E
(∑2
j=1 qj | y1
)
= (a−M0)+(−1−M1) c1+(−M2E (c2 | y1))+(−M3E (c1 | y2))
E
(∑2
j=1 qj | y2
)
= (a−N0)+(−1−N1) c2 +(−N2E (c1 | y2))+(−N3E (c2 | y1))
So by comparing the coefficients of these two equation groups, the groups of
functions can be obtained as:
M0 +N0 = a−M0
M1 = −1−M1
M2 +N3 +N1 = −M2
M3 +N2 = −M3
and
M0 +N0 = a−N0
N1 = −1−N1
M1 +M3 +N2 = −N2
M2 +N3 = −N3
Then solve these equations to give the solution of the coefficients as:
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M0 = N0 = a3
M1 = N1 = −12
M2 = N2 = 13
M3 = N3 = −16
So the optimal output strategies are:
qd1 (y1) = a3 − 12c1 + 13E (c2 | y1)− 16E (c1 | y2)
qd2 (y2) = a3 − 12c2 + 13E (c1 | y2)− 16E (c2 | y1)
where E (c2 | y1) = E (c2 | s2)and E (c1 | y2) = E (c1 | s1)
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The probability table
Table 2.4: The probability table
Signal Type True Cost Realization (c− ε ) True Cost Realization (c+ ε )
S1L, S
2
L(LL) 12 · (λ+ δ) ·
(
λ+2δ
2
)
1
2 · δ ·
(
λ+2δ
2
)
S1L, S
2
H(LH) 12 · (λ+ δ) ·
(
2−λ−2δ
2
)
1
2 · δ ·
(
2−λ−2δ
2
)
S1H , S
2
L(HL) 12 · (1− λ− δ) ·
(
λ+2δ
2
)
1
2 · (1− δ) ·
(
λ+2δ
2
)
S1H , S
2
H(HH) 12 · (1− λ− δ) ·
(
2−λ−2δ
2
)
1
2 · (1− δ) ·
(
2−λ−2δ
2
)
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. When the firms precommit to an imposed accounting system, there
is an optimal level of conservative bias δ = 1−λ2 to maximize the expected profit,
depending on the informativeness of the signal λ ∼ [λ0, 1] where λ0 ≈ 0.58.
The expected profit of firm i :
E(Πdi ) = 14
(
1
3a− 13c+ 12− 16 λλ+2δ
)2
(λ+ δ) (λ+ 2δ)+14δ (λ+ 2δ)
(
1
3a− 13c− 12− 16 λλ+2δ
)2
+12δ
(
2−λ−2δ
2
) (
1
3a− 13c− 12+ 13 λ2−λ−2δ + 16 λλ+2δ
)2
+14 (1− λ− δ) (λ+ 2δ)
(
1
3a− 13c+ 12− 16 λ2−λ−2δ − 13 λλ+2δ
)2
+14 (1− δ) (λ+ 2δ)
(
1
3a− 13c− 12− 16 λ2−λ−2δ − 13 λλ+2δ
)2
+14 (1− λ− δ) (2− λ− 2δ)
(
1
3a− 13c+ 12+ 16 λ2−λ−2δ
)2
+14 (1− δ) (2− λ− 2δ)
(
1
3a− 13c− 12+ 16 λ2−λ−2δ
)
+14 (λ+ δ) (2− λ− 2δ)
(
1
3a− 13c+ 12+ 13 λ2−λ−2δ + 16 λλ+2δ
)2
Then the first order derivative of the above profit w.r.t. the variable δ
∂
∂δ
E(Πdi ) =
11
9
λ22 (λ+ 2δ − 1)
(−2 + λ+ 2δ)2 (λ+ 2δ)2
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when δ>1−λ2 ,
∂
∂δ
E(Πdi ) > 0; when δ<1−λ2 ,
∂
∂δ
E(Πdi ) < 0
So when ∂
∂δ
E(Πdi ) = 0,obtain δ = 1−λ2 . Next take the second order derivative
w.r.t.δ have
∂2
∂δ
E(Πdi ) =
22
9
λ22 (−6λ− 12δ + 3λ2 + 12λδ + 12δ2 + 4)
(2− λ− 2δ)3 (λ+ 2δ)3
The item −6λ− 12δ + 3λ2 + 12λδ + 12δ2 + 4 decides whether ∂2
∂δ
E(Πdi ) is >0 or
<0. then −6λ− 12δ + 3λ2 + 12λδ + 12δ2 + 4 = 3 [λ− (1 + 2δ)]2 + 1− 24δ.
Further substituting δ = 1−λ2 into the expression above, it then yields: 12λ
2 +
12λ− 11. Setting 12λ2 + 12λ− 11 = 0 then results in λ =
√
122+4·12·11
24 ≈ 0.58.
When λ > 0.58 ,∂2
∂δ
E(Πdi ) < 0 and When λ < 0.58 ,∂
2
∂δ
E(Πdi ) > 0
When λ > 0.58, δ = 1−λ2 maximize E(Π
d
i ), otherwise when λ < 0.58, δ = 1−λ2
minimize E(Πdi ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. When the existing competitors report under such accounting sys-
tem, the expected profits are lower than the profits under an unbiased system.
Derive E(Πdi ) from the last proof and denote Eb(Πdi ) as the expected profit
under the unbiased system from table 1. And the difference between the profit
under unbiased system and the profit under current system:
Eb(Πdi )− E(Πdi ) =
11
18
2 (2δ2 + 2λδ − 2δ + λ2 − λ)
(−2 + λ+ 2δ) (λ+ 2δ)
Since
−2 + λ+ 2δ ≤ 0
and 2δ2 + 2λδ − 2δ + λ2 = 2 ·
(
δ − 1−λ2
)2 − (1− λ) · 1+λ2
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As δ ∈ [0, 1− λ],when δ = 0,the above expression is 2 ·
(
1−λ
2
)2 − (1− λ) · 1+λ2 =
(1− λ) ·
(
1−λ
2 − 1+λ2
)
< 0
When δ = 1− λ,the expression is the same:
(1− λ) ·
(
1− λ
2 −
1 + λ
2
)
< 0
. When δ = 1−λ2 , the expression became:
−(1− λ) · 1 + λ2 < 0
Thus
2δ2 + 2λδ − 2δ + λ2 − λ ≤ 0
When λ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1− λ], Eb(Πdi )− E(Πdi ) ≥ 0; and they are the same
when δ = 0 and λ = 1
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. When the firms report under extreme conservative or aggressive
accounting system, their expected profits are the same and they are strictly lower
than the profit under an unbiased system.
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When δ = 0,the weighted
E(Πdi ) =
1
18
−4acλ+ 2a2λ+ 2c2λ− λ2 + 8ac− 4a2 − 4c2 − 92
−2 + λ
When δ = 1− λ,the weighted
E(Πdi ) =
1
18
−4acλ+ 2a2λ+ 2c2λ− λ2 + 8ac− 4a2 − 4c2 − 92
−2 + λ
Denote Eb(Πdi ) as the expected profit under the unbiased accounting system,
then
Eb(Πdi ) =
a2 − 2ac+ c2 + 5
9
Eb(Πdi )− E(Πdi ) =
11
18
2 (1− λ)
2− λ > 0
The triopoly production strategies
Similar to what approach apply in the two-firm case and Hwang et al. (2000).
Conjecture the following linear output strategies:
qt1 (y1) = X0 +X1c1 +X2E (c2 | y1) +X3E (c1 | y2) +X4E (ce | s1, s2)
qt2 (y2) = Y0 + Y1c2 + Y2E (c1 | y2) + Y3E (c2 | y1) + Y4E (ce | s1, s2)
qte (ye) = Z0 + Z1ce + Z2E (c1 | y2) + Z3E (c2 | y1) + Z4E (ce | s1, s2)
Then the optimal output strategies can be illustrated accordingly:
qt1 (y1) = a4 − 12c1 + 14E (c2 | s2)− 14E (c1 | s1) + 14E (ce | s1, s2)
qt2 (y2) = a4 − 12c2 + 14E (c1 | s1)− 14E (c2 | s2) + 14E (ce | s1, s2)
qte (ye) = a4 − 12ce + 14E (c1 | s1) + 14E (c2 | s2)− 14E (ce | s1, s2)
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
The results regarding entry decision

These representation of the relevant terms such as boundary cost, entry proba-
bility and expected entrant’s cost are similar to what Hwang et al.(2000) derive in
their entry setting. But the conservatism parameter δ and the informativeness pa-
rameter λ are affecting the boundary cost, entry probability and expected entrant’s
cost in all signal scenarios that differentiate the results from Hwang et al.(2000).
1. Boundary cost
Assume the boundary unit cost for the entrant is c¯e, then plug the entrant’s
output strategy into the above condition,obtain the following condition:
a
4 − 12 c¯e + 14E (c1 | s1) + 14E (c2 | s2)− 14E (ce | s1, s2) =
√
K (17)
It is assumed that the entrant enters the market when it observes its own unit
cost is smaller than the boundary cost c¯e. So
E (ce | s1, s2) = E (ce | ce ≤ c¯e) = (e−ω)+c¯e2
Then plug the above expectation into (17), the expression of the boundary cost
c¯e is:
c¯e = 15
[
2a+ 2E (c1 | s1) + 2E (c2 | s2)− e+ ω − 8
√
K
]
The detailed break-downs of the boundary costs can be shown as follows under
different scenarios:
cHLe = cLHe = 15
[
2a+ 4c− 4λ(λ+2δ−1)(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε− e+ ω − 8
√
K
]
cLLe = 15
[
2a+ 4c− 4λ
λ+2δ · ε− e+ ω − 8
√
K
]
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cHHe = 15
[
2a+ 4c− 4λ
λ+2δ−2 · ε− e+ ω − 8
√
K
]
Then comparing these boundary costs from different situations:cHHe − cHLe =
4λ
(λ+2δ)(2−λ−2δ) · ε,cHLe − cLLe = 4λ(λ+2δ)(2−λ−2δ) · ε, and cHHe − cLLe = 8λ(λ+2δ)(2−λ−2δ) · ε.
Since λ ∈ [0, 1] , δ ∈ [0, 1 − λ], and 2 − λ − 2δ > 0, the relation of these boundary
cost is: cLLe ≤ cHLe (cLHe ) ≤ cHHe

2. Entry probability
Next the probability of entry Pe also can be calculated based on the assumption
of the entrant’s cost distribution and the boundary cost c¯e:
Pe = P (ce ≤ c¯e) = c¯e−(e−ω)2ω
then substituting c¯e into Pe, obtain
P (ce ≤ c¯e) = 15ω
[
a+ 2E (c1 | s1) + 2E (c2 | s2)− 3e+ 3ω − 4
√
K
]
The probabilities of entry under different cost signals are shown below:
PHLe = PLHe = 15ω
[
a+ 2c− 2λ(λ+2δ−1)(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε− 3e+ 3ω − 4
√
K
]
PLLe = 15ω
[
a+ 2c− 2λ
λ+2δ · ε− 3e+ 3ω − 4
√
K
]
PHHe = 15ω
[
a+ 2c− 2λ
λ+2δ−2 · ε− 3e+ 3ω − 4
√
K
]
Then since λ ∈ [0, 1] , δ ∈ [0, 1−λ], and 2−λ−2δ > 0, PLLe ≤ PHLe (PLH) ≤ PHHe

3. Expected entrant’s cost
As the expectations of the entrant’s cost is considered as the mean of e− ω and
the boundary cost c¯e, given the disclosed signals and the derived expression of c¯e,
the value of E (ce | s1, s2) should be:
E (ce) = 15
[
a+ E (c1 | s1) + E (c2 | s2) + 2e− 2ω − 4
√
K
]
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Then the different expected costs are:
E (ce)HL = E (ce)LH = 15
[
a+ 2c− 2λ(λ+2δ−1)(λ+2δ)(λ+2δ−2) · ε+ 2e− 2ω − 4
√
K
]
E (ce)LL = 15
[
a+ 2c− 2λ
λ+2δ · ε+ 2e− 2ω − 4
√
K
]
E (ce)HH = 15
[
a+ 2c− 2λ
λ+2δ−2 · ε+ 2e− 2ω − 4
√
K
]
Since λ ∈ [0, 1] , δ ∈ [0, 1−λ], and 2−λ−2δ > 0, similar to the entry probabilities,
the relation of these expected costs is E (ce)LL ≤ E (ce)HL ≤ E (ce)HH
Chapter 3
Joint Audit and Audit Market
Competition∗
3.1 Introduction
Audit market concentration has been a serious concern for the regulators and many
market participants. It is a well established fact that the Big Four auditors (Ernst &
Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte) provide services to the bulk
of public listed firms in most major economies (Francis et al., 2012; Sikka 2013). For
instance, in the UK market, 90% of FTSE 350 index firms are audited by the Big
Four and in the US they collect more than 90% of total audit fees.1 Moreover, even
for the small cap companies, it seems that the Big Four are gaining their business
for several years now (Morningstar Professional Services Rankings Guide, 2012). As
indicated by the Morningstar research report, Deloitte and Ernst & Young are the
top two earners for this section of the market in terms of total profit. The regulators
∗ This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Aiyong Zhu and Christopher Koch.
1 FTSE 350 is a share index of the 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange with
the highest market capitalization.
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concern that the high concentration has created high entry barriers for the audit
service market and companies purely favor the Big Four because of their dominance
(Government Accountability Office, 2008; European Commission, 2010). They also
concern that the lack of choice in the audit market, especially for financial service
industry, might have serious ramifications if one of the Big Four fail like Arthur
Andersen did.2 After the financial crisis, these Big Four audit firms came under
scrutiny since they were accused of being “too cosy” with their clients and the
regulators especially the auditing policeman of UK, Financial Reporting Council
(FRC), believe auditors should take a “stronger lead” in checking certain industries
such as banking or mining (Jones, 2013). Hence both the US and the EU regulators
are discussing possible regulatory changes. When the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the US is still exploring the possibility of introducing
audit reforms, the European parliament is acting more swiftly. Several proposals
have been made by Michel Barnier (the EU internal market commissioner) and the
parliament members are currently drafting the proposed law. These efforts made
by regulators suggest that they are rather determined to improve competitiveness
of the audit market.
Among some major reform proposals put forward by the EU regulators, joint
audit policy has been more controversial in the policy debate (Jones, 2013). Since
the European Commission green paper (2010) expresses the concern over audit mar-
ket concentration, the mandatory joint audit was first seriously considered by the
European Commission (henceforth EC) in 2010, then in the early 2011 proposal,
the joint audit policy become only “encouraged” due to the concern for seeking
2 This might be possible since some of the Big Four have been investigated by US regulators
for criminal wrongdoings either in the US or abroad (Rapoport, 2014)
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enough support in the EU states (EC, 2011a, article 31, para. 1). However, later
the European Union lawmakers beef up the reform by adding the joint audit to a
draft EU law designed to improve the performance of audit firms (Jones, 2012).
The most recent development indicates that the lawmakers again drop the initial
proposal when facing unpopular support from corporate clients and the Big Four
(Barker and Jones, 2011; CFO UK, 2012; Jones, 2013). In general, the corporate
clients believe joint audit would raise their audit costs and the Big Four claim that
it would be also not effective to work with another audit firm. Apparently the EU
regulators have gone back and forth on this particular policy debate. This implies
that joint audit is quite controversial since this proposed reform is obviously wel-
comed by the mid-tier firms and the Big Four quickly lobby against such policy (UK
parliament report, 2011; Jones, 2012). And the existing evidences are not conclusive
enough to support regulators to push the reform forward.
Hence our paper intends to provide a thorough investigation on how joint audit
policy would affect the audit market. In particular, we focus on the public quoted
firms in the UK. The main reason we look into the UK audit market is because of
its importance in the European setting. During the debate process of possible audit
market reform, the EU lawmaker was waiting for the outcome of UK inquiry into
competition in the audit market. And many believe that the pending views from the
Competition Commission would significantly affect the reform of the audit market
in the EU (Crump, 2012). Moreover, the current draft law on audit market reform
is sponsored by one British conservative member in the European parliament. In
his own words, “The views presented by the Competition Commission will be one of
a number of factors considered when designing the future of the audit market in the
EU,” said Sajjad Karim, the British lawmaker who is leading the reform. The recent
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approval of EU audit reform framework indicates that the views of the Competition
Commission and the FRC have been significantly considered (Deloitte, 2014). So
we think that the UK market would be a good sample market for the estimation of
possible EU audit market reform.
Joint audit policy was adopted or is still in use for a few EU states.3 Denmark
had mandatory joint audit until 2005, then the requirement was abolished. In fact,
France is the only EU country that currently implements this policy for the listed
companies. France and Denmark are reported to have the least concentrated audit
markets in Europe (London Economics, 2006). So it is the EC’s intention to use such
policy to shape up the audit market competition and allow the medium or small
size audit firms to participate in large audits (EC 2010). As mentioned above, such
policy is not welcomed by all parties. The advocates of joint audit argue that the
potential benefits could include: less concentrated market, the audited evidences are
better assured by two professional firms, and the audited report has to be co-signed
by both firms, then it is less likely for both firms to collude with the client. However
joint audits may suffer from a potential free rider problem (Deng et al., 2012) and
it is possible that there could be chance of miscommunication between two firms.4
The potential rising audit fee is the other argument brought against the joint audit.
What actual effects this policy reform might bring is still unclear. The up to
date empirical research provides mixed evidences on the impact of joint audit on
audit fees and audit quality (Francis et al., 2009; Andre et al., 2012; Ratzinger et
al., 2013). They find limited support to suggest that joint audits lead to increased
audit quality, but some support to suggest that joint audits lead to additional costs.
3 For example, Sweden allows voluntary joint audits.
4There are concern raised by audit committee chairs in the UK (Jones, 2012).
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However, these studies mainly focus on the correlations between audit fees (or audit
quality) and firm characteristics.
Our research goes beyond and addresses these issues with a demand and supply
market framework. We model client firms’ preference for audit service based on
the clients’ own attributes as well as the auditors’ attributes. So our estimation
quantifies clients’ heterogeneous preferences over each individual audit firm. More-
over, since most of the existing empirical researches are conducted on the French
or Danish cases, these current evidences could not answer the question “how would
the joint audit shape up an audit market like UK which does not have this policy”.
Thus our research intends to contribute to such question and additionally address
it especially from a social welfare perspective.
Our empirical analysis on the effects of joint audits evolves in three steps. In a
first step, we describe and examine the demand fundamentals for a joint audit market
and a single audit market. We assume that the audit market is characterized by
differentiated audit services. For example, our assumption holds when an industry
specialists offers an audit service that is of different quality than the audit service
offered by a non-specialists. We assume that client firms pick the auditor that
maximizes their own utility. In the utility maximization framework, clients consider
the attributes of audit firms, e.g., industry specialization. They also consider how
well the audit firms match with their own attributes, e.g., client size. The price
of the audit services enters into negatively into the utility equation. Based on this
framework, we can identify the demand fundamentals by using data on publicly
listed firms in France and in the UK. We observe that the client preference towards
certain auditors are mainly driven by the client attributes. Furthermore, when using
our estimates for client preferences to predict audit choice, we observe that our
58
predictions are quite close to the actual choices with a rate of successful predictions
of more than 82%.
In the second step, we consider in the demand estimation that client firms do
not only pick individual auditors but pairs of auditors. Previous research suggests
that client firms prefer specific pairs of auditors (Francis et al., 2009). A client that
has a Big Four auditor in a single audit regime might improve the cost-effectiveness
of the audit in a joint audit regime by adding a medium-sized or small audit firm
as a second auditor. It appears likely that different combinations of auditor pairs
differ in their abilities to cooperate, implying different levels of coordination costs
and synergies benefits. For example, the Big Four audit firm may achieve a more
cost-effective collaboration as they share a similar audit methodology. Our empirical
approach allows us to estimate the pair effect using French data. The pair effect
captures the opportunity of client firms to pick the combination of two auditors that
is most suitable for them. We do so by incorporating all possible pair combinations
into the clients’ utility to choose auditors. We consider that the preferences for pair
combinations may differ across clients with different characteristics by interacting
the pair combinations with client attributes.
The third step involves the analysis of the effects on market structure and social
welfare when joint audits are introduced in a single audit regime. We assume that
UK firms will most likely handle an introduction of joint audits by choosing a second
auditor while keeping the current one. This scenario seems likely given the persis-
tence of auditor-client relationship. 5 In the analysis, we derive counterfactuals for
choices of auditors and auditor pairs in the UK. We do not change the preferences
5 Based on the report of UK parliament in 2011, a FTSE 100 auditor remains the same auditor
for about 48 years on average; for the FTSE 250 the average is 36 years.
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of UK firms for individual auditors, but we include preferences for combinations
of auditors based on the estimated pair effect from France. Our estimates for pair
effects can be transferred to other contexts assuming that the pair effect is mainly
driven by client characteristics. This approach enables us to investigate the policy
implications of joint audit quantitatively. Moreover, we can also assess changes in
consumer surplus for estimating welfare implications. We define consumer surplus
for the audit market as the difference between the total value that clients derive
from the audit services and audit fees.
The simulation results suggest that the big four auditors would benefit very
differently in terms of their market share. The market leader PwC in the UK would
experience a significant increase in the market share not only measured by the
number of clients, but also would have a fairly increase around 6.5% in the market
share measured by clients’ assets. The second largest auditor Deloitte would have
slight decrease in the market share on the number of clients; but a slight increase
in the share measured by clients’ assets. The other two big four auditors would
have significant percentage decrease in their market shares in terms of both the
number of clients and clients’ assets. With respect to the medium auditors (in this
case Grant Thornton and BDO), the change in their market share shows a different
pattern. Both auditors would have a sharp drop, more than 40% in their market
share measured by the number of clients; however, their share in the client assets
would change in a completely contrasting way. BDO would stay more or less the
same, but Grant Thornton would quintuple the original share. The means that
although medium auditors lose some clients, they would be able to compete for the
big clients under the counterfactual joint audit policy.
Given the simulation results, it seems no surprise that Grant Thornton and BDO
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are the main voice to support such reform in the audit market since the medium
auditors would gain some market share. However, it is surprising that the Big
Four would necessarily lose their clients because of joint audit and some of the Big
Four would even gain market share, for instance PwC as the market leader would
benefit from such policy. The small auditors would not benefit too much compared
with the medium auditors. The total market share audited by all small auditors in
terms of both the number of clients and client assets would increase very marginally,
around 2%. Additionally, we can also compare the counterfactual results with the
predicted market shares which are derived from the model fitness tests. All the
changes for different auditors are moving the same directions as we compare the
counterfactuals with the actual market shares. So our assumption about clients
from different markets choose similar type of auditor when their client attributes
are similar doesn’t bias our results, at least the counterfactual changes remain quite
similar.
Our counterfactuals also show that if such policy were introduced in the UK, the
total consumer surplus would decrease by 7.2 million GBP on average over time.
Consumer surplus in the audit market is defined as the difference between the total
value client firms place on the audit service provided by the auditors and the audit
fees client firms pay for. The decomposition of the change in consumer surplus
shows that the consumer surplus difference between one single auditor and two
single auditors would decrease by 220 million GBP; while the pair effect associated
with joint audit would increase the consumer surplus by 212.8 million. It is not
surprising that the consumer surplus would decrease if clients were forced to choose
another auditor, generally the second-best in the market, but the pair effect would
compensate this loss even though not high enough.
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, section 3.2 relate
this chapter to the existing literature. Next, section 3.3 present the details of the
structural model to be estimated and discuss some specific issues related to the audit
market. Then section 3.4 describe the dataset used for empirical analysis. Finally,
the estimation results and counterfactual analyses are discussed in section 3.5 and
then followed by the conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
Our paper relates to studies that describe audit market competition and draw im-
plication on pricing or differences on audit quality from the analysis (Simunic, 1980;
Francis et al., 2005; Hay et al., 2006). This strand of literature has shown that
clients value audits differently and are willing to pay different fees for audits per-
formed by different types of auditors (Numan and Wilekens, 2012). We follow these
literature on what they found as significant auditor attributes,for instance,industry
specialist and we also use the client attributes that previous studies describe as im-
portant in the audit pricing (Hay et al., 2006). But our estimation approach offers
a broader theme of possible evaluations on the client and auditor relationship. The
issues related to demand, supply and strategic responses of market participants are
all able to be included under such framework. This allows us to provide more thor-
ough evidences on possible policy effects than the previous papers. The existing
studies also show that the Big Four or industry specialist may earn a fee premium.
Such evidences on the fee premiums are more prominent for US studies (Numan and
Wilekens, 2012). In our setting, the typical auditor attributes includes the industry
expertise proxies similar to what these studies define and the dummy variables in-
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dicate individual type of auditors (ex. the Big Fours or the medium auditors).The
preferences over certain auditors from certain clients are estimated to describe the
auditor-client relationship.
As our model describes how listed firms choose auditors, our research is related to
the studies on auditor choice. Prior research argues the selection of an auditor could
be due to either cost or quality considerations, or both (Knechel et al., 2008). Cost
is often associated with audit fees and the quality perspective is often manifested
as the Big Four or certain groups of auditors provide better quality. Of course the
evidences are rather mixed regarding different types of clients (Francis, 2004). The
general consensus is that the characteristics of client firms are affecting their choice
of auditors. And what we usually observe from previous studies is that the client
attributes associated with audit fees often affect the auditor choice (Craswell et al.,
1995; Hope et al., 2012). Our demand estimation approach basically considers the
match between certain clients with certain auditors reflects the choice preference
of certain clients and the estimation approach quantifies such choice preference.
Generally, the existing studies on auditor choice have been more focus on the choices
between the Big Four and the non-Big Four. But we intend to address the choice
preference with more specified choices, so our research has more detailed choice sets
and the choice set contains each individual big four auditor, each individual mid-tier
firms and other small small auditors (outside options). The specifications allow us
to investigate changes in the market structure for more relevant individual audit
firms if certain policy were introduced.
Our study models the audit service market if an individual client would choose
a better fitting auditor. The matching is conditioned on both the client’s attributes
and auditor’s attributes. So the framework of audit market competition no only
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captures the cost consideration of client firms but also the quality perspective. It
would be ideal to have data on more directly observable auditor attributes. But
since we conceptualize the auditor client relationship as the clients consider how the
attributes of auditors would fit its needs and choose the auditor offers the best net
value. The more direct auditor attributes, such as numbers of staff or hourly rate
of audit work, would already be captured by the observable attributes such as audit
fees or industry expertise. And since our model describes the market more from
the client firms’ point of view, it is adequate to measure the demand fundamentals
based on publicly observable attributes.
The demand estimation we use in this paper is well developed in the industrial
organization literature (Berry et al., 1995; Berry et al., 2004). But there is very little
empirical research on the service related market. There are some unique features
about service markets, like the audit market. For instance since the listed firms
are obligated to have their financial reports audited, there is a minimum amount of
service required. In a typical differentiated product, the price for the same product
does not vary across clients. But for the audit market the price (audit fees) differs
across clients and only available for those actual chosen auditors in the data. Hence
by addressing these issues in the demand estimation, our paper also contributes
to the IO research which investigates demand fundamentals in the general service
market. Gerakos and Syverson (2013) is one contemporaneous study that applies
a similar approach to investigate possible market impact when one of the Big Four
fails or mandatory rotation were introduced in the US. But we focus on different
policy issues and address the endogenous issue of audit fees in a more careful way
with respect to the demand estimation.
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3.3 Demand Model
To model how clients choose audit firms, we apply the random utility maximization
approach, rooted in McFadden’s choice theory (McFadden, 1973).In order to accom-
modate the auditor choice for clients from both France and the UK in a common
framework, We assume mainly the client’s attributes and auditor’s attributes ad-
dressed in our demand model drive the clients’ auditor choices. With respect to the
two markets we are looking into, UK and France, the differences between these two
markets are in fact not affecting the firms’ auditor choices much, especially regard-
ing the choice of having the second auditor. Then we specify the assumption that
the underlying heterogenous preference for auditors are the same across markets for
clients in both markets conditional on their characteristics.
For this particular assumption, We mainly assume the client’s attributes and au-
ditor’s attributes addressed in our demand model drive the clients’ auditor choices.
With respect to the two markets we are looking into, UK and France, the differences
between these two markets are in fact not affecting the firms’ auditor choices much,
especially regarding the choice of having the second auditor. During the time period
of our data, the listed firms in both countries have mostly adopted IFRS so that
they are subject to similar set of accounting standards.6 And as listed firms, these
clients would also share similar market incentives for considering the auditor choice.
Moreover, the industry compositions of these two markets share a lot of similarities
(see Table (3.9) in the appendix). We understand that these two markets are some-
what different and there are different audit policy implementation. But we provide
empirical evidence to validate this assumption and show that indeed the preferences
6 In both samples more than 90% firms have adopted IFRS. We also run robustness checks
with an IFRS dummy and it doesn’t change our results.
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over single auditor choices are quite similar across these two markets. So it is rea-
sonable to derive the counterfactuals for the UK firms by taking the preferences
from the French market. This assumption does not seem as strong as it appears but
we provide empirical validation that it does hold empirically.
We model the demand of listed firms for audit services as these clients choose a
better fitting auditor among several potential auditors, in our case, each individual
Big Four auditor, two medium auditors that rank as the fifth and the sixth in each
market and the other auditors as outside option. The client firms also choose the
better fitting auditor in order to maximize the expected benefits obtained from using
such auditor. The expected benefits are captured by the preferences attached to
client attributes, auditor attributes and match-specific attributes. And the match-
specific attributes are the audit fees and tenure. For instance, to illustrate a simple
example, assume in the estimation there is a positive parameter shown for client
size, then we can claim that larger client would enjoy higher utility from having
an auditor. However, such effect would be the same for all potential auditors. So
such parameter wouldn’t really help us to identify the choice preference. But if we
interact client size with different auditor dummies, then the interaction terms can
inform the auditor preferences of clients with different sizes.
We also assume the utilities enjoyed by clients for individual auditor attributes
are addable. In another words, we assume the clients’ utilities reflected in different
attributes are addable. Of course, the audit service is a product different from
typical merchandise, but since the service is difficult to separate into units and
the directly measurable variable such as working hours is difficult to observe for
researchers. As mentioned before, we utilize the observable attributes to capture
clients’ choice preference and some of the unobservable characteristics are already
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represented. This type of demand models are commonly used in the IO literature
and some marketing research (Dube et al., 2002 and Train, 2009), especially for
differentiated products. In the model, each firm chooses its auditor based on the
expected utilities from having each of the auditors. In the later estimation, as small
auditors are considered outside option and normalized, the utilities for having the
Big Four auditors and the medium auditors are benchmarked by the outside option.
So the client firm’s preference represents the relative level of client utility for audit
service. The model essentially describes the clients’ willingness to substitute different
auditors based on its own attributes.
3.3.1 Choice of single audit
The publicly listed firms (clients) are mandated to hire an auditor each period (year)
to maximize their utility. The audit firms in the choice set for every client includes
the Big Four (Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG and PwC), two medium audit firms
(BDO and Grant Thornton) and all other audit firms grouped as small auditors.
The deterministic part of the utility of client i at period t choosing one of the top 6
(the Big Four plus 2 medium auditors) audit firms j = 1, . . . , 6 in both France and
the UK is given by:
Vijt = α0Xijt + α1χijt +
6∑
k=1
(β1kδk + β2kδkτit)− α2pijt + ξjt (3.1)
The deterministic component Vijt of utility is approximated as a function of observed
auditors’ attributes as well as clients’ characteristics. Variable Xijt denotes audit
firm j’s attributes: industry expertise or industry specialist, defined in the same
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industry as client i.7 This is to capture the fact that clients in certain industries may
have systematically different preference for specific auditors. Variable χijt denotes
the tenure between client i audit firm j in period t. pijt is the audit fee that
client i pays to auditor j in period t, which will be discussed in length in the next
subsection. Parameter α2 captures the marginal willingness to pay a unit of audit
fees; ξjt denotes unobserved (to researchers) auditor j’s attributes, e.g., reputation
and quality.8
Variable δk is the dummy variable for the top 6 audit firms; parameter β1k cap-
tures the auditor fixed effect that represents the mean utility for all clients choosing
auditor k. It is well known that clients with different size prefer different audit
firms: big clients may prefer the Big Four while small clients may prefer the non-Big
Four.9 Hence, we use the interaction between clients’ size measured by logarithm
of total assets with auditor fixed effect to capture this heterogeneous preference. In
principle, we could interact all clients’ characteristics with auditors’ attributes to
allow for a very flexible form of heterogeneous preference, but this requires more
variation from the data to identify all the parameters. At this stage, we just use the
general notation τit for clients’ attributes and we will specify the exact interaction
term in the estimation stage.10 If client i chooses outside option, i.e, a small auditor
(non-top 6 audit firms), we represent the utility as Vi0t and normalize it to be zero:
Vi0t = 0
7 Industry classification is based on Famma-French criterion.
8 “unobserved” term refers some auditors’ attributes difficult to measure or observe in the
data from researchers’ perspective. From clients’ perspective, in the model they can observe every
attribute when making the decision to choose the auditor.
9 The Big Four audit almost all the FTSE 100 companies, and 240 of the companies in the
FTSE 250 (the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 2011).
10 Please find the complete description of variables in the Appendix
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It is a standard approach to normalize the deterministic component of utility of
choosing outside option as 0 because utility is invariant to monotone transforma-
tions. Since the identification requirement of discrete choice model (the demand esti-
mation approach) imply that only the difference of utilities matters (Train, 2009), we
normalize the utility of choosing small auditors to be a constant number, typically
as zero. So we consider all the small auditors provide homogenous audit service.
The client utilities of choosing different small auditors are the same.
3.3.2 Choice of joint audit
As joint audit is mandatory in the French audit market,11 clients are obligated to
choose a pair, i.e, two different auditors at the same time. Similar to the UK market,
the set of single audit firms in France also consists of the top 6 auditors and the
small auditors. Therefore, the choice set for clients in France is composed of all
possible pairs of auditors. The total number of all possible pairs in the choice set
equals to 22.12 The deterministic utility of client i in period t choosing a single
auditor j follows the same specification as equation (3.1) in both markets. However,
the utility of choosing a pair of auditors is not simply the sum of individual utility
of choosing two single auditors, because the cooperation process between different
auditors may vary vastly due to concerns about the reputation, technology platform,
auditor liability and so on. Compared with single audit, the unique feature of joint
audit hinges on the pair effect that varies across different combinations of auditor
types. The most straightforward way to capture the pair effect between two audit
11 According to French commercial law, statutory joint audit is required when firms register in
France and issue the report on consolidated financial statement.
12 Since small auditors also include many small audit firms, around 200 in France, clients can
choose two small different auditors as a pair. Thus the total number of possible combination of
pairs is given by (72) + 1 = 22.
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firms is to define them pair-wise, i.e.for each possible combination of auditor i and
j. It is, however, almost impossible to estimate these pair-wise combination effect
due to difficulties in computation and identification. Motivated by the observation
in the data that clients are interested in certain combinations of different groups of
audit firms as in table (3.3), we think group-wise combination are perfect candidate
for measuring the interesting pair effect with little loss of generality as well as for
identification. The group wise combinations should capture the different preferences
among different pairs well also because auditors within the same group are considered
quite similar, such as the Big Fours and the two medium auditors.
Auditors are categorized into three mutually exclusive groups, GL, GM , GS; the
group GL denotes the Big Four; GM includes two medium audit firms, i.e. top5 and
top6, and small auditors in group GS. In addition, we assume the pair effect is the
same for all audit firms in the same group:13
Γ(j, k) =

ΓLL, if (j, k) ∈ (GL ×GL);
ΓLM , if (j, k) ∈ (GL ×GM)⋃(GM ×GL);
ΓLS, if (j, k) ∈ (GL ×GL)⋃(GS ×GL);
ΓMM , if (j, k) ∈ (GM ×GM);
ΓMS, if (j, k) ∈ (GM ×GS)⋃(GS ×GM);
ΓSS, if (j, k) ∈ (GS ×GS);
Moreover, the pair effect of joint audit for each client firm i takes the following
parametric form:
Γit(j, k) =
∑
l
γ0lΓl +
∑
l
∑
r
γlΓlτrit, l = LL,LM,LS,MM,MS, SS
13 ΓLM is the same as ΓML, the same applies for ΓLS and ΓMS .
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where γ0l is the constant utility of choosing each specific combination of auditors; τrit
denotes the client i’s attributes that affect the choice of pair, such as size, sector,
complexity of financial statement, etc. This term captures clients’ heterogeneous
preference towards different specific groups as in table (3.3), for instance, large
clients may prefer two big four auditors as a pair over one big four combined with
one medium auditor; in contrast small clients may prefer one big four coupled with
one small auditor or two small auditors as a pair.
The overall utility of client i of choosing a pair of auditor j and k in period t is
given by:
uijkt = Vijt + Vikt + Γit(j, k) + ijkt (3.2)
Where ijkt is the idiosyncratic preference for a pair of auditors. This is the random
component of overall utility, which follows iid type 1 extreme value distribution.
Regarding this idiosyncratic preference shock ijkt, it captures factors that affect
clients’ utility associated with the chosen auditors but not included in Vikt, Vijt or
pair effect Γit(j, k). From researchers’ perspective, we are assumed to know the mere
distribution of these shock, but not the realized values.
Since we have assumed the utility of choosing one single small auditor is nor-
malized to be 0, we also normalize the deterministic part of the utility of choosing
a pair of small auditors to be 0 for consistency. As a result, the overall utility of
choosing a pair of small auditors equals to
ui00t = i00t
The term i00t denotes random preference shock of choosing this specific pair. It also
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follows iid type 1 extreme value distribution. Given the distribution of the random
shock, the probability of client i of choosing a pair of auditor j and k in period t
conditional on client’s and auditors’ attributes equals to
Prit(j,k) =
exp[Vikt + Vijt + Γit(j, k)]
1 +∑6l2=l1+1∑5l1=0 exp[Vil1t + Vil2t + Γit(l1, l2)] (3.3)
The choice probability Prit(j,k) in equation (3.3) is
Prit(j,k) = Pr(uit(j,k) > uit(n,m),∀n 6= i,m 6= k)
= Pr(ijkt − inmt > Vint + Vimt + Γit(n,m)−
(
Vikt + Vijt + Γit(j, k)
)
,∀n 6= i,m 6= k
)
=
∫
A11
. . .
∫
Anm
. . .
∫
A77
dF (ijkt − i11t) . . . dF (ijkt − inmt) . . . dF (ijkt − i77t)
Set Anm = Vint+Vimt+Γit(n,m)−
(
Vikt+Vijt+Γit(j, k)
)
, ∀n 6= i,m 6= k. Given the
type 1 extreme value distribution of ilkt for all l and k, the difference of ijkt − inmt
follows the logistic distribution, which yields to a closed form solution for the above
integration as,
Prit(j,k) =
exp[Vikt + Vijt + Γit(j, k)]
1 +∑6l2=l1+1∑5l1=0 exp[Vil1t + Vil2t + Γit(l1, l2)]
The constant number 1 is from the normalization of choosing small auditors (n = 7),
i.e., V17t = 0 and Γit(7, 7) = 0.
Prit(j,k) represents the probability of client i choosing a pair between auditor i
and j in period t. As the function form indicates, this probability is monotonically
increasing with the utility derived from each single auditor as well as the pair effect
between these two auditors.
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3.3.3 Audit Fees
As mentioned before, we only observe audit fees for real matches between clients
and auditors. Following the approach adopted by Gerakos and Syverson (2013), we
also estimate what audit fees a client would have expected to pay had it hired an
audit firm other than the one we observed in the data. A large body of literature
has demonstrated that audit fees are associated with measures of client size, client
risk, and client complexity as well as auditors’ characteristics (Hay et al., 2006).
Size measured in clients’ total asset generally accounts for a large proportion of the
variation in audit fees (Hay et al., 2006). In particular, we use the logarithm of
clients’ total asset to capture the economy of scale in common practice. Complexity
is measured by the number of product segment, number of foreign subsidiaries as
well as the number of operating business sectors. We use leverage ratio and current
ratio to capture the clients’ risk. Loss indicator (a dummy variable that equals 1
if loss occurs) and return on assets (ROA) are used to capture clients’ profitability.
We also control for price to book ratio, growth in sales in prior year, dummy variable
to capture whether the firm was a client of the auditor in prior year, industry fixed
effect using Fama-French 12-industry classification14 and time fixed effect in equation
(3.4).
ln(pijt) = p¯jt +
∑
r
βrτrit + µjt (3.4)
Where p¯jt is the basic audit fee charged by each auditor j in period t and is constant
across all clients; the premium of audit fee varies across clients and it is assumed
to be a linear function of client’s characteristics, equal to ∑r βrτrit. Variable µjt
14 We run robustness checks for different industry classifications and the results remain similar.
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denotes the iid normally distributed error term.15 This equation (3.4) implicitly
assumes that the rule of setting audit fees is a common knowledge between auditors
and clients. Hence clients know exactly how much audit fees they would expect to
pay if they decide to switch another auditor.
3.3.4 Endogenous Audit Fees
An obvious concern in the demand estimation are the endogenous audit fees. If
we leave some unobserved or unmeasured auditor attributes, e.g., audit quality and
reputation, etc, in the error term, the audit fees charged by each auditor will be
correlated with the error term, i.e., cov(pijt, ξjt) 6= 0. As Gerakos and Syverson
(2013) suggested, we can use the supply shock among audit firms as an instrument
variable to correct the upward biased coefficient of audit fees. Intuitively, if there
were mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between clients, the supply structure of audit
firms would be changed because one of transaction parties in M&A has to drop the
original audit firm. In the next period, the dropped audit firms will use attractive
audit fees to compete for new clients to compensate the client loss from M&A.
Therefore, the supply shock induced by M&A between clients in the previous period
is correlated with audit fees (pijt) but uncorrelated with demand shifts (ξjt).
However, differing from their procedure of dealing with endogenous issue, we use
the same instrument variable, but apply the control function approach which is more
appropriate in the discrete choice model. In the literature of health economics, the
way used by Gerakos and Syverson (2013) is the two-stage predictor substitution
(2SPS) while the control function approach is called two-stage residual inclusion
15 In the current version of this paper, we only use OLS to predict the audit fees. The estimation
results show such approach is sufficient.
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(2SRI). 2SRI is generally statistically consistent for nonlinear models, but 2SPS is
not by Terza, Basu and Rathouz (2008).16 The general idea underlying the control
function correction is to find a proxy for the unobserved auditor attributes ξjt.
With the proxy of ξjt in the demand estimation, the variation of endogenous audit
fee will be independent of the error term. And the estimation result of the standard
approach would become consistent (Petrin and Tain, 2010). More precisely, we first
use zt−1, the ratio of three-digit SIC industry assets merged in the prior year to
instrument the variation of audit fees in the current period as in equation (3.5).
ln(pijt) = p¯jt + ρ0zt−1 +
∑
r
ρrτrit + µjt (3.5)
µjt and ξjt are independent of zt−1 and τrit, but are not independent of each other.
The key idea of the control function approach is that we can use µjt as the proxy
variable for unobservable attributes ξjt such as audit quality and then obtain the
consistent estimators of demand preference condition on it. After the first stage
regression of equation (3.5), residual µˆjt enters the demand estimation in the second
stage. The general control function approach allows for a flexible function form of
µˆjt in the second-stage estimation
ξjt = h(µˆjt), (3.6)
where h(µˆjt) denotes the control function. The simplest form of h(µˆjt) would be
linear function. Alternatively, a high order polynomial approximation can be used
for robustness check. It is worth mentioning that the unobserved auditor attributes
16 Please find the details of control function approach in Petrin and Train (2010).
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ξjt which do not vary across clients implicitly make it feasible to apply the control
function approach. Otherwise, we can not obtain the proxy for audit quality from
the unobserved audit fees.
Regarding the unobserved auditor attributes ξjt, it can be generally interpreted
as anything (not necessarily audit quality) that are correlated with the audit fee.
Such term is assumed to be constant across clients, which assume that for instance
one auditor should provide the same service quality to all clients. However if it
were allowed to vary across clients, it will be confounded with preference shock
that cannot be identified from the data. We can normally interpret it as quality
because quality is one common item that could generate the typical endogenous
problem. And it also affects the audit fees and auditor choices. In our case, it can
be regarded as a mixture between audit quality and litigation liability, or something
else that are (approximately) constant across clients, correlated with audit fees and
also affect clients’ auditor choice. Then this term should be explained consistently
in the control function approach.
Similar to Gerakos and Syverson (2013), Table (3.1) shows that the coefficients
of “Scaled merged assets” are significantly negative, which means the bigger merg-
ers and acquisitions of clients are associated with lower audit fees in the following
period. The industry wise shock presented by M&A activities creates a downward
price effect. Hence we can use supply shock from M&A between clients as a valid
instrument for audit fees.
Figure (3.1) illustrates the plots of actual versus predicted audit fees in both
France and UK. As shown in Figure 1, the predicted audit fees fit well with the
actual audit fees. The correlation between predicted audit fees and actual audit
fees is larger than 0.93 in both countries. The average magnitude of audit fees in
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Table 3.1: M&A between clients as supply shock during 2005-2012
ln(Audit Fees) UK France
scaled merged assets -0.1653∗∗ -0.2878∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.000)
ln(assets) 0.5072∗∗∗ 0.6842∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0144)
leverage ratio 0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0026
(0.0001) (0.0021)
No. geographical subsidiary 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0083)
No. product segment 0.0865∗∗∗ 0.0283
(0.0136) (0.0196)
current ratio -0.0042∗ -0.1140∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0306)
price to book value 0.0007 0.0073∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0026)
sale growth 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0053
(0.0000) (0.0516)
tenure -0.0002 0.0220
(0.0181) (0.0362)
cross listed 0.2774∗∗∗ 0.2429∗∗∗
(0.0679) (0.0510)
receivable to assets 0.1217∗ 1.0523∗∗∗
(0.0649) (0.1589)
ROA -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0089∗
(0.0007) (0.0041)
loss dummy 0.0611 0.1041∗
(0.0523) (0.0524)
location 0.1395∗∗∗ 0.1766∗∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0433)
constant -0.5976∗ -3.0979∗∗∗
(0.2727) (0.2704)
Auditor fixed effect Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 6159 2392
Adjusted R2 0.6612 0.9122
Notes: Standard errors clustered at industry-level; ***, ** and * denote signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
Scaled merge assets denotes the ratio of occurred M&A assets over total assets
in three-digit SIC industry; cross listed is a dummy, equal to 1 if the client
is cross listed in the US stock market; location is an indicator whether the
headquarter of the client is located in the capital of the country.
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Figure 3.1: Actual v.s. predicted audit fees
(a) UK (b) France
the UK is relatively higher and a larger proportion of them distributed between the
range of above 5 and 10 compared with the distribution in France,17 The difference
is mainly driven a larger proportion of big clients measured in assets in the UK.
3.4 Data
The sample in our study consists of the listed firms in the UK and France with
available data. The sample period lasts from 2005 to 2012. Our data are from
commercial databases and publicly available financial reports of listed firms. The
data on client attributes and auditor-client matches are from Amadeus database.
We collect the audit fees from Datastream for the UK firms and hand-collected
data from annual reports for French firms. And we also obtain the mergers and
acquisitions data from SDC database.
Table (3.2) presents the descriptive statistics.18 Table (3.9) in the appendix
17 The scale in Figure (3.1) equals to the logarithm of thousand audit fees in the local currency,
i.e., GBP for the UK and EURO for France.
18 The descriptive statistics show that some variables take on extreme values, e.g., current ratio
and price to book ratio. Our findings are robust to winsorizing these variables at the 1% and 99%
percentile.
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shows the descriptive statistics for the distribution of client firms across industries.
Table 3.2: Summary of descriptive statistics in the UK
UK
Variable Mean SD P10 P90 N
MA ratio (MAit−1) 1.434% 0.091 0 9.968% 7100
log(total assets) 11.323 2.343 8.567 14.607 7100
Leverage ratio 16.354 18.496 0 136.190 7100
Num-Geo 1.767 1.675 0 4 7100
Num-Prod 1.644 1.022 1 3 7100
Current ratio 3.432 15.394 0.655 5.810 7100
Price to book ratio 2.315 18.675 0.400 5.810 7100
Growth of sales 0.207 0.860 -0.239 0.658 7100
Receivables 0.165 0.346 0.015 0.338 7100
ROA -0.731 15.834 -13.655 12.290 7100
Variable mean sd obs (dummy=1) obs (dummy=0) N
Loss dummy 0.382 0.486 2712 4388 7100
London 0.335 0.472 2378 4722 7100
Cross list dummy 0.101 0.301 717 6383 7100
France
Variable Mean SD P10 P90 N
MA ratio (MAit−1) 0.137% 0.017 0 0 2392
log(total assets) 13.900 2.053 11.344 17.020 2392
Leverage ratio 23.297 15.112 3.79 43.810 2392
Num-Geo 2.015 2.417 0 6 2392
NUM-Prod 2.499 1.416 1 4 2392
Current ratio 1.436 0.775 0.780 2.310 2392
Price to book ratio 1.914 3.923 0.660 3.490 2392
Growth of sales 0.096 0.392 -0.094 0.264 2392
Receivables 0.241 0.140 0.084 0.443 2392
ROA 4.966 8.251 -2.360 13.030 2392
Variable mean sd obs (dummy=1) obs (dummy=0) N
Loss dummy 0.161 0.368 386 2006 2392
Paris 0.360 0.480 862 1530 2392
Cross list dummy 0.209 0.405 500 1892 2392
As shown in Figure (3.2), the average market share measured by number of
clients over the sample period is around 13% among the big four auditors in the
UK. For small auditors, their total market share in terms of the number of clients
is up to 27% average over time, but there are between 200 and 300 small auditors
in each period, resulting in the market share per small auditor almost trivial in the
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Figure 3.2: Market shares of audit firms in the UK during 2005-2012
market. Based on the average market share measured by the number of clients,
the audit market doesn’t seem so concentrated. However, if we use the total assets
audited by each auditor to measure the market share, the audit market is basically
dominated by the Big Four as expected in the UK. The sum of this average share
by the Big Four is more than 90%, and the market leader PwC alone even reach
47%, almost half of the total market. In this case, two medium auditors- BDO and
Grant Thornton also become marginal in the market. With respect to the share of
audit fees, it is positively correlated with total assets audited by each auditor. In
brief, the big clients are audited by the Big Four and the other clients are shared by
medium and small auditors.
As joint audit is mandatory implemented in France, Table (3.3) describes the
distribution of different pairs between audit firm during the sample period. L denotes
one of the big four audit firms; M denotes one of the medium audit firms; S denotes
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Table 3.3: The distribution of different pairs in France 2005-2012
Group Percentage Client Size
(%) I II III
LL 24.18 9.48 18.60 44.64
LM 18.17 7.73 17.39 29.43
LS 37.99 48.88 44.20 20.70
MM 0.99 1.75 1.21 0.50
MS 7.89 12.72 10.39 0
SS 10.77 19.45 8.21 4.74
one of the small audit firms in France. LL denotes a pair composed of any two of
the big four audit firms. LM denotes a pair composed of one of the big four audit
firms and one of the medium audit firms. LS denotes a pair composed of one of
the big four audit firms and one of the small audit firms. Client size I, II, and III
denotes small, medium and large clients measured in total assets respectively.19 It
is clear that clients have heterogenous preference for specific pairs under the joint
audit policy as in Table (3.3). Although LS is the most prevalent pair in general,
around 38%, large clients strongly prefer LL and LM to LS; while it remains the
most preferred pair for medium and small clients.
Table (3.4) shows the basic statistic summary of audit fees charged by each au-
ditor in both countries. We first divide both original fees by thousand and then take
the logarithm, leading to the observations in (3.4). It is not surprise that the big
four auditors on average charge a higher audit fee than the medium auditors and
similarly the medium auditors charge higher fees than the small auditors, because
the audit fees mainly depends on the workload which is measured by clients size.
Compared with France, the audit fees charged by small auditors, medium auditors
and the Big Four in the UK on average is relatively higher, but with a smaller vari-
19 The total assets are discretized by the 3-quantiles. So the top 33% are large client, the
medium 33% are medium client and the bottom 33% are small clients.
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Table 3.4: Summary of audit fees in France and the UK during 2005-2012
mean sd median min max N
UK
PwC 12.871 0.231 12.720 12.674 13.367 1314
E&Y 11.666 0.165 11.576 11.478 11.970 629
Deloitte 11.796 0.127 11.760 11.636 12.087 1111
KPMG 11.984 0.577 11.789 11.630 13.430 1148
GT 9.473 0.306 9.445 8.964 9.914 936
BDO 9.234 0.148 9.192 9.012 9.436 657
Small auditors 6.224 0.211 6.155 5.982 6.593 2114
overall 10.015 2.568 11.571 5.982 13.430 7909
France
PwC 11.047 0.614 11.131 8.082 11.359 232
E&Y 11.754 0.750 11.882 8.050 12.122 389
Deloitte 11.161 0.556 11.209 7.979 11.516 350
KPMG 11.076 0.659 11.232 8.038 11.396 299
Mazars 10.867 0.780 11.175 7.762 11.406 254
GT 8.758 0.911 8.589 4.771 9.724 87
Small auditors 5.709 0.663 5.402 4.558 6.585 819
overall 9.280 2.688 11.069 4.558 12.122 2430
ance. The composition of two medium auditors is different across the two countries.
The fifth largest auditor in the UK is Grant Thornton (GT) and Mazars in France;
while the sixth auditor auditor is BDO in the UK and GT in France.The approach
we label these auditors are merely based on their relative ranking in each market.
The label of medium auditor represents the auditors’position in the markets as the
fifth and sixth largest auditors. Therefore, the label for the medium auditors can
be commonly regarded as a ranking or recognition of auditor reputation in both
countries.
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3.5 Demand Estimation Results
3.5.1 Demand Estimation Results in French market
The demand model is estimated in two steps as required by the control function
approach. We first regress the endogenous variable (audit fee) on other observed
clients’ characteristics and the instruments. The corresponding estimation results
have been reported in Table (3.1). The residuals of first-stage regression are used
to compute the control function, which enters the discrete choice model as an extra
variable in the second step. Then we implement bootstrap to correct the standard
error for the two-step estimators (Petrin and Train, 2010).
Table (3.5) presents the general preference of public listed firms in France esti-
mated by conditional logit approach. The first column in this table does not use
control function to address the endogenous audit fee; while the other two does and
allows for a different form of control function. As expected, the control function
approach helps to correct the biased coefficient of willingness to pay the audit fees
in column 1, from −0.4 to −0.5 as in column 2. In column three, we add a higher
order term in the control function, but the estimated parameter is fairly close to that
in column 2 and the square term is not significant. Thus we stick to the estimation
results in column 2 and use them for counterfactual analysis in next subsection. The
proxy for unobserved auditor attributes also have the positive sign and the coefficient
is significant, which implies the control function might be able to provide a good
approximation for audit quality if we consider such unobserved audior attributes as
audit quality.
The estimation results mainly represent clients’ preference for individual audi-
tor. The variables such as tenure, industry leader and industry specialist are all
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Table 3.5: Demand Estimation in France
industry leader 3.8726∗∗∗ 3.9275∗∗∗ 3.9301∗∗∗
(0.5141) (0.5901) (0.5892)
industry specialist 4.1172∗∗∗ 4.1692∗∗∗ 4.1675∗∗∗
(0.4647) (0.5167) (0.5145)
tenure 22.6902∗∗∗ 25.2915∗∗∗ 24.5025∗∗∗
(3.3080) (5.0744) (5.3123)
ln(audit fee) -0.4422∗ -0.5003∗∗ -0.5029∗∗
(0.2338) (0.2356) (0.2374)
PwC -5.9710∗∗∗ -5.8629∗∗∗ -5.6679∗∗∗
(2.2027) (2.1539) (2.1270)
E&Y -6.0621∗∗ -6.0183∗∗∗ -5.8149∗∗
(2.3802) (2.3253) (2.3095)
Deloitte -5.1957∗∗∗ -4.8842∗∗∗ -4.6111∗∗∗
(1.1578) (1.0613) (1.1060)
KPMG -5.0292∗∗∗ -5.1046∗∗∗ -4.9487∗∗∗
(0.8568) (0.7737) (0.7794)
Mazars -6.3394∗∗∗ -6.1735∗∗∗ -5.8366∗∗∗
(1.8086) (1.7496) (1.7375)
GT -4.4489∗∗ -4.7346∗∗ -4.8091∗∗
(1.9534) (1.9274) (1.8683)
PwC*ln(assets) 0.4122∗∗ 0.4013∗∗ 0.3819∗∗
(0.1758) (0.1707) (0.1707)
E&Y*ln(assets) 0.4248∗∗ 0.4181∗∗ 0.3981∗∗
(0.1781) (0.1734) (0.1728)
Deloitte*ln(assets) 0.3434∗∗∗ 0.3185∗∗∗ 0.2948∗∗∗
(0.0949) (0.0865) (0.0902)
KPMG*ln(assets) 0.3403∗∗∗ 0.3428∗∗∗ 0.3256∗∗∗
(0.0663) (0.0620) (0.0607)
Mazars*ln(assets) 0.4676∗∗∗ 0.4610∗∗∗ 0.4396∗∗∗
(0.1316) (0.1287) (0.1278)
GT*ln(assets) 0.2211 0.2515 0.2581
(0.1703) (0.1694) (0.1643)
audit quality 1.9334∗ 2.6697∗∗
(1.0020) (1.0917)
audit quality square -5.5148
(4.5755)
pair1*geography 0.1587 0.1691 0.1764
(0.1564) (0.1536) (0.1557)
pair2*geography 0.1133 0.1220 0.1145
(0.1143) (0.1092) (0.1083)
pair3*geography 0.1896 0.1906 0.1889
(0.1226) (0.1228) (0.1223)
pair4*geography 0.0242 0.0273 0.0235
(0.1306) (0.1275) (0.1310)
pair5*geography -0.1502 -0.1501 -0.1494
(0.1176) (0.1149) (0.1139)
pair1*receivable -3.9552∗∗∗ -3.7406∗∗∗ -3.4206∗∗∗
(0.8560) (0.7670) (0.7621)
pair2*receivable -3.1668∗∗∗ -3.6651∗∗∗ -3.4826∗∗∗
(1.1258) (1.0466) (0.9643)
pair3*receivable -0.2766 0.1385 0.1863
(0.6323) (0.6902) (0.6884)
pair4*receivable -1.1392 -0.9592 -0.8633
(4.2133) (4.1956) (3.9982)
pair5*receivable 0.2172 0.7096 0.8033
(1.4453) (1.4997) (1.3760)
pair1*location 1.7254∗∗∗ 1.7663∗∗∗ 1.7866∗∗∗
(0.4076) (0.3750) (0.3669)
pair2*location 0.2319 0.1530 0.0870
(0.4269) (0.3896) (0.3809)
pair3*location 0.9708∗∗ 0.9327∗ 0.9145∗
(0.4799) (0.4937) (0.5005)
pair4*location -15.7572∗∗∗ -17.4911∗∗∗ -16.2370∗∗∗
(0.6808) (0.6870) (0.6735)
pair5*location 0.3731 0.4281 0.5002
(0.5297) (0.5639) (0.5300)
R2 .8907496 .8911568 .8913553
−L -401.2769 -399.7815 -399.0523
Standard errors clustered at industry-level.
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
84
significant and have the expected sign.20 That is to say, given everything else being
equal, public listed firms prefer low audit fees, more likely to choose the auditor
that already has a long run tenure, and also prefer auditors that are industry leader
and specialist. The interaction terms between clients’ size and auditors’ fixed ef-
fect capture clients’ heterogeneous preference. The positive sign of these interaction
terms suggest that client with larger size prefer the top 6 auditors compared with
small auditors. The magnitudes of interactions on the top 5 auditors are similar but
much larger than the interactions on one medium auditor (GT), which means that
the Big Four are more preferable by large clients and only one of the two medium
auditors can compete with the Big Four for these large clients. Bigger clients would
strongly prefer the big four auditors over the medium auditors, although the the top
six auditors are preferred by big clients in general.
Pair1 to pair6 are the pair dummies, representing big-big, big-medium, big-small,
medium-medium, medium-small and small-small pairs between audit firms respec-
tively.21 The small-small pair (pair6) is used as the base due to the normalization
and collinearity. The pair dummies are interacting with clients’ attributes including
financial complexity measured by the number of foreign subsidiaries, risk measured
by the ratio of receivable over total assets and the location of firm’s headquarter.
Location equals to 1 if this client is located in the capital of the country, otherwise
0. As suggested by previous research (Craswell and Francis ,1999; Ferguson et al.,
2003), audit engagements are administered by an audit team typically located in
an office in the same city as the clients’ headquarters. And the two cities consid-
20 Detailed definition of these variables are present in the Appendix. ln(assets) is the natural
logarithm of the client’s total assets.
21 The estimation results in Table (3.5) do not contain pair fixed effect because of the identifi-
cation issue. The pair dummies are just certain linear combination of individual dummies, thus we
can not identify pair fixed effect alone when controlling for clients’ preference for each individual
auditor.
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ered in our setting are Paris and London which can be considered to have more
capital and more personnel at their offices in general. So the use of the headquar-
ter locations could capture some extent of the office level competition and clients’
willingness to pay for better auditor for higher costs. Since the pair1 and pair3
(big-big and big-small) are strongly preferred by clients located in the capital, the
results does confirm that clients would like to pay for large premium for auditors
with high reputation if their headquarter is located in the capital of a country. As
in Table (3.5), the interaction between clients’ financial complexity shows a positive
sign, though not significant. This means as the financial structure of public listed
firms become more complicated, these clients would prefer pairs with at least one
auditor from the Big Four or medium-tier. It confirms the perception that the Big
Four are more capable of handling financially complicated clients. The coefficient of
interaction between receivable and pair fixed effect reach significantly negative sign
in such pairs as big-big and big-medium. This suggests if clients are getting risky in
terms of high ratio of receivable over assets, they will be less likely to choose pairs
with at least one auditor from the Big Four. This indicates the Big Four might avoid
risky clients because their better risk management. Regarding the interaction be-
tween location and pair dummies, we find significantly mixed sign for distinguished
pairs. Clients with the headquarter in the capital most prefer big-big pair and then
big-small pair, but strongly dislike medium-medium pair compared with small-small
pair base. These results confirm that there is the pair effect under the joint audit
policy. Moreover clients have heterogenous preference for specific pair combinations
in addition to its original preference for single auditor.
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3.5.2 Model fit for the UK market
In the beginning of this paper, we have imposed a basic assumption that publicly
listed firms have the same preference for auditors conditional on their attributes in
both countries. We will validate this assumption in this section in spite of a variety
of country differences. Although Table (3.5) presents the results of the demand
estimation in the French market, it also contains the information on the public
listed firms’ preferences for individual auditors. These parameters for the variables
such as tenure, industry leader, industry specialist, individual auditor dummy and
its interaction with assets are assumed to be the same as clients in the UK. Then
we use them to predict the single auditor choice for clients in the UK and compare
the prediction with actual choice observed in the data.
uukijt = Vijt + ijt
The utility of client i choosing single auditor j at period t in the UK market is
represented by uukijt. It composes of two parts: the deterministic part Vijt, exactly
the same formula as in France and the random part ijt also iid extreme value type
1 distribution. Similarly, the utility of choosing small auditors is normalized as:
uuki0t = i0t
Given this utility specification as well as the preference for single auditors derived
from French market, we can compute the probability Prukijt of client i choosing each
single auditor j in each year t in the UK conditional on her attributes τit. We then
use the corresponding highest probability as the predicted choice to compare with
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actual choice in the data.
Table 3.6: Model fit in the UK market during 2006-2012
Actual/Predicted choice PwC E&Y Deloitte KPMG GT BDO Small auditor
PwC 93.8% 0.5% 1.4% 1.2% 0.9% 0.1% 2.1%
E&Y 10.2% 84.2% 1.4% 1.2% 0.6% 0.4% 1.8%
Deloitte 8.3% 1.0% 86.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.3% 2.2%
KPMG 5.1% 0.9% 1.1% 89.2% 0.8% 0.9% 2.2%
GT 8.1% 0.5% 1.6% 1.3% 83.5% 0.5% 4.5%
BDO 7.1% 0.6% 1.4% 1.6% 0.8% 82.2% 6.3%
Small auditor 9.9% 0.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.4% 86.3%
Table (3.6) shows how the preference parameters derived from French market fit
the observations in the UK. The row denotes clients’ actual choice and the column
displays the predicted choice according to highest probability. The first row should
be interpreted as conditional on the actual choice of clients choosing PwC during
2006 to 2012, the model predicts that 93.8% of these clients choose PwC, which
coincides with the actual choice. And 0.5% of these clients are predicted to choose
Deloitte and so on. Therefore, the numbers on the diagonal of Table (3.6) indicate
the fitness of the preference parameters. On average 86.5% of the predicted choice
is consistent with actual choice in the UK, in particular for clients that actually
choose PwC, the correctness of prediction reaches 93.8%. Regarding clients that
choose other auditors in the UK, on average around 85% predictions coincides with
actual choice and PwC seems to be the second best choice among these clients.
Please note that we only use UK sample from 2006 to 2012, because the variable
tenure has more than 67% missing values in the first year 2005. Consequently, we
drop the first year 2005’s observations in the UK and all the following counterfactual
analyses are also based on the sample from 2006 to 2012.
Figure (3.3) presents another measure how the preference parameters fits the
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Figure 3.3: Model fit of the UK during 2006-2012
(a) Clients’ number (b) Clients’ asset
UK data in terms of aggregated market share. In general, the predicted market
shares by both number of clients and assets of clients fit the actual share quite well.
However, the aggregated share of PwC is overpredicted in both measures, because
PwC is systematically over predicted for clients that choose other auditors as shown
in Table (3.6).
3.6 Counterfactual Policy Analysis
The European Commission has been concerned about the high concentration of Big
Four in the UK market. France is the only country that implements mandatory joint
audit policy and has the least concentrated audit market in Europe. The debate
on this policy has been controversial. In this section, we would like to provide a
guideline for policy makers on the potential impact of joint audit policy in the UK
market.
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3.6.1 Change of Market Share under Joint Audit in the UK
If public listed firms in the UK were mandated to choose two audit firms under
joint audit policy, two possible cases would arise. One case would be that clients
still keep the current auditor and choose a second auditor. The other one would be
that clients drop the current auditor and choose two new auditors for the joint audit
service. The first case is more likely to be expected to be true because the variable
tenure in the demand estimation shows that clients prefer to establish a long-term
relationship with audit firms. Therefore, we simulate how the audit market structure
evolves in the UK under the joint audit policy, in which clients keep the original
auditor and additionally choose a second audit firm. Then the utility of client i in
period t keeping original auditor j0 and adding another auditor j1 in the UK would
be
uukij0j1t = Vij0t + Vij1t + Γit(j0, j1) + ij0j1t
Γit(j0, j1) represents the pair effect between auditor j0 and j1, and it varies across
client i according to their individual characteristics. It is worth mentioning how
we calculate the predicted audit fee under joint audit policy. The two auditors are
supposed to share workload and charge each individual audit fee associated with
the separated workload. The criteria for dividing workload in the counterfactual is
derived from the observed ratio in the French market. In addition to the shared
workload, the individual auditor’s attributes also multiply the associated workload
ratio to enter Vij0t and Vij1t under joint audit policy. Take individual fixed effect
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for example, client i can enjoy all the utility from the fixed effect (reputation) of
auditor j0 under single audit, while under the joint audit, client i’s utility from
original auditor j0 would get a discount because auditor j0 now only provide part of
auditing service under the joint audit. Given the each individual predicted audit fee
pˆij0t and pˆij1t, clients’ preference parameters, auditors’ attributes, and the random
draw of the idiosyncratic preference shock, we can compute each client’s optimal
choice in every period. As a result, we calculate every auditor’s new market share
in the counterfactual joint policy.
Figure 3.4: Change of market shares in the UK (clients’ number)
Figure (3.4) and Figure (3.5) show the market share would change for each
auditor in terms of number of clients and assets of clients respectively under the
joint audit policy. In both figures, we plot the actual share observed in the data,
the predicted share under single audit as in previous subsection and the share under
joint audit. The predicted share under single audit provides another necessary
benchmark to compare with counterfactual scenario because it helps to provide a
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Figure 3.5: Change of market shares in the UK (clients’ asset)
robustness change in the market share with controlling for the prediction error.
As shown in the figures, the market share of the Big Four changes quite differently
from each other in both on the number of their clients and the asset size of their
clients. The market leader PwC would have a significant increase in the share of
clients’ number, from originally around 17% increase to around 30% under joint
audit policy. Its market share of clients’ assets would also have a fair increase, from
around 46% to around 49% average over time. The direct follower after Pwc in the
UK market is Deloitte, who also experience a slight increase in both market share
measures. The third Big Four- Ernst & Young’s share of clients’ assets would almost
stay the same as in single audit, while its share of clients’ number would have a fair
decrease. The forth Big Four KPMG in the UK market would experience a sharp
drop in the share for both number of clients and assets of clients. The market share
loss for KPMG and Ernst & Young seems to justify their incentive to lobby against
this potential reform.
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It is interesting to see how the two medium size auditors change their market
share since they are quite in favor of this policy reform (Jones 2012). As both
figures shows, Grant Thornton (GT) and BDO would lose at least one third of their
original share in number of clients, but would benefit substantially for their share
in clients’ assets. This market share measure for Grant Thornton would quintuple,
from originally 0.36% to around 1.8%. This means Grant Thornton would be able
to compete for some big clients even though have less total amount of clients under
the joint audit. However for BDO, this measure would increase very tiny, almost
the same as before. With respect to small auditors, they would get relatively bigger
share of the pie than before. Although on average, their market shares still are
trivial to the bigger auditors as in Figure (3.4) and Figure (3.5). Their total market
shares would increase by 2% on average over time in terms of both clients’ number
and assets.
Table 3.7: Patterns of chosen pair under the joint audit policy in the UK
Big4 Medium Small
PwC 0.8904 0.0891 0.0205
E&Y 0.9699 0.0115 0.0186
Deloitte 0.9628 0.0177 0.0195
KPMG 0.9612 0.0181 0.0208
GT 0.9564 0.0043 0.0393
BDO 0.9294 0.0072 0.0634
Small auditors 0.0295 0.0138 0.9567
Table (3.7) shows detailed pattern how clients choose pairs conditional on keeping
their current auditors in the UK. Around 89% clients that originally choose PwC
would choose another Big Four to form a pair; and then 9% of them would choose
one medium firm as pair, leaving the left 2% to choose a small auditor in a pair.
For these clients that originally choose other Big Four auditors, more than 96% of
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them would choose another Big Four (most likely PwC) as a pair choice under joint
audit, and the remaining has a relatively higher probability to choose small auditors
compared with medium auditors. The same pattern holds for clients that choose
medium auditors originally. Regarding small auditors’ clients, they would like to
choose another small auditor as a pair because they do not benefit too much by
choosing one Big Four or medium auditor indicated by their preference parameter.
The simulation results seems unexpected to some extent because we observe that big-
small pair is the generally most prevalent pair choice in France. But Table (3.3) also
shows that clients with large amount of assets (the top 33%) have a strict preference
ordering which is big-big big-medium, big-small pair and other pairs. Since clients’
size in the UK market on average is larger than in France, it is not surprising that
most of them would choose big-big pair if joint audit policy were introduced in the
UK. Combined this table with previous figure, we can well explain which channel
drives the change of the aggregated market share. PwC would lose a few big clients,
but harvest more relatively small clients from other Big Four and medium auditors
under joint audit policy. That’s why its share in number of clients increases much
higher than the share in assets of clients. The medium auditor-Grant Thornton
would successfully compete for some big clients that originally choose PwC, leading
to the soar of its share in clients’ assets. Small auditors would benefit very marginally
due to distribution of clients’ size in the UK. In all, the concentration of the Big
Four auditors measured by the sum of their market shares in clients’ assets drop
slightly because of the rise of the medium auditors under joint audit.
These results show the possible introduction of joint audit would significantly
shape up the current market structure in the UK. However, we would like to point
out that these results do not include the possible strategic price response from
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auditors, especially the Big Four. Since the Big Four have much more market power
in the current market, they would react to the policy change by setting a new optimal
price in order to compete for more clients. The same applies to other auditors, but
they might be in a disadvantaged position to compete. In addition, there would not
be any entry or exit of audit firms during the sample period if the joint audit were
implemented in the UK. Basically, we focus on the short-run effect of joint audit
policy. The general equilibrium model with audit firms entering or exit would enable
us to investigate the long-run policy effect, but it is much more complicated and
beyond the scope of current version. Hence our current results should be interpreted
with caution.
3.6.2 Change of welfare under Joint Audit in the UK
The welfare in this paper is equal to consumer surplus of all clients in the UK since
we do not model cost function in the supply side so far. To estimate the change of
consumer surplus, we apply the approach developed by McFadden (1999): calculate
the expected change in consumer surplus for each client as the expected unit currency
transfer required to make that client indifferent between choosing original auditor in
the single aduit and choosing new auditors arising under the counterfactuals. Then
we sum the change across all clients to obtain the expected total change in consumer
surplus.
To more specific, to calculate the expected change in consumer surplus for each
client firm as the expected money transfer required to make that client indifferent
between the original choice set of the status quo and the joint audit choice set arising
under the counterfactuals. We sum these changes of surplus across individual clients
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to obtain the expected total change in consumer surplus.
max
k
uikt(pikt, ~xikt, ikt) = max
k1,k2
uik1k2t(pik1t + pik2t − Cik(k1k2)t, ~xik1t, ~xik2t, ik1k2t) (3.7)
Where the vector ~xikt represents all the other factors, besides the audit fee pikt
and idiosyncratic shock ikt that affect client i’s utility of choosing any auditor j
in period t. Suppose in the data we observe client i original chooses auditor j
to reach the maximum utility uijt, and under counterfactual policy of joint audit,
client i chooses the auditor j and k that yields the maximized utility uijkt. Then
the change of consumer surplus Cij(jk)t is the pounds transfer that would make the
client reach the same utility between the original choice and optimal choice under
the counterfactual. In other words, Cij(jk)t can be interpreted as the compensation
in pounds client i could obtain due to enforcement of counterfactual policy. The
total change of consumer surplus is the sum of Cij(jk)t across all clients each period.
Figure 3.6: Change of welfare in the UK after joint audit policy
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As a similar procedure to compute the change of market share in the coun-
terfactual, we can simulate each client’s optimal auditor choice and then compute
the difference of the maximum utility for each client derived in both original and
counterfactual world. As shown in Figure (3.6), clients would slightly be worse off
over the sample period in the counterfactual joint audit policy, ranging from 9 mil-
lion GBP to 5.6 million GBP. The estimated average change in welfare over time
would decrease by 7.2 million GBP. However, the decomposition of consumer surplus
change suggests clients instead would benefit from pure pair effect from joint audit
to a great extent, on average around 212 million GBP better off, but unfortunately
this compensation is not high enough to balance out the loss from being forced to
choose another auditor in the pair.
To mitigate the concern that these simulation results are driven by specific forms,
we try alternative utility function forms, i.e., adding several more clients’ attributes
to interact with pair fixed effect as a robustness check. We first re-estimate all
the preference parameters associated with each specification and then use them to
simulate the counterfactual results. We find that the change in the direction of
above all shares as well as consumer surplus is quite consistent and robust, but the
percentage of the change varies across different specifications.
3.7 Conclusion
Within EU, the European Commission green paper (2010) raises the issue of audit
market concentration. The UK regulators are also extremely concerned with the
concentration of audit market. The report from the House of Lord (2011) indicates
that they believe there is a lack of choice in the UK audit market, especially for large
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client firms. While a series of policy debates are ongoing, some possible reforms are
proposed. In this paper we investigate how one of the possible reforms, namely
mandatory joint audit would affect the audit market concentration in the UK. The
demand estimation approach allows us to identify clients’ preferences to substitute
among individual auditors. Using observations in French market, we can measure
how listed firms perceive services provided by the Big Four, the medium auditors
and the small auditors. In the meantime, we are able to identify how different firms
choose different pairs of auditors. In the policy experiment, we force the UK clients
to choose another auditor while keep their original auditor under joint audit. Given
the preference for individual auditors as well as for pair choices derived from French
market, we can simulate how listed firms in UK respond to such policy change and
the potential evolution of market structure.
Our demand estimation results show that the public listed firms in both countries
have heterogenous preference for the big four auditors, mainly varying across clients’
size. While considering the audit market in France, the heterogenous preference is
also manifested in the pair choice. That is to say, different groups of listed firms
do prefer certain types of pairs, e.g., the bigger firms prefer the combination of
having two big four auditors as a pair. After recovering preference parameters, we
calculate the market share changes of audit firms and the welfare change of client
firms in the UK under the counterfactuals. Our results show that the market leader
auditor would experience substantial rise in the share of number of clients as well
as a fair increase in the share of clients’ assets. The second auditor would enjoy a
small growth in the both market share measures. However, for other two big four
auditors, they would have to incur market share losses: on average 20% decrease of
client numbers and on average of over 25% decrease of client sizes. Even though, both
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medium auditors would loss the share of clients’ number substantially, one medium
auditor-fifth largest player in the UK market-Grant Thornton would quintuple its
share of clients’ assets after joint audit policy. Another medium auditor BDO would
not benefit much from such reform. And the small auditors would benefit very
marginally from the joint audit by expanding their market shares by a very tiny
percentage. The concentration of the Big Four under joint audit would drop mildly
due to the rise of medium auditors. The counterfactual results also indicate that joint
audit would increase clients’ consumer surplus to some extent due to the positive
pair effect, but this pair benefit is not high enough compensate the welfare loss from
being forced to choose another auditor. As a consequence, the net welfare change
for clients in UK would be negative and decrease by 7.2 million GBP on average
over the sample period.
We would like to point out that although the evidences suggest dramatic changes,
we would interpret these counterfactuals with caution. Nevertheless, these estimates
are informative about the trade-offs of changing the auditor choice of clients and
the cost v.s. benefits of changing audit market structure. For the future research,
we are considering several extensions to further the discussions. For instance, we
include modeling of strategic price responses from auditors in the policy simulation
and the comparison of audit fee changes.
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3.8 Appendix
The table for the variable definitions
Table 3.8: Variable definition
Industry Fama-French 12 industry classification
Industry leader equal 1 if the audit firm has the highest asset market share in each industry,
otherwise 0
Industry specialist equal 1 if the audit firm has a fee market share over 30% in each industry,
otherwise 0
Tenure equal 1 if the public listed firm is a client of the audit firm in the last year,
otherwise 0 in the UK
equal 0 if the public listed firm is not a client of any audit firms in the pair
in the last year in France
equal 1 if the public listed firm is a client of one of the pair of two audit firms
in the last year in France
equal 2 if the public listed firm is a client of both of the two audit firms
in the last year in France
Size the natural logarithm of total assets
No of industrial segments includes number of business segments and number of
geographical segments
Leverage ratio the ratio of short plus long term debt to total assets
Current ratio the ratio of current assets to current liabilities
Quick ratio the ratio of cash and receivable to current liabilities
Receivables the ratio of receivables to total assets
Foreign sales the ratio of foreign sales to total assets
Growth in sales the ratio of sales in current year to sales in previous year
Price to book ratio the ratio of market value of a firm to its book value
ROA return to total assets
Loss dummy equal 1 if profit is negative, otherwise 0
Cross list dummy equal 1 if firm is crosslisted in US, otherwise 0
Location dummy equal 1 if firm’s headquarter is located in Paris or London, otherwise 0
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Descriptive statistics for industry classifications
Table (3.9) illustrates the descriptive statistics of Fama-French industry specifica-
tions for both the UK and France. The distributions of some industries are quite
similar for both markets, for instance business equipment, sales, chemicals, utilities
and healthcare. Regarding the percentages, for instance in the UK there are more
energy related firms and in France there are more consumer related firms. Such
differences would be most likely captured by the industry fixed effects included in
the audit fee predictions (see Table (3.1)).
Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for industry classification (Fama French)
UK France
Industry Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Consumer NonDurables 507 6.96% 316 13.08%
Consumer Durables 154 2.11% 124 5.13%
Manufacturing 637 8.75% 278 11.51%
Enrgy 559 7.68% 38 1.57%
Chemicals 168 2.31% 56 2.32%
Business Equipment 1278 17.55% 476 19.70%
Telecommunications 175 2.40% 114 4.72%
Utilities 113 1.55% 30 1.24%
Sales 789 10.83% 244 10.10%
Healthcare 414 5.68% 128 5.30%
Other 2489 34.18% 612 25.33%
Total 7283 100% 2416 100%
Chapter 4
Client Mergers, Audit fee pricing
and Audit opinion
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I empirically investigate how client mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
affect audit fee pricing and auditors’ behavior to issue audit opinion in the UK mar-
ket. This chapter is an extension on one of issues that we addressed in Chapter 3.
In the early chapter, we utilize the ratio between the total merged client assets and
total client assets in an industry to present the scale of client M&A activities. It
means that the higher the ratio, the more M&A activities incurred in a particular
industry. And here I provide some further evidence on how client M&A can be
viewed as an external shock to the dynamic of auditor- client relationship and how
auditors react to such shock. Mergers and acquisitions between client firms present
an interesting dynamic for the audit firms. In general, after the merger and acqui-
sition transaction finish, one of the two firms has to drop its auditor. And typically
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the auditors of target firms are the ones losing their business (Anderson et al., 1993).
The observation from the data confirms the similar trend during the sample period.
In my data, 48 firms were target firms in M&A transactions and only 9 of firms kept
their original auditors. On the other hand, out of 140 acquirers, 120 firms kept their
original choices. So such change creates a shock to the previous stable auditor client
relationship. In this case, the target firms more or less involuntarily change their
auditors. Hence the sudden available auditors are able to provide their available
ability to current clients or compete for new clients. Comparing to voluntary audi-
tor change, auditor change caused by mergers is less likely to represent firm specific
incentives since the level of M&A activities in an industry are more likely associated
with industry wide shocks, for example deregulation (Becker et al., 2008). So this
paper intends to test how would auditors compete in industries with more M&A
activities.
Client mergers in fact represent a significant proportion of auditor switch. As in-
dicated by the Oxera report (2006)1, the most significant reason to trigger switching
is client mergers in the UK market. Over 20% of all auditor switches were the results
of client mergers. The switching rate in the UK market has been quite low, which
was around 4% in the period of 1994-2004 (The Oxera report, 2006) and around 10%
in my sample period. But audit switching might have important implications for
the level of competition in the audit market. So client mergers should be considered
as an important change to the audit market as a whole. In addition, other switches
often are triggered by concerns on audit quality or unstable working relationship
between auditor and clients (Krishnan, 1994 and Chan et al., 2006). The switch
1 The report is commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Financial
Reporting Council in the UK
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triggered by client mergers seems like more peaceful “break up”. The survey results
in the Oxera report show that both auditors and clients can well rationalize such
change. Since the research on auditor switching typically does not differentiate the
different types of switch and more focus on voluntary switch, it should be worthwhile
to investigate client mergers separately.
As mentioned earlier, the client M&A activities as a whole in each industry can be
seen as an indicator for the condition of that industry. There are also some evidence
suggesting that M&A activities might be also associated with certain macroeconomic
condition. Matthews (2013) suggests that the recent M&A booms in UK and US
market may be because of uprising economic conditions, especially the strength of
the stock market. Since mergers are often financed through stocks, firms now have
more resources to make acquisitions. And another reason is that central banks
such as the Federal Reserve have been keeping interest rates low to stimulate the
economy. Since client mergers would change auditor-client relationship, the industry
or economic conditions represented by M&A activities might have impact on audit
market. The research in this chapter would be the first step to identify possible
effects.
In general, the research is mainly twofold: first I look into how client mergers
affect audit fee pricing, especially for the client firms which weren’t involved in M&A
at all; second I examine how client mergers affect auditors to issue qualified opinion.
In the last chapter, we show that client mergers have a negative effect on the audit
fees. However, we only use the level of client mergers as an instrument variable for
predicting audit fees and the validation test was conducted on the whole sample
(see Table (3.1)). So in this chapter, I further test the effect of client mergers on
audit fees and distinguish client firms which involved in M&A and client firms which
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weren’t involved in M&A. There are evidences that suggest firms which involve in
M&A transaction might face a higher fee because more complex tasks are required
by mergers and auditors have to spend more efforts on financial due diligence reviews
(Golubov et al., 2011). Moreover, in the first part, I also test whether such negative
effect would be perceived earlier by auditors and the persistence of such effect. In
the second part, I focus on how auditors would behave by issuing qualified audit
opinion after experiencing more M&A activities. So here I consider changes in the
propensity of the auditor to issue a qualified audit opinion as a direct outcome of
the audit process and possible changes of auditors’ behavior (Carcello and Li, 2013).
Qualified audit opinions are also considered as audit quality by some research (for
instance, Chen et al, 2010 and Firth et al, 2012).
With respect to the tests on audit fee pricing, it is confirmed that audit firms
charge less audit fees after more clients merge and acquisition transactions happened.
The results also show that the negative effect on audit fee pricing is even stronger for
clients which were not involved in M&A activities. And such negative effect would
appear even before actual M&A transactions happened. This is possible because
many of these M&A deals were rumored around or even announced relatively earlier
than the actual transaction took place. So it can be seen as some evidence that
auditors perceive the change of certain industry and react accordingly. In contrast,
the test on the persistence of such effect shows that the negative pricing effect
brought by M&A activities would not appear in the next period, which is defined as
the subsequent year. So as certain shock, the level of total M&A activities would only
affect the supply of audit market for one period. Next, the results on audit opinion
show that auditors are more likely to issue qualified opinions after experiencing more
M&A shocks. It means that auditors may behave differently after there were more
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M&A activities in certain industry. In addition, such effects are more pronounced
in the post 2008 period.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. First, section 4.2 discusses
briefly about the related literature. Next, section 4.3 presents the research design.
Then section 4.4 shows the test results. The last section concludes.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 Auditors and M&A
The research on the relation between auditor and M&A activity is somewhat limited.
It is possible that the role of auditors in M&A transactions are less important
compared to investment banks or transaction attorneys (Dhaliwal et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, prior research has focus on how auditors would influence merger and
acquisition outcome (Louis, 2005; Niemi et al., 2013 and Dhaliwal et al., 2013). In
general, some of these research compare the M&A outcomes of different auditors,
such as the Big 4 and the non-Big 4. For instance, Louis (2005) shows that stock
market reacts positively to acquirers with small auditors and it may be because
small auditors can provide greater involvement. Dhaliwal et al. (2013) find that
target firms and acquirer firms with the same auditors are more likely to make a
M&A deal. These research focus on the subset of firms that involve with M&A
activity and are interested in the acquisition outcomes. Instead, in this research I
focus on the outcome of audit market and look into the effect of M&A activity on
a boarder set of firm.
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4.2.2 Auditor switch
There have been various studies that address the issues related to auditor switch.
These studies are mainly about what trigger auditor switch, how stock market reacts
to auditor switch and how auditors react to switch. For example, firms become more
likely to switch auditors when firms receive going concern opinions (Krishnan, 1994).
Since Big N auditors is considered to have better audit quality, research also show
that firms tend to switch to Big N auditors for better audit quality (Cassell et al.,
2012). And the evidence on market reaction to auditor switch is more or less in
line with this argument. So market reacts negatively if firms switch from Big N and
non-Big N auditors (DeFond and Lennox, 2011). Schwartz and Soo (1996) show
that auditor switches are associated with reduced audit efficiency, as evidenced by
increased reporting lags and earnings announcement delays. With respect to how
auditors react to auditor changes, the studies mainly show the low balling effect
(for example: Gul et al., 2009) and the opinion shopping (for example: Chan et
al., 2006), which mean that at the initial few years of the engagement auditors may
be willing to charge less audit fees and clients may seek successor auditors who are
willing to issue a clean audit opinion.
However these studies mostly only focus on the firms that changed auditors. So
what differentiate this paper is to demonstrate that auditor switch might also have
effects on other client firms in the same industry. In addition, some studies also show
there might be reputation effect related to auditor switch (Johnson and Lys, 1990;
Francis et al., 2013). It means that auditors who lost clients might also experience
reputation loss. But such reputation loss is less likely for M&A, because auditors of
target firms usually replaced, for instance, Anderson et al. (1993) find a switch in
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73% and Firth (1999) finds 85%. This paper contributes this strand of literature by
relating the effect of particular auditor switches to audit market as a whole.
4.2.3 Other literature
Gaver and Gaver (1995) propose an interesting theoretical framework that includes
both supply shifter and demand shifter in an audit market competition setting. But
they also point out that supply shifters are more difficult to observe. As proposed by
Gerakos and Syverson (2013), the scale of M&A activities can be considered as some
sort of supply shifter because possible available auditors would have more capacity
to provide to the market. Here I further test how such shifter would affect audit
fees and audit opinions.
Auditor mergers have been used for natural experiment to test the competition of
audit firms. Previous literatures focus on investigating the consequences of mergers
between audit firms and try to figure out the impact on audit fees, audit quality and
so on (Pong, 1999; McMeeking, 2007; Ding and Jia, 2012). However, the mergers
between big auditors have been scarce. In UK market, there have been only two
significant mergers in the past fifteen years (Currently BDO and PKF are finalizing
their merger deal), Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand in 1998
and Deloitte acquired Arthur Andersen after the Enron scandal. If we consider the
collapse of Arthur Andersen as a rather extraordinary case, the last ordinary merger
between audit firms in UK happened a decade ago. In contrast, client mergers are
much more frequent and dynamically changing the audit market. So in this chapter I
propose client mergers as another exogenous shock to test how audit firms compete,
particularly in the UK market.
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4.3 Research design
In this section, I present the regression models for testing and also briefly discuss
the data used for this chapter.
4.3.1 Audit fee pricing
In this part I mainly test how client mergers affect audit fees. The literature on audit
fee pricing has been discussed in Chapter 3. So I will more focus on the issues related
to these tests. To be more precise, the scale of client mergers is evaluated by scaling
the M&A assets to the total industry size, with industries based on three-digit SIC
codes. It means that when the scale of client mergers is higher, there are more M&A
activities within respective industries. Following the argument from earlier section,
after M&A transaction incurred between clients, the supply structure of audit firms
would be different because one of firms in M&A transaction has to drop its original
auditor. In the next period, the dropped auditor may lower its audit fees to compete
for new clients to compensate the earlier loss. Another similar argument would be
that the dropped auditor may have more available capacity after the M&A and
the total supply of audit service shift upwards which leads to lower fees in general
(Gaver and Gaver, 1995; Copley et al.,1995). Moreover, the discussion could be also
related to the argument for low balling effect. Auditors might use lower audit fees
in order to win the client (e.g. Craswell and Francis, 1999; Gul et al., 2009). And
the current empirical evidence is limited to initial year engagements. Since in one of
main tests all the firms are the ones who do not change auditors, if auditors might
lower audit fees, they are actually trying to win over potential clients or simply are
trying to stabilize their current client portfolio.
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So the basic hypothesis is as follows:
H1: firms in an industry that had more M&A activities would pay less audit fees
in the subsequent period.
The regression model is similar to the standard audit fee regression (Hay et al.,
2006). The basic model is illustrated as:
ln(pijt) = β0 + β1MAit−1 +
∑
r
βrcontrolrit + µijt (4.1)
ln(pijt) equals to the natural logarithm of audit fees at year t with respect to
client i and auditor j.
MAit−1 represents the level of M&A activities by scaling the M&A assets to the
total industry size (SIC 3 digit). And this ratio is calculated at year t− 1.
Control variables include typical audit fee determinants, for instance: total as-
sets, leverage ratio, current ratio, location, receivables and ROA.2 βs are the coeffi-
cients.
4.3.2 Audit opinion model
In the second part of tests, I intend to identify whether auditors would issue au-
dit opinion differently after certain industry experienced more M&A activities. In
the UK, a qualified audit opinion contains either scope limitations or non-pervasive
departures from GAAP. However qualified audit opinions for publicly-traded com-
panies are extremely rare in the US (Defond et al., 2012). According to the opinion
shopping argument, if clients prefer successor auditors who are more likely to issue
an unqualified audit opinion, the dropped auditors may want to show their clients
2 See the details about control variables in the result table and the Appendix.
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that they are willing to do so and issue more unqualified audit opinions. Early evi-
dence suggest that clients changed auditors after receiving a going concern opinion
but did not get better opinion from the successor (Krishnan, 1994). Then later UK
and Chinese evidence suggest that clients would have more qualified opinions if they
didn’t change auditors (Lennox, 2000 and Chan et al., 2006). But the scenario with
M&A activities is somewhat different. First, the switch is not because of getting a
going concern opinion. Second, the switch is not voluntary. So it might be different
for the effect of M&A on audit opinion. As mentioned in the introduction, M&A ac-
tivities can represent industry-wide or market-wide conditions. Becker et al. (2008)
demonstrate that deregulation in certain industry encourage more M&A activities.
So auditors would simply react to the M&A activities by evaluating the related
industry shock and incorporate such evaluation into their audit opinion process.
Since the direction of the effect is unclear so I will form the hypothesis as:
H2a: auditors are more likely to issue qualified opinions to firms in the industry
that had more M&A activities.
H2b: auditors are less likely to issue qualified opinions to firms in the industry
that had more M&A activities.
Here I also focus on the client firms who are not involved with M&A transaction,
because firms with M&A might be systematically different from the other firms, for
instance, target firms might be in a vulnerable situation or acquirer firms might
have more capital to spend (Dhaliwal et al., 2013).
Then the regression model is a logistic model based on the prior research which
studies the propensity of qualified audit opinions (Chen et al, 2010 and Firth et al,
2012). The basic model is illustrated as:
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opinionijt = λ0 + λ1MAit−1 +
∑
r
λrcontrolrit + ijt (4.2)
opinionijt is the dummy variable for qualified opinion, equal to 1 if qualified
opinion is issued, 0 otherwise.
MAit−1 represents the level of M&A activities by scaling the M&A assets to the
total industry size (SIC 3 digit). And this ratio is calculated at year t− 1.
Control variables include total asset, typical risk and complexity factors (leverage
ratio, sale growth, Numbers of segments, loss indicator, litigation risk) and other
attributes like tenure and busy season. These are comparable to previous research
(Carcello and Li, 2013). λs are the coefficients.
4.3.3 Data
The sample in this study consists of the listed firms in the UK with available data,
which is a similar dataset from Chapter 3. The sample period is from 2005 to 2012.
The data are mainly from commercial databases. The data on client attributes and
auditor-client matches are from Amadeus database. Audit fees and audit opinion
data are from Datastream. And the mergers and acquisitions data are obtained
from SDC database.
In addition, Table (4.1) presents the summary of descriptive statistics for all the
variables. And in this table, the descriptive statistics of the dummy variables are
presented slightly different. For instance, it shows that out of 8508 observations,
459 of them received qualified audit opinion.
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Table 4.1: Summary table for descriptive statistics
Variable mean sd min max
log(audit fee) 5.046 1.617 -2.714 13.150
MA ratio (MAit−1) 1.322% 0.087 0 98.10%
log(total assets) 10.886 2.429 1.792 19.206
leverage ratio 22.293 14.2319 0 986.67
No. of geographical segments 1.702 1.654 0 9
No. of business segments 1.613 1.012 1 9
current ratio 3.492 14.502 0 843.64
Price to book ratio 2.485 31.418 -138.7 168.25
Growth of sales 4.007 15.114 -1.660 113.22
Receivables 0.169 0.653 0 51.439
ROA -1.149 16.682 -99.68 92.55
Variable mean sd obs (dummy=1) obs (dummy=0)
opinion dummy (opinionijt) 0.054 0.226 459 8049
loss dummy 0.406 0.491 3451 5041
london 0.343 0.474 2922 5586
busy season 0.475 0.499 4048 4460
cross list dummy 4.356 2.499 752 7756
litigation dummy 0.138 0.345 1176 7332
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Results on audit fees
First I test the basic fee regression which show how the level of M&A activities would
affect audit fees, then I test whether such effect would be perceived by auditors before
the actual transaction. Last, I also test the persistence of such effect.
Table (4.2) shows all the results in a comparison format. So the results of the
basic regression are shown in the column where Ln(Audit Fees) is at time t. The
coefficient of MAit−1 is significantly negative. It means that when more M&A
activities happened at time t − 1, client firm in these industries will pay less audit
fees in the next year. So this confirms the hypothesis H1. And because the sample
is limited to firms who are not involved with any M&A activities, this result also
support that MAit−1 as supply shifter would have negative pricing effect on the
whole audit market.
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Table 4.2: Effects of M&A as a supply shock on audit fee pricing
Ln(Audit Fees) t+1 t t-1 t-2 t-3
MAit−1 -0.0034 -0.213∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗ -0.0158∗∗ -0.0034
(0.0036) (0.0593) (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0075)
log(total assets) 0.5232∗∗∗ 0.5124∗∗∗ 0.5229∗∗∗ 0.5225∗∗∗ 0.5250∗∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0215) (0.0206)
leverage ratio 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗ 0.0009∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
growth of sales 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
segment(geo) 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.1061∗∗∗ 0.1118∗∗∗ 0.1173∗∗∗ 0.1250∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0083) (0.0092) (0.0087) (0.0075)
segment(prod) 0.0837∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0825∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0969∗∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0119) (0.0160) (0.0129) (0.0109)
current ratio -0.0037∗∗ -0.0049∗ -0.0042∗∗ -0.0036∗∗ -0.0042∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017)
price to book value 0.0011 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0010)
tenure 0.0987∗∗ -0.0150 0.0016 -0.0112 0.0161
(0.0318) (0.0133) (0.0167) (0.0246) (0.0172)
cross listed 0.2965∗∗∗ 0.2584∗∗∗ 0.2502∗∗∗ 0.2184∗∗ 0.2025∗
(0.0589) (0.0544) (0.0577) (0.0747) (0.0958)
litigation -0.0626 -0.0849 -0.0415 -0.0288 -0.0393
(0.0655) (0.0645) (0.0506) (0.0613) (0.0683)
receivable 0.8488∗∗∗ 0.0585∗∗∗ 0.0590∗ 0.0526∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗
(0.1107) (0.0180) (0.0276) (0.0217) (0.0051)
ROA -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗ -0.0027∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008)
loss dummy 0.1111∗∗ 0.0603 0.0627 0.0316 -0.0044
(0.0465) (0.0459) (0.0456) (0.0579) (0.0650)
London 0.1626∗∗∗ 0.1211∗∗∗ 0.1294∗∗∗ 0.1353∗∗∗ 0.1086∗∗
(0.0288) (0.0269) (0.0281) (0.0291) (0.0354)
busy season 0.0823∗∗∗ 0.1044∗∗∗ 0.1064∗∗∗ 0.1193∗∗∗ 0.1077∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0218) (0.0239) (0.0252) (0.0246)
constant -1.3790∗∗∗ -0.7556∗∗∗ -1.2660∗∗∗ -1.2459∗∗∗ -0.8184∗∗∗
Auditor fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5418 7532 5275 4043 3184
Adjusted R2 0.8377 0.8293 0.8444 0.8465 0.8463
Standard errors are clustered at industry level.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Then the columns with t− 1, t− 2 and t− 3 demonstrate how audit fee pricing
change before the actual transaction. Since MAit−1 is our interested variable, the
coefficients in these three columns show that the negative price effect kicks in at
the same year as the transaction year and even one year prior to the transaction
year. It is possible because these M&A activities are often rumored months prior to
the transactions take place and firms often make announcement prior to the actual
transaction (Niemi et al., 2013). So auditors might perceive ongoing or possible
M&A activities as change of auditor-client relationship. They might adjust audit
fees to adapt to possible changes.
Lastly the results in the column t + 1 show whether such negative price effect
would persist after one period. Basically the coefficient is negative but not significant
at all, which means the negative price effect caused by supply shifterMAit−1 is short
term. But since client mergers are rather frequent, such negative price effect would
continue on, for example, only the shock from last year would affect audit fees in this
year. The signs of control variables are very similar to previous research (Hay et al.,
2006) and the results from Chapter 3. In addition, I control for auditor fixed effect,
year fixed effect and industry fixed effect in order to make sure that the results are
rather robust. And I also winsorize the data at the 1% and 99% percentile and run
the same tests. The results remain similar and the effect remain robust.
4.4.2 Results on audit opinion
Here I mainly present and discuss the results on how client mergers affect audi-
tors to issue qualified opinions. So Table (4.3) demonstrates the results from the
logistic regression on the propensity of qualified audit opinion. The same as be-
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fore, the MAit−1 is the most interested variable. Interestingly, the coefficients are
all positively significant, which means that auditors are more likely to issue qual-
ified opinions to firms in the industry that had more M&A activities. So H2a is
true. When facing the change of auditor supply structure, auditors are willing to
be stricter on issuing qualified opinions. It seems that they do not want to comfort
current clients or attract potential clients by issuing a clear opinion. And if we
consider the argument that auditors use supply shock to evaluate industry condi-
tion, the results show that auditors in fact consider firms in industry with higher
MAit−1 as more problematic. If we only consider the post-2008 period, the effect
on the propensity of qualified audit opinion gets even stronger. It is possible that
this stronger effect is driven by the fact that the financial crisis made many firms
vulnerable and become possible M&A targets (Dhaliwal et al., 2013). However, fur-
ther research on what drive these M&A activities is needed to identify the actual
incentive of auditors.
There are also some interesting results on the control variables. For instance, firm
with larger size, higher profit and higher liquidity is less likely to receive a qualified
opinion. And firm with more geographical segments is more likely to receive a
qualified opinion. The auditor tenure has no effect on the propensity of qualified
audit opinion, which suggests auditors are not getting cozy with their clients.
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Table 4.3: Effects of M&A as a supply shock on audit opinion
Auditor opinion dummy Full sample Post-2008
MAit−1 0.1625∗∗ 0.2548∗∗∗
(0.0890) (0.0643)
log(total assets) -0.2549∗∗∗ -0.2618∗∗∗
(0.0559) (0.0728)
leverage ratio 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001)
segment(geo) 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.0549
(0.0276) (0.0468)
segment(prod) -0.1655 -0.1656
(0.1504) (0.1662)
current ratio -0.0208∗∗ -0.0586∗∗∗
(0.0097) (0.0209)
price to book ratio -0.0006 0.0001
(0.0014) (0.0019)
growth of sales -0.0081 -0.1027∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0254)
cross listed -0.7795∗∗ -0.7704∗
(0.3271) (0.3996)
receivable -0.9533∗∗∗ -0.7939∗∗∗
(0.2777) (0.2697)
ROA -0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0395
(0.0040) (0.0261)
loss dummy 0.9754∗∗∗ 1.0913∗∗∗
(0.0687) (0.1130)
London 0.0824 0.1226
(0.1142) (0.1229)
busy season -0.2657 -0.5169∗
(0.2884) (0.2638)
litigation 0.4416 0.3141
(0.3212) (0.4412)
tenure 0.0095 0.0185
(0.1041) (0.1859)
constant -2.1082∗∗∗ -0.3932
(0.3790) (0.7258)
Auditor fixed effect Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations 7534 3275
Pseudo R2 0.2035 0.1729
Standard errors are clustered at industry level.
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate how client mergers affect audit fee pricing and auditors’
behavior to issue qualified audit opinions. M&A activities between client firms create
some kind of shock to audit market because the auditor-client relationship is affected.
Some auditors, mostly likely auditors from target firms become available. This paper
considers such shock as supply shifter and provides evidence on how auditors would
react to the supply shifter. From a price competition perspective, the paper shows
that in general audit firms charge less audit fees after more M&A transactions
happened, and client firms which are not involved in any M&A transactions receive
lower audit fees in the subsequent period. And such fee reducing effect would appear
even before the actual merger transaction took place. Given the fact that some
of these transactions were rumored or announced relatively long time before the
transaction date, it is possible that the auditors anticipate and react to possible
competition pressure. However, the negative pricing effect is not persistent and
only valid for the next year. After experiencing more M&A activities in certain
industry, auditors are more likely to issue qualified opinion for the clients in the
same industry. Such effects are more pronounced in the post 2008 period.
This paper is an extension to Chapter 3 but a further step on a less explored
setting. And future research are expected to understand more about how the level
of M&A changes the competitive strategy of auditors.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.4: Variable definition
Industry Fama-French 12 industry classification
Tenure equal 1 if the public listed firm is a client of the audit firm in the last year,
otherwise 0 in the UK
Size the natural logarithm of total assets
No of industrial segments includes number of business segments and number of
geographical segments
Leverage ratio the ratio of short plus long term debt to total assets
Current ratio the ratio of current assets to current liabilities
Quick ratio the ratio of cash and receivable to current liabilities
Receivables the ratio of receivables to total assets
Foreign sales the ratio of foreign sales to total assets
Growth of sales the ratio of sales in current year to sales in previous year
Price to book ratio the ratio of market value of a firm to its book value
ROA return to total assets
Loss dummy equal 1 if profit is negative, otherwise 0
Cross list dummy equal 1 if firm is cross-listed in US, otherwise 0
Busy season equal 1 if fiscal year ends in December, otherwise 0
London equal 1 if firm’s headquarter is located in London, otherwise 0
opinionijt equal 1 if firm i receive a qualified opinion from auditor j at year t, otherwise 0
MAit−1 the ratio of the M&A assets to the total industry size (SIC 3 digit) at year t− 1
Chapter 5
The Impact of Accounting
Regulatory Change on Banks: A
Study on the Reclassification of
Financial Assets∗
5.1 Introduction
After the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU as of 2005, accounting scholars
and practitioners began more serious debates about fair value accounting versus
historical cost accounting (e.g. Beatty, 2007; Muller et al., 2008). In general, reg-
ulators such as FASB and IASB favor the use of fair value accounting in financial
reporting, especially regarding the financial reporting of financial instruments. How-
ever, the credit market turmoil in 2008 has led the management of many financial
∗ This chapter is a spin-off paper based on my master thesis (co-authored with Maliza Matovu).
119
120
institutions to wonder what exactly the accounting numbers stand for.1 Although
both the FASB and IASB strongly disagree with the idea of changing the fair value
regime, both regulator bodies face serious demands from some politicians and in-
dustry entities (Jones, 2011). On the 13th of October 2008, the IASB amended to
IAS 39 which permits the reclassification of certain financial instruments from fair
value accounting practice to historical accounting, and IFRS 7 requires additional
disclosures in respect of reclassification practice. These amendments were issued
to address the prevailing market conditions that many banks were reporting huge
write-downs, and were therefore issued fairly rapidly. Since the new amendment
to IAS 39 gives the IFRS followers permission to reclassify certain financial assets,
it partially changes the mark-to-market requirements and such regulatory changes
certainly impose impact on accounting practice and disclosure, especially for finan-
cial institutions. As it was controversial and not entirely in line with what IASB
planned for (Jones, 2011), it is interesting to study the subsequent consequences of
the new regulatory adjustment, to see how bank entities from different regions are
affected, and how relevant information was disclosed.
The recent financial crisis forces the accounting system to evaluate the fair value
approach on a worldwide scale, and this makes the study of fair value accounting
more contemporary (Barth and Landsman, 2010). The purposes of our paper are to
provide some direct empirical evidence on the impact of practicing reclassification
of financial instruments and shed some light on the use of fair value accounting
on financial instrument when the accounting policies have been switched from fair
value accounting to historical accounting. Among the first ones (Bischof et al., 2011
and Fiechter, 2011) to study this significant regulatory change empirically, this paper
1 Deloitte 2008 web report
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examines and analyzes the impacts brought by the reclassification of financial assets,
and how the reclassifications are associated with the different bank characteristics.
Moreover, this paper provides evidence indicating how the reclassification activities
have affected the accounting results and financial disclosures. This paper also shows
that banks from different European regions reacted differently to such regulation
change and experienced different accounting results and disclosure. The general
findings show that under inactive market situations, the new amendments help banks
with the problematic financial assets by avoiding further impairment losses. The
banks that applied the option were characterized by a lower ROE and bigger bank
size and banks from more developed regions were more likely to adopt such option.
And the sampled banks that implement such option were not all fully complied with
the disclosure requirements of the amendment to IFRS 7 and in general the banks
from more developed regions performed better to meet the disclosure requirements.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents the regulation background
and literature review. Section 5.3 provides the research strategy and data collection.
Section 5.4 describes the findings and empirical results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Regulation Background and Literature Re-
view
5.2.1 Regulation Background
When given the requests from politicians and industry participants to address the
new market developments (Hughes et al. 2008; Moyer, 2008), the IASB recognized
the need to clarify IFRS as a response to the credit crisis. They wanted to make
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sure that the European financial institutions were not deprived of the opportunity
to compete with their international competitors, in terms of accounting rules and
their interpretation. To create a “level playing field” with US GAAP, as far as the
ability to reclassify financial assets was concerned, IASB monitored developments in
the United States to avoid inconsistencies under both accounting standards (KPMG
2008 report, page 2). Noticeably, similar reclassifications were permitted by SFAS
115 and SFAS 65 under US GAAP, before the IASB introduced its amendments.
The changes to IAS 39 and IFRS 7 approved by the EU on 15th October 2008
allow reclassifications of certain financial instruments under “held for trading” to
either “held to maturity”, “loans and receivables” or “available for sale”. Also the
amendment to IAS 39 permits transfer of certain financial assets from the category
of “available for sale” to “loans and receivables”. In general, the amendments were
introduced to enable bank entities to record instruments which are no longer traded
in an active market at amortized costs instead of mark-to-market values. We ex-
pect to see less volatility and some emerging issues such as the comparability of
accounting practice after the amendment has been applied. The earliest date for
reclassification of the relevant financial assets was 1st of July 2008, and all of the
assets were measured at their fair value on the date of reclassification.
According to the amendments, the regulatory changes do not concern the clas-
sification and measurement of derivatives. It is non-derivative financial assets that
are majorly involved with the reclassification rules. There are a total of six differ-
ent reclassification forms. Figure (5.1) shows: the first four (in green) are newly
permitted by IAS 39 and the other two (in red) are already permitted by the pre-
vious standard. Two of the conditions that must be met when financial assets are
transferred out of “available for sale” and “held for trading” into “loans and receiv-
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ables” (that is, measured at amortized cost) are that the definition of loans and
receivables at initial recognition is met by the relevant financial assets and that the
entities have the intention and ability to hold the financial assets for the foreseeable
future or until maturity. Before or after the reclassification, financial assets cannot
be reclassified into fair value through profit or loss after initial recognition. So the
requirement of no reverse treatments remains the same.
Figure 5.1: An illustration of the six reclassification forms
To make transparent to financial report users, the amendment to IFRS 7 brings
more extensive disclosures requirements. Hence the amendment standards state that
an entity should disclose specific information if it applies these amendments. This
disclosure information includes initially the amounts reclassified in and out of each
category along with the relevant reasons. Secondly, an entity has to disclose: “for
each period following the reclassification, including the period in which the financial
asset was reclassified, until derecognition of the financial asset, the fair value gain or
loss that would have been recognized in profit or loss or other comprehensive income
if the financial asset had not been reclassified, and the gain, loss, income and expense
recognized in profit or loss” (IASB, 2008). Thirdly, the financial reports must include
the effective interest rate and estimated amounts of cash flows the entity expects to
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recover, on the date of reclassification of the financial asset.
5.2.2 Literature Review
First of all, this paper is related to the discussion on the use of fair value accounting,
especially for bank entities. The theoretical discussions developed by Freixas and
Tsomocos (2004) or Plantin et al. (2008) address the role played by fair value ac-
counting in the stability of financial markets and pointed out the possible downward
effect of using the fair value accounting for banks in the event of financial stress.
Recently, after the crisis progressed, there are studies (Barth and Lansman, 2010;
Laux and Leuz, 2010) that examine the influence of fair value accounting on the cri-
sis in the US setting. They conclude that the fair value accounting approach should
not be blamed for the crisis. The evaluation of fair value accounting is also related
with relevance and reliability. The relevance discussed by most of the prior research
tries to determine whether fair value disclosures in the banking industry have incre-
mental information content and explanatory power over and above historical cost
(Barth et al., 1996; Eccher and Healy, 1996 and Khurana et al., 2003 etc.). Benston
(2006) and Penman (2007) point out that fair value based on related information or
professional judgments are costly to determine and verify. Furthermore, the use of
fair values could be readily manipulated by opportunistic and over-optimistic man-
agers (Ramanna, 2008). This study adds to the discussion by examining the impact
of transferring financial assets from fair value accounting to historical accounting
practice.
Secondly, the literature regarding the determinants and consequences of account-
ing choice offers evidences about how managers make decisions to affect firm per-
125
formance, or make choices for communication purposes (Holthausen and Leftwich
1983; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Holthausen, 1990; Fields et al., 2001). Bar-
lev et al. (2007) show that the motives and effects related to asset revaluations
vary across different countries. With respect to the study on particular reclassifi-
cation options, Gramlich et al. (2006) show that firms manage accounting ratios
through the reclassification option which from short-term obligations into long-term
debt. Considering the reclassification of financial assets particularly, this accounting
choice offers certain costs (ex. costs to collect and disclose relevant information) and
benefits (ex. possible avoidance of future losses). So as a rather sudden change on
the accounting practice, the reclassification choice could be heavily influenced by
banks’ financial position and performances. Our study contributes to this stream of
literature by offering evidence on what kind of banks applied this option and how
their accounting results were affected.
Thirdly, this paper is also related to the research on the factors affecting deci-
sions by managers on financial reporting and disclosures (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999;
Healy and Palepu, 2001 etc.). There have been studies that associate different firm
characteristics with accounting disclosure. For instance, Hossain et al. (1994) test
the firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, total assets, leverage level, auditor
type and find a significant correlation between voluntary disclosure with firm size
and leverage. However, the results about the company-specific characteristics are
not always consistent and tend to vary depending on whether it is about the general
disclosure level or more specific types of information (Chavent et al, 2006). Because
financial service firms have been routinely excluded from prior research, we know
less about how banks form their disclosures. So our study adds to the literature
by providing evidence that how banks’ disclosure respond to the amendment guid-
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ance, especially during the crisis in which much attention focused on their financial
condition and profitability.
Lastly, this study contributes to the research on the comparison of certain ac-
counting practice in different regions. The application of international accounting
regulation intends to improve the consistency of accounting treatments. However,
when disclosure practice from various countries are considered, there is a concern
that the convergence of accounting standards may not lead to the convergence of
accounting practices if firms do not comply with the standards (Street et al., 1999;
Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2002). The problem is partially caused by
the fact that the newly developing countries do not have enough qualified accounting
professionals (Eccher and Healy, 1996) or the familiarity and language accessibility
to international accounting standards affect the level of compliance (Abd-Elsalam
and Weetman, 2003). Tsakumis, Doupnik, and Seese (2006) presented evidence
to explain the diversity in geographic area disclosure practices. So this paper also
evaluates whether inconsistent practices or disclosures emerge from the different
sampling regions.
5.3 Research design and data collection
5.3.1 Research design
Descriptive analysis
The direct changes on the valuation, such as changed incomes or equity figures, are
all revealed when the new accounting treatments are applied. And the comparison
is conducted on the different categories of financial assets that were involved with
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these reclassifications. The disclosures regarding the information of reclassification
are evaluated using a self-constructed checklist. The selection was based on the
required six items. In this checklist, every item that a bank had was denoted “1”,
as in fulfilled, and for items that they did not have “0”, as in not fulfilled. This is
similar to Cooke (1989), who adopted the use of dichotomous procedure in which an
item scores one if it was disclosed and zero if it was not disclosed. And the approach
of disclosure checking list is consistent with the previous disclosure literature (Meek
et al., 1995, Eng et al., 2003). Figure (5.2) illustrates the basics of how the checking
list works 2.
Figure 5.2: Disclosure checklist
Hypothesis developments
Frist of all, with regard to the reclassification choice, it is suspected that non-
financial and financial characteristics of sampled banks might have significant influ-
ence on their decision whether to adopt this option or not.
2 In regards to item F, in IFRS 7:12A, it states information regarding both “effective interest
rate” and “expected cash flow”. So if only one of them were covered in the disclosure, then “0.5”
will be assigned to this item.
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The new amendments do not allow any financial asset that has been reclassified
out of “fair value to profit or loss” category to be reclassified back into the category
in the future. Consequently, if the financial asset should be carried at amortized
cost after reclassification, future increases in fair value will not be reflected in the
balance sheet immediately. So the relevant assets that banks are interested in are
the ones they anticipate to have downward fair value in the future. It is possible that
the banks operating European-wide are more likely to expose their assets portfolio
to the market turbulence in the time of financial crisis. So these banks might have
higher demand to avoid further losses if they could reevaluate their problematic fi-
nancial assets. Some studies (Boyd et al. 1993; Gunther and Robinson, 1999 etc.)
suggest that banks can benefits from the geographical diversification. Berger and
DeYong et al. (2001) indicate that banks operating in multiple regions can diverse
their operation risk in order to control the scale of default losses. However, the em-
pirical evidences on the scope of economic effects through cross-border expansions
of financial companies are still unclear, especially in the European context (Allen et
al. 2011). Given the magnitude of this crisis, it is very likely that the multinational
banks are unable to mitigate their operation risk or possible losses of certain regions
through diversifications, because most of the regions are affected (KPMG, 2008).
Besides geographic expansion, banks can also increase its market power by diver-
sifying the business activities, for instance, conducting more non-lending activities.
Kroszner and Rajan (1994) point out commercial banks diversify their activities
into investment banking because it is more profitable. But these banks also have
to deal with the conflicts of interest coming from the coexistence of investment and
commercial banking activities within the same company (Uhede et al., 2009). In the
setting of financial crisis, the investment banking businesses were heavily affected
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(Moyer, 2008), and since most of the financial assets from this part of business are
recorded under the fair value accounting, it is possible that banks under more stress
from investment banking want to take advantage of this option. Then the following
hypothesis can be derived:
H1a: Banks operating EU-wide are more likely to adopt the reclassification op-
tion.
H1b: Banks operating with more investment-banking business are more likely to
adopt this option.
Regarding the financial characteristics, similar to previous studies that evaluate
the performance of banks or financial institutions, for instance Kosmidou et al.
(2006) and Carbo et al. (2007), the financial ratios are indicators of the competitive
position and financial status of a bank. By evaluating the firm’s performance, these
ratios demonstrate the banks’ strengths and weaknesses from different perspectives.
This is also consistent with the idea of reclassifying financial assets that reconstruct
the firms’ financial position and performance.
First of all, the earlier studies on the relation of bank size and bank performance
provide mixed evidence. For example, Calomiris (2000) finds an inverse relationship
between bank size and bank failure in the US. But Hughes and Mester (1998) suggest
that consolidation between banks tends to increase the risk of bank portfolios. The
argument of “too big to fail” protection also challenges these debates in the recent
crisis. It is obvious that the banking associations in Europe were lobbying for the
change to IAS 39 and the role of the big banks in this discussion is also evident
(EBA, 2008). And as the aim of the regulators is to mitigate the competitive
difference between European banks and US banks, the major market players may
be most likely to take advantage of this option and become more comparable to
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their US counterparts. Moreover, the analysis report issued by Deloitte (2008)
suggests that when considering the reclassification option, whether other entities
in the industry will reclassify similar financial assets or not should be considered.
Then the bigger banks have certain information advantage and they are likely to
strategize the accounting choices in a more similar way.
H2a: Banks with larger size are more likely to reclassify the financial assets.
Secondly, according to the guidance reports issued by audit firms (Ernst &
Young, 2008 and Deloitte, 2008), whether reclassification will result in any ben-
efit to the entity is quite crucial for the decision to adopt the option. In practice
the benefits are often considered in terms of “profit or losses” and equity changes.
For example, for those financial assets that will be classified as “available for sale”,
exchange differences will continue to be recognized in the income statement, and if
the instruments were to decrease in value, all amounts recognized in equity will be
reversed out of equity and into profit and loss. The profitability and cost efficiency
ratios are possible to be associated with the reclassification option. So we predict
that the banks adopted the reclassification option are likely to be characterized with
lower ROE. The predication on leverage ratio is rather unclear, as the effect on the
leverage stress by the reclassification is not straightforward, although it could impose
equity change on the banks.
So the following hypothesis is derived:
H2b: Banks with lower ROE are more likely to reclassify the financial assets.
Thirdly, earlier studies (Moyer 1990; DeAngelo et al. 1994) suggest that banks
under the pressure of capital requirement use certain accounting choice to manip-
ulate the capital adequacy ratio for instance the estimation of loan loss provision.
After the introduction of Basel II, the industry regulators are more stringent about
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the adequate capital requirements. The reclassification of financial assets would af-
fect the banks’ capital structure. So it is possible to expect that the banks might
opportunistically use the reclassification option to adjust the capital ratio to meet
the regulatory requirement and avoid regulatory costs.
Then the logit regression model is illustrated when the dependent variable is to
describe the reclassification choice made by different banks, whereas the independent
variables include the selected financial ratios and non-financial characteristics.
R = β0+β1OT+β2OR+β3RG+β4TA+β5LER+β6CAR+β7LLP/TA+β8ROE+ε.
(5.1)
Where: R is the dependent variable for the event of reclassification (R = 1
for the banks applied the reclassification option and R = 0 for the banks that
did not apply the option). OT represents business type for our bank samples. The
banks identified are involved with either general financial services or a multi business
including investment banking, insurance and asset investments. OR is another scale
factor which denotes whether the bank entities are operating regional or European-
wide (European-wide also include banks that are operating globally). RG stands
for the regions which are Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe and
Western Europe. TA represents business sizes, and the values here are the total
assets of bank entities. LER and CAR stands for leverage ratio (Debt to equity
ratio) and capital adequacy ratio. LLP/TA is loan loss provision scaled by total
assets. ROE is return on equity.
The hypothesis regarding the disclosure on the new reclassification and bank
characteristics are developed as follows: regarding the non-financial characteristics,
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there are evidences that firms operating more diversely or from more developed
regions tend to perform better on the disclosure evaluation, especially on the volun-
tary disclosure. As suggested by Cuijper and Buijink (2005), companies operating
more internationally tend to have higher disclosure level. Meek et al. (1995) and
Mangena et al. (2007) found evidences that firms from countries with more sophis-
ticated financial markets voluntarily disclose more accounting information. So it is
possible that the sampled banks from western and northern Europe perform better
on the disclosure of reclassification activities than the sampled banks from eastern
and southern Europe.
H3a: Banks operating European-wide have a higher disclosure level on the re-
classification activities.
H3b: Banks operating in more developed region have a higher disclosure level.
Regarding the financial characteristics, some of previous studies (Cooke, 1991;
Wallace et al. 1994; Ali et al. 2004 etc.) showed that the size of company has
a positive association with its disclosure level. It seems that larger bank entities
are likely to make more voluntary disclosure since they have more professionals and
lower cost to collect relevant information, as well as greater demand from external
user (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). When firms’ leverage level are high, firms may
have to disclose more information because creditors might require more informa-
tion to control their risks. It is possible that companies with higher profitability
may disclose good news to attract potential investors and reassure current investors
(Meek et al. 1995; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2008). But They also have to stick to the
disclosure level when things turn worse. So the case of profitability ratio is not clear.
For instance, banks with better profitability could be more willing to share more
information with the report users; however, banks with better profit ratio might not
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need to reclassify their assets. And if the investors consider the reclassification as a
sign of having many problematic assets, then banks might be reluctant to disclose
more information.
H3c: Banks with bigger size have a higher disclosure level.
H3d: Banks with higher leverage level have a higher disclosure level.
The model (includes all the mentioned variables) can be illustrated as follows:
DiscS = λ0+λ1OT+λ2OR+λ3RG+λ4TA+λ5LER+λ6CAR+λ7LLP/TA+λ8ROE+.
(5.2)
Where: DiscS is the dependent variable for the level of disclosure with regards
to reclassification and it indicates the disclosure score from the disclosure checking
list. Besides the variables of interests the rest of indicators are used for control
variables. OT represents business type for our bank samples. The banks identi-
fied are involved with either general financial services or a multi business including
investment banking, insurance and asset investments. OR is another scale factor
which denotes whether the bank entities are operating regional or European-wide
(European-wide also include banks that are operating globally). RG stands for the
regions which are Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe and Western
Europe. TA represents business sizes, and the values here are the total assets of
bank entities. LER and CAR stands for leverage ratio (Debt to equity ratio) and
capital adequacy ratio. LLP/TA is loan loss provision scaled by total assets. ROE
is return on equity.
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5.3.2 Data Collection
Banks that were of interest for this paper were entities that had a sufficient amount
of disclosed information, had geographical diversity, and were following IAS/IFRS.
Similarities between the countries were categorized to one of the four regions: North-
ern, Western, Eastern and Southern. Some bank policy literatures (Sinkey et al.,
2000; DeYoung et al., 2004; Carbo et al., 2007) target banks from one certain re-
gion where the political or financial systems have similarities. According to Mikko
(1996), the Nordic countries have similarities in their political systems and their well-
developed welfare system. Western Europe is characterized for its well-developed
banking environment whereas Eastern Europe for not having a sophisticated bank-
ing system. Eastern European financial market was neglected for quite long period
of time (Fink et al., 1998) and still has troubles as new state members to integrate
with to other EU economies (Mitra et al., 2009). Countries in Southern Europe
are included in the group code law and are characterized by an association between
financial and tax accounting (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Furthermore, the region
of where the bank entities had their main operation was considered. The primary
base of the sample size is the bank list of the Euro Banking Association (EBA),
which consists of 189 European banks. Due to data availability and other issues for
instance the sampled banks need to have information regarding the reclassification,
the banks need to follow IFRS and some banks’ annual reports were in their native
language, the final sample size was 53 banks (See the Appendix for the breakdowns),
and had about 13 banks from each regional group. The accounting results and the
financial disclosures were obtained manually from the banks’ 2008 annual reports
or taken from their consolidated group financial accounts. Most of the data are
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obtained from specific notes on reclassification in the annual reports.
5.4 Empirical finding and results
5.4.1 Descriptive findings
We had 53 banks in our sample, the entities that had applied the reclassification
amendment were 35 banks, and the remaining 18 banks did not choose the option to
reclassify. The research showed that the usage of the new reclassification amendment
was high in Western and Southern region. This is beneficial for entities that operate
on a market-wide scale as their financial assets portfolio will be subjected to various
financial risks. In regards to the bank entities in Northern and in particular Eastern
region, the application of the reclassification was low. They had been exposed to
a relatively small profit change, and an explanation could be that their financial
assets portfolios were less exposed to the inactive market.
Figure 5.3: Usage of the reclassification option
Banks operating European-wide all applied the reclassifcation option, and around
58% of regional banks applied. With regards to “operation type”, 71% of the banks
with multiple business used the reclassification option, while 68% of the banks with
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general business applied. It seems that the different operational types (e.g. general
business and multi business) have less influence on the choice of reclassifying financial
assets.
As stated in the new amendment, the non-derivative financial assets under held
for trading (fair value) can be reclassified into available for sale or held to maturity
when exposed to rare circumstances. As shown in Figure (5.4), 22% of the sample
size had reclassified its financial assets under “held for trading” to “available for
sale”, whereas 17 percent had reclassified its financial assets from “held for trading”
to “held to maturity”. The banks which transferred their financial assets out of
“available for sale” into “loans and receivables” were34% and 27% had reclassified
from “held for trading” to “loans and receivables”. The two last reclassification forms
could be achieved when available for sale and held for trading met the definition of
loans and receivables.
Figure 5.4: An overview of the four reclassification forms
Beside the categories transfers and the changes on accounting treatments (e.g.
relevant valuation approaches from fair value to amortized cost), the most significant
adjustments on the results of 2008 brought by the reclassification actions are avoided
profit losses or fair value losses, and the changes on revaluation reserves, which
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directly contribute to shareholder equity. When the financial assets under held for
trading are transferred, the avoided value losses affect the profits of entities directly,
and if the assets from available for sale are also involved, the shareholder’s equity
will receive either a positive or negative impact, mainly positive. The banks in the
sample that had applied the new amendment, 27 of them had their profits affected
and 23 banks had equity changes due to the reclassification.
Then the percentage change on the profit or equity resulted from the reclassifi-
cation are calculated (under the assumption that no tax effects and all the valuation
losses go into profit or equity account). The proportion changes made on the profits
due to the new reclassification were significant, and the previous differences with re-
gards to avoided valuation losses become less significant among different groups. 15
banks avoided fair value losses, more than 10% of their current profits, and in these
15 banks there were 3 banks over 50%, whereas 5 banks falling into the 30% to 50%
range. The size and region of banks did not undermine the effect of reclassification
on the profits. In Eastern group, the sample banks are small players with less profit;
however, one of the banks reduced losses by 34 percent of its current profit.
In the following figure, it clearly shows that the reclassification had more influ-
ential impacts on entities’ profit results than shareholder equity since the values of
“profit change” are moving further away from the x-axis than the values of “equity
change”.
As mentioned in the previous sections, the positive effects on equity will be
compromised by valuation losses when the financial assets were reclassified into
available for sale. Since the strategy is to reclassify the assets that exposed to
problematic market, stabilizing the operation results and avoiding further losses
are the main purposes of reclassification. Many bank entities seem to enjoy the
138
Figure 5.5: The comparison of percentage changes on profit and equity
obvious change on profit result. The fair value changes through profit account
play an important part of operating results. On the other hand, the unrealized
fair value gains or losses take up relatively small percentage of shareholder equity.
Moreover, the revaluation reserves, under the category of supplementary capital in
most circumstances, do not reflect ordinary business results. The effects on equity
are also limited because revaluation reserves usually are not able to be used by
the entities for leverage purposes. Nevertheless, the positive effects on revaluation
reserves help the banks with their capital status.
5.4.2 Empirical results
Descriptive statistics
Overall, all banks from Western region and all bank entities operating European-
wide applied the new amendment. The following section regarding the descrip-
tive statistics will focus on the financial variables and their differences between the
sample groups that applied the amendment and the group that did not apply the
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amendment.
Table 5.1: Summary table for descriptive statistics of financial variable
mean min max sd
Sample group that applied
the new amendment (N=35)
D/E ratio 29.775 6.000 131.000 25.11
ROE −5.61% −216% −25.9% 0.43
Capital ratio 11.70% 4.48% 17.70% 0.03
LLP to TA 0.50% 0.00% 1.80% 0.00
Log TA 5.159 2.335 6.343 0.918
Sample group that did not apply
the new amendment (N=18)
D/E ratio 16.713 7.000 29.100 7.60
ROE 12.34% 0.67% 24.40% 0.08
Capital ratio 12.24% 9.81% 22.30% 0.03
LLP to TA 0.65% −0.03% 2.52% 0.01
Log TA 4.356 2.499 5.735 0.97
As shown in Table (5.1), the sample group which applied the new amendment had
a high D/E ratio that was higher than the average, as well as a large amount of total
assets that was higher than the sample banks that did not apply the amendment.
With regards to the ROE ratio, it was clear that the second sample group showed
a stronger profitability as it was higher than the average. As Mann-Whitney U test
shown in the Appendix, there were certain differences on the variables such as D/E,
ROE and Log TA (logarithmic form of total assets) for the two sample groups. We
saw no difference on the other two financial ratios: capital ratio and LLP to TA.
Logit regression results
Noticeably, in the whole sample group the Log TA has a relatively high association
with D/E ratio which indicates that larger banks tend to apply more aggressive
leverage policy. In regards to a financial turmoil as the current situation, this could
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cause some serious liquidity issues that would be reflected as losses in the financial
reports. Moreover, these two variables are applied in different variable sets.
So in order to obtain the relationship of the non-financial variables and the
dependent variable, as well as the differences between the two sample groups, the
Chi-square tests were also performed (see the Appendix). The results of the Chi-
square tests illustrate that there are certain differences in the frequency of region
(significant at the 0.01 level) and the operation region (significant at the 0.05 level)
across the two groups, however not with the operation type. Based on the results
of the Chi-square tests, the bank entities from more developed regions, Western
and Northern and banks operating EU-wide were more likely to reclassify their
financial assets. The operation type does not affect the reclassification event, which
means that the banks involved with high-risk business are not necessarily in favor of
applying the option to reclassify their financial assets. Because the logit regression
results are not significant, the hypothesis H (1a) is partially confirmed. And there is
no evidence to support the prediction of H (1b), and it is possible that the dummy
variable of “operation type” does not capture the difference of banking business
type.
According to the results in the table (5.2), the ROE ratio was significant in
model 1, and all the coefficients of ROE were also negative. Thus, it indicated
that the banks that did not apply the option were characterized by a higher ROE
compared to the banks that had applied the reclassification. So the reclassification
prevents further valuation losses and this helps with the profitability performance
of bank entities. The future practice of this amendment might be an incentive
for the management to avoid poor profit performance, and could potentially be a
problem. The variable Log TA is found significant to model 1 and 2 with a positive
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Table 5.2: The logistic regression results
R Model1 Model2
Region -17.264
(0.301)
OR -17.038
(0.998)
OT -2.109 ∗∗
(0.070)
D/E ratio 0.043 0.025
(0.321) (0.383)
ROE -6.911∗ -3.891
(0.100) (0.510)
Capital ratio 21.975 42.850
(0.184) (0.201)
LLP to TA 32.930 -7.445
(0.636) (0.926)
Log TA 1.172 ∗∗ 1.273∗
(0.026) (0.044)
Prediction percentage 74% 84%
Pseudo R2 0.1363 0.2466
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
R is the dummy variable for the event of reclassification. Region stands for the
dummy for developed regions. OR is a dummy factor which denotes whether
the bank entities are operating regional (as 0) or European-wide (as 1). OT
represents business type for our bank samples: denote as 0 when traditional
financial services; denote as 1 when include investment banking and insurance.
LogTA represents the logarithmic form of total assets. LLP to TA is Loan Loss
Provisions/Total Assets. ROE is return on equity. Model 1 includes only the
financial variables; Model 2 includes all variables.
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coefficient. It was a contrast to ROE, as the banks that had applied the amendment
had exhibited a larger bank size. An argument that could be made is that the larger
banks prefer to apply the reclassification option, as the banks with larger monetary
size are more likely to have more problematic financial assets that need to be dealt
with. Then these findings support the prediction of both hypothesis H (2a) and H
(2b).
The variable D/E ratio did not exhibit any significant results in the table above.
In a nutshell, the D/E ratio is not really relevant. Indeed, the reclassification of
certain financial assets may help entities with their leverage by preventing valuation
losses through equity. But the effects on shareholder equity are somehow limited as
seen in the Figure (5.5).
The results regarding capital ratio and LLP to TA are insignificant, when paying
attention to the model results and individual test. The two variables contributed
less in the regression model, and had the least relevance over the dependent vari-
able. This also matched the results from Mann-Whitney U test. So the hypothesis
H2c is not confirmed. The reasons that the capital ratio did not differ from the
two groups, and was less affected by the reclassification could be that the Basel II
regulation around that time allowed bank entities to raise more obligatory capital
which would increase the capital ratio. Subsequently the effects brought by the new
amendment might possibly be hidden. The effects could be possibly insignificant,
for example two sample banks had even disclosed information that the application
of reclassification did not affect their capital adequacy ratio. Secondly, LLP to TA
is not significantly different between the two groups. Although a large amount of
financial assets were reclassified into loans and receivables, the entities intend to
hold these assets for certain time period and the default possibility would not rise
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as the assets were just reclassified. However, the future situation might be a lot
different when the default possibility increases. A higher loan loss provision might
occur in the entities that reclassified a large amount of its financial assets to loans.
Evaluation on the disclosure of reclassification
In this section, the results on the disclosure evaluation are demonstrated and followed
by the regression results. As shown in table (5.3), the average score of 35 banks was
6.12. As the average score was little over 6, which was the score after meeting all six
required items3, however there are 15 out of 35 banks were not fully complied with
the disclosure requirements set out by IFRS 7.12A. Some banks made additional
efforts to disclose more relevant information. From the extra items they disclosed,
we can see that the banks with higher disclosure score tried to reveal more details
about the reclassification and the reclassified assets, which gives the various user
groups a better idea about how the reclassification actions were affecting the entities.
The transfers of financial assets out of fair accounting valuation to amortized cost
were mostly belong to the level 2 or 3 of the fair accounting hierarchy. However, only
10 sample banks clearly stated the detailed information regarding what valuation
the assets were applied with before the reclassification.
From the regional groups, we could see that Western group had a higher average
disclosure score on information of the reclassification. The average point of Northern
group is slightly higher than the total average score. The average disclosure scores
3 The extra information mentioned in this part are the same as the extra items used in the
completed evaluation table. They are: 1. The break-down information about reclassification
in different business segment; 2. The break-down information about reclassification on different
financial products, for instance, US market portfolios; 3. The effects of reclassification on some
other issue besides profit/loss, equity, for example, the effects on credit risk or capital ratio; 4.
Detailed explanation on why they had reclassified into these particular type of financial assets.
This extra type of information covers all the extra items we found in the researched banks annual
reports.
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Table 5.3: Summary of disclosure scores
Group Number of banks Average score Max score Min score
Total sample 35 6.12 9 4.5
Northern EU 6 6.5 7 6
Southern EU 10 5.45 7 5
Eastern EU 4 5 5.5 4.5
Western EU 14 6.71 9 5.5
Region-wide 20 5.84 7 4.5
EU-wide 15 6.49 9 6
of Southern and Eastern are all below the average level of the entire sample group.
Eastern group performed the worst in all four regional groups. However the results
would not establish a solid generality that the banks in this group could not meet
the disclosure requirements in the new amendment. Nevertheless, it was evident
that the bank samples from Western Europe performed more professionally and
disclosed extra information related to reclassification activities in addition to the six
basic requirements.
With regards to the group of “European-wide” or “Regional-wide”, the average
scores of disclosure were quite different: European-wide banks had higher average
score of 6.49 and the average of Regional-wide group were lower than the average
score. The reason could be that the European-wide banks are more sophisticated
with their disclosure techniques and have more professionals to analyze their relevant
problems.
For the specific disclosed items, the most problematic item was item F, which
requires the disclosure on “effective interest rate” and “expected cash flow” from
recovery of financial assets. We believe that many banks did not pay attention
to this matter, due to the effective interest rates varying from entity to entity,
and are usually applied internally. Secondly, the figures of expected cash flows are
more objective than fair value or carrying amount of relevant assets. If the entities
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overestimate their figure, it would not have substantial effects on either entities or
the report users. Thirdly, some of the expected cash flows on certain assets might
be difficult to obtain since there is no active trading market and few reliable inputs
can be applied. As a result some entities may follow the approach that miss this
information than report it unreliably. One of purposes of the disclosure requirement
introduced by the new amendment was to maintain the comparability between the
information regarding the reclassification released by the financial reports of different
entities. When the entities disclosed the relevant information of effects on profit or
equity, it raises the question whether the information of effects on other issues such
as risk estimations or financial indicators should become part of the regulatory
requirements. And we believe that the extra items some entities disclosed can be
taken into consideration or references to develop upon.
Then the results from table (5.4) show the relation of disclosure level and bank
characteristic:
From the two sets of regressions with financial variables (Model 1.1 and 1.2),
apparently among all the financial indicators, the total asset of bank (Log TA) has
the strongest contribution in both regression models. This approves the prediction
of H (3c). Then it is followed by the positive contribution from D/E ratio and capital
ratio (both at the significant level of 10%.). So these two variables might have certain
but not strong relationship with the disclosure score on reclassification. H (3d) is not
confirmed. Possible explanation could be in our case the general demands on more
information from creditors agreed by many previous studies might be weaken by the
fact that financial institutions such as banks usually have higher D/E ratios than
other sectors and large proportion of their creditors are individual customers who do
not have powerful influence. ROE and LLP to TA both have negative contribution
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Table 5.4: The results of regression models (dependent variable: disclosure score)
Model1.1 Model1.2 Model2
Region 0.188
(0.961)
OR 0.122
(0.590)
OT -0.163
(-0.842)
D/E ratio 0.245∗ 0.166
(1.602) (1.001)
ROE -0.200
(-1.280) (0.510)
Capital ratio 0.249∗ 0.247∗ 0.146
(1.563) (1.476) (0.776)
LLP to TA -0.202 -0.200 -0.162
(-1.263) (-1.225) (-0.913)
Log TA 0.578 ∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗
(3.533) (3.947) (2.031)
Obs 35 35 35
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.473 0.474
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%.
The dependent variable is the level of disclosure with regards to reclassification
and it indicates the disclosure score from the disclosure checking list. Region
stands for the dummy for developed regions. OR is a dummy factor which
denotes whether the bank entities are operating regional (as 0) or European-
wide (as 1). OT represents business type for our bank samples: denote as
0 when traditional financial services; denote as 1 when include investment
banking and insurance. LogTA represents the logarithmic form of total assets.
LLP to TA is Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets. ROE is return on equity.
Model 1 includes only the financial variables; Model 2 includes all variables.
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and statistical insignificance.
If we compare our results with some previous papers that focus on financial
instrument disclosure, the results with entity size are consistent with the previous
study of Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). They conclude positive relationship between
size and disclosure level. The positive result of operation region is also similar
with Cuijpers and Buijink’s study, as they found more internationalized companies
have better disclosure level. But some other studies did not come across the same
conclusion. Our finding of limited positive influence from D/E ratio is not consistent
with some previous studies (Abd-Elsalam andWeetman, 2003; Lopes and Rodrigues,
2008).
Robustness check
Several robustness tests were performed to assess whether our basic findings change
when other variables are used or added. First of all, region variable represents the
similarity of the underlying social and financial system. And one might argue that
the differences of law system might also play a role. So we use the variable “Law”
(1=code law; 0=common law) in the logit regression but it doesn’t show any sig-
nificance. The reason could be the fact that many European countries are code-law
countries. Secondly, we also include the amount of total financial assets the sam-
pled bank has as control for the incentive that banks with more financial assets tend
to apply this option. However, this relation is not significant and the explanation
could be that it is more decision-relevant when the amount of problematic assets is
high not the total amount. Thirdly, we tested whether the reclassified amount of
financial assets is associated with the disclosure level. When the reclassified amount
is scaled by the total assets, it is not correlated with the disclosure score. And
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the profit change caused by the reclassification is also not relevant to the disclosure
level, which suggests that the entities affected by the reclassification significantly
did not disclose more relevant information than the entities that were less exposed
to the new amendment. Lastly, as suggested by the disclosure literature (Becker et
al. 1998), the auditor type might affect the voluntary disclosure level. So we include
an extra variable “auditor” (1=big four, 0=otherwise) in the disclosure regression
and it doesn’t affect the results and the variable itself doesn’t have significance.
This could be that most of sampled banks were audited by the big four and as the
amendments are first-time application the auditors were also uncertain about how
much information should be included.4
5.5 Conclusion
In this study, the first application of the new amendment (to IAS 39 and IFRS 7)
provided a great opportunity to learn about the impacts brought by the reclassi-
fication of financial assets and how this practice was associated with the different
characteristics of bank entities. As the banking industry has changed dramatically
and the application of such option requires closer monitoring, the IASB has been
making some continuing regulatory modifications (e.g. introduction of IFRS 9). Fac-
ing the option to reclassify certain financial assets, banks showed different strategies
to deal with the problematic assets. Generally, banks with different characteristics
handled the option to apply the new amendment, the practice and the disclosure of
the reclassification differently. In our sample group, 35 entities out of the total 53
applied the amendment. From regional perspective, the banks samples from West-
4 KPMG(2008) report
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ern region were more in favor of this option than the entities from Northern and
Eastern Europe. After the reclassifications were applied, the profit or shareholder
equity of the bank entities could be affected positively by avoiding future valuation
losses. In our study, more banks took advantage of the positive effects on profits.
The positive effects on shareholder equity are not significant as expected. The rea-
sons could be that the unrealized fair value gains or losses usually take up relatively
small percentage of shareholder equity.
The relationships of the reclassification and selected characteristics of bank en-
tities were studied by taking the sample group that did not apply the amendment
as a comparison. The results of the logistic regression and other statistical analysis
show that the banks that did not apply the option were characterized by a higher
ROE compared to the banks that had applied the reclassification. So the banks with
lower ROE are more likely to apply the amendment. In contrast to ROE, the bank
size exhibited positive prediction sign which means that the larger bank entities
prefer to apply the option. It could be explained by the fact that the larger entities
possessed more problematic financial assets to deal with. Moreover, the results also
show that the D/E ratio was relevant, but not heavily associated. With regards
to the non-financial characteristics, region was the most significant factor and the
operation type did not affect the decision of entities to apply the reclassification.
The disclosures on the reclassification practice were evaluated by the un-weighted
checking list. As the reclassification was applied for the first time, there were some
inconsistencies among sample entities, especially the disclosure about the “expected
cash flow” and the “extra items”. The regression analysis was performed to examine
the relationship between evaluation results on disclosure and bank characteristics.
The bank size and region are significantly associated with the disclosure level but
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not the operation type.
Indeed, there are some caveats concerning our study, firstly we applied a limited
hand-collected sample and the generality of the results are limited. Nevertheless,
our sample banks contain more banks from Eastern Europe compared to similar
studies. And we believe that our study provides some valuable points and results
for future studies. Some of the studies conducted in this paper can be a starting
point for some future topics. For instance, based on our studies, the studies on the
relationship between reclassification and impairment of financial assets would be a
valuable contribution to this particular area. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
see how different types of financial assets react to the reclassification; especially the
problematic ones (e.g. embedded derivatives). Secondly, the factors related to the
reclassification of financial assets we focus on are the banks’ geographic, operation
characteristics and some relevant financial indicators. The more detailed banking
regulation environment and financial market incentives are not included and these
might also be the drivers for the managers’ decisions.
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5.6 Appendix
Table 5.5: Table for the sample country breakdowns
Region Country Obs Appy Didn’t apply
Western Europe Austria 2 1 1
Belgium 1 1 0
France 2 2 0
Germany 5 4 1
Netherlands 2 2 0
United Kingdom 3 3 0
Eastern Europe Czech Republic 2 0 2
Hungary 2 1 1
Latvia 2 2 0
Lithunia 1 1 0
Poland 4 0 4
Southern Europe Greece 5 5 0
Italy 4 3 1
Spain 2 1 1
Portugal 3 2 1
Northern Europe Denmark 4 3 1
Finland 2 0 2
Iceland 1 0 1
Norway 2 1 1
Sweden 4 3 1
Total 53 35 18
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Table 5.6: Non-parametric tests for financial variables
D/E ratio∗∗ ROE∗∗ Capital ratio LLP to TA Log TA∗∗∗
Mann-Whitney U 167.500 163.000 240.000 248.000 133.000
Wilcoxon W 287.500 793.000 870.000 878.000 253.000
Z -2.011 -2.107 -0.476 -0.307 -2.742
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.044 0.035 0.634 0.759 0.006
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Table 5.7: Chi-square test for non-financial variables
Region Operation region Operation type
Pearson Chi-square 13.297∗∗∗ 8.333∗∗ 0.036
(0.004) (0.050) (0.849)
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation, the four chapters mainly address different issues regarding the
impact of regulation in a competitive market and how market participants react
strategically in such market. The main findings highlight certain regulation or reg-
ulated disclosure would affect market participants differently, often depending on
their own attributes and the competitive nature of the market.
In Chapter 2, I investigate the effect of conservative reporting on the output and
profits of competing firms in a product market. The results show that if only the
existing competition was considered, the incumbent firm would obtain higher output
outcome if the rival firm was imposed with a less conservative reporting system. And
with respect to the expected profit under duopoly case for each incumbent firm, there
exists an optimal level of conservative bias that might maximize the expected profit,
but it was subject to the informativeness of the accounting report. The finding also
suggest that accounting distortion introduced in such accounting system decreases
the expected profits of existing competitors. To avoid anti-trust investigation, such
distortion might not be worse off for the incumbent firms. More importantly, firms
153
154
may use conservative reporting as a credible commitment device in a product market
competition setting.
In Chapter 3, the demand estimation approach was employed to investigate the
effect of mandatory joint audit reform on audit market structure in UK. Based on
the observations in French market, we measure the firms’ perceptions of the services
provided by the Big Four, the medium and small auditors, and examine how different
firms choose different pairs of auditors. Then given the preferences of individual
auditors and pair choices derived from French market, we simulated how listed firms
in UK respond to such policy change and the potential evolution of market structure.
There are three major findings of the demand estimation approach. Firstly, the
public listed firms in both countries have heterogenous preference for the big four
auditors. For example, the bigger firms prefer the combination of having two big
four auditors as a pair. Secondly, market leader auditor would experience substantial
rise in the share of number of clients as well as a fair increase in the share of clients’
assets. The second auditor would enjoy a small growth in the both market share
measures. And the small auditors would benefit very marginally from the joint audit
by expanding their market shares by a very tiny percentage. Thirdly, that joint
audit would increase clients’ consumer surplus to some extent due to the positive
pair effect, but this pair benefit is not high enough compensate the welfare loss from
being forced to choose another auditor. This implies that the net welfare effect is
somewhat limited.
In Chapter 4, I empirically investigate how client mergers and acquisitions af-
fected the audit fee pricing and the auditors’ behavior to issue audit opinion in the
UK market. The results showed that audit firms charged less audit fees after more
clients merged and acquisition transactions happened. And such fee reducing effect
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would appear even before the actual merger transaction took place. In contrast,
auditors are more likely to issue qualified opinion for the clients in the industry with
more M&A activities.
In Chapter 5, the relationships of the reclassification and selected characteristics
of bank entities were studied by taking the sample group that did not apply the
amendment as a comparison. The results of the logistic regression and other statis-
tical analysis show that the banks that did not apply the option were characterized
by a higher ROE compared to the banks that had applied the reclassification. So
the banks with lower ROE were more likely to apply the amendment. In contrast to
ROE, the bank size exhibited positive prediction sign which means that the larger
bank entities prefer to apply the option.
Every research study has its own limitations, which, however, could be the
threads for potential future research. In the following, I will list some limitations
and possible future research.
In Chapter 2, there are three improvements could be considered for future re-
search. First, other disclosed information except cost and other influencing factors
such as debt contracting could be included in the model to test whether the present
results will hold. Second, social welfare analysis could also provide more policy im-
plications. Finally, multiple periods of reporting could be included in the analysis
to investigate firms’ completive position. In Chapter 3, we could extend the model
with strategic price responses from auditors in the policy simulation and the com-
parison of audit fee changes. The framework we used in Chapter 3 could be applied
to other policy issues in the audit market. Chapter 4 is a preliminary step to better
understand how auditors react to exogenous changes of auditor-client relationship.
And I think it is an interesting setting to further explore how auditors compete with
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each other in a rather dynamic fashion. To sum up, I think further research are
needed for the role of accounting or regulation in different competition settings and
we can also pay more attention to certain market which is both highly regulated
and politically oriented.
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